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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Egypt seems to be on the brink of a new era in water management.  The Ministry of 
Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) has recognized the need for a different 
operational mode that is “water conservation oriented, decentralized, environmentally 
sensitive, private sector oriented, equitable and operationally efficient” (MWRI, 2001).  
Four approaches to positive change have been identified:  
 
· expanded use of economic instruments: creating incentives and disincentives for 
water management to protect its quality and allocate and use it more efficiently. 
· public-private partnerships: institutionalizing the role of water user associations, 
expanding private participation in environmental protection, and identifying 
mechanisms to ensure appropriate benefits for participating private sector 
partners. 
· institutional adjustment: decentralizing decision making, institutionalizing 
environmental protection at MWRI, restructuring organizational structures to 
better reflect the changed role of MWRI, improving personnel policies and 
procedures, building capacity, and defining a more central role for MWRI in 
macro-level decision making regarding uses of the Nile River. 
· public awareness and stakeholder participation: encouraging active stakeholder 
participation at all stages of policy formulation, implementation and assessment, 
and improving awareness of water resources and associated environmental issues 
in the public at large and in MWRI itself. 
 
In response to the first of these four steps, it was decided that a broad-based review 
would be undertaken of the potential applicability of economic incentives to improved 
water resources management.  The focus of this resulting study was on market-based 
instruments (MBI’s) as complements to traditional command and control measures for 
managing water quantity and quality.   
Prior to evaluating potential water MBIs, it was felt necessary to identify the water 
management problems that need to be addressed through policy adjustments.  Key water 
management challenges noted are listed below: 
 
Water Management Challenges Identified 
Water Quantity Water Quality  
Threat of water shortages By Location: 
Service delivery in municipal water supply  Lake Nasser pollution 
Irrigation service delivery challenges Nile River pollution above Cairo 
Insufficient irrigation system upkeep Water pollution in the Nile Delta 
High on-farm water use Pollution of lakes 
Low user contribution to irrigation system upkeep Groundwater contamination 
Weak attention to in-stream flows By Impact: 
Nonrenewable groundwater management  Adverse effects on human health 
Subsidies affecting water use efficiency Reduced agricultural productivity 
Rainfall capture and flash flood protection Threats to aquatic ecosystems 
Negative consequences of rising water tables Negative impacts on aesthetics (incl. tourism)  
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Screening Process 
 
A two-step screening process was developed and utilized to evaluate the likely success of 
alternative market-based instruments in response to one or more of water management 
challenges.  The instruments were screened on the basis of economic efficiency and 
equity and other economic factors relating to the nature of the instrument itself (see 
below).  They also were evaluated on the basis of criteria that considered the specific 
social, cultural, political and institutional context in which the instrument will be applied.  
The criteria are given below in summary: 
 
Criteria Intrinsic to the Instrument  Contextual Criteria 
 
Economic efficiency or cost-saving potential   Political acceptability 
Environmental or resource management effectiveness   Social and cultural acceptability 
Distributive/equity effects      Geography and existing infrastructure 
Revenue raising potential     Legal framework 
Institutional capacity      Administrative ease of implementation 
Technological change and innovation    Experience from other nations 
 
 
The screening process resulted in a preliminary list of economic instruments that then 
were presented at a concluding workshop for additional scrutiny.  These were classified, 
respectively, as those primarily aimed at improving water quantity versus quality 
management.    
 
Instruments with a Primary Goal of Improved Water Quantity Management: 
 
Area-based Irrigation Charges for Smallholder Agriculture. Water service charges 
could be assessed on individual farms using the existing agricultural land tax or charges 
based on irrigated feddans.  This would raise revenues that could be used to improve the 
delivery system and also might be structured to encourage water conservation. 
 
Priority Water Delivery for Smallholder Agriculture.  Water user associations (WUAs) 
formed at the branch canal or district level, could pay a fee for guaranteed supply of 
irrigation water akin to an insurance policy.  This would encourage greater cost sharing 
by farmers and introduce limited conservation incentives. 
 
Creating a Market for Irrigation Improvement and Management Transfer Programs. 
Areas such as mesqas within branch canals where WUAs have been established would be 
selected for further irrigation system upgrades on the basis of their willingness to accept 
faster and less subsidized repayment terms.  This would allow the IIP, DIP and IMT 
programs to be extended more quickly to other areas, including those in greatest need of 
poverty alleviation.   
 
Volumetric Charges Outside Toshka. Water delivery charges to large farmers or 
investors could be based on the quantity of water supplied, similar to contracts being 
written in Toshka.  This would increase cost sharing between the government and these 
APRP Water Policy Program                                                      Economic Incentives for Water Management ES-3 
 
farms for operation and maintenance as well as system improvements and provide 
incentives for more efficient use of water. 
 
Tradable Groundwater Extraction Rights.  Transferable rights for groundwater in the 
Western Desert could be used to create incentives for this water’s allocation to the 
highest valued uses and for self-monitoring of groundwater pumping. The deep 
groundwater for the Nubian Aquifer is largely a non-renewable resource, and this could 
provide a means for the transition from continuous free-flowing wells to controlled 
pumping to the end of the wells’ economic life.   
 
Increased Tariffs for Urban and Industrial Water Service. Urban water rates would be 
increased  to fund system O&M, rehabilitation and expansion in order to improve service 
and reduce leakage.  Other objectives in tariff design would be to favor the poor and to 
ensure that basics needs are met.  Industrial users with flat (unmetered) or low tariffs 
would be assessed a higher rate. 
   
Groundwater Extraction Charges. Industries that pump groundwater could be assessed 
an extraction charge.  With respect to Western Desert groundwater, extraction charges for 
irrigators and others would encourage conservation and prolong the economic pumping 
of the aquifer as well as raise revenue for system O&M.  Extraction charges are an 
alternative to area-based charges or tradable extraction rights.  
 
Subsidy for Imported Water Meters. Tariffs on imported water meters could be lowered 
or eliminated to bring higher quality meters into the marketplace.  Their use would 
improve the basis for accurate accounting of water service charges. 
 
Subsidized water conserving equipment   Tariffs on water conserving technologies in 
urban and agricultural uses could be reduced to encourage their adoption.   
 
Reduced Subsidy on Fuel. A gradual reduction in the subsidy on fuel, whose price is 
about half the world price, would increase the cost of pumping water for irrigation and 
encourage greater water use efficiency.   
 
Instruments with the Primary Goal of Improved Water Quality Management: 
 
Increased User Fees for Wastewater Treatment. Cost-sharing from users could be 
increased to enhance the ability of government entities to fund system rehabilitation and 
expansion to achieve improved service and reduced water pollution.   
 
Subsidized Wastewater Treatment Facilities.  Construction of wastewater treatment 
facilities would continue to be subsidized by the government with the primary objective 
of further expanding the collection and treatment of wastewater.  
 
Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment.  Water pollution control equipment could be 
subsidized by reduced tariff rates or price subsidy to encourage greater pollution 
abatement. 
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Increased Industrial Discharge Fees.  Fees for industrial discharges could be increased 
to raise revenues and to encourage firms to reduce pollution.  
 
Tradable Effluent Discharge Permits.  Maximum discharges could be established for 
various types of discharges and tradable permits allocated among dischargers to lower 
compliance costs for achieving specified goals.  
 
Voluntary Agreements for Environmental Improvements. Various options exist for the 
introduction of voluntary agreements between the Government and individual enterprises, 
municipalities, industry associations, community groups and other entities to encourage 
them to reduce their polluting behavior to below levels required by current law.   
 
Subsidized Rural Sanitation. Technical assistance and possibly subsidized sanitation 
technologies could be provided to rural communities to encourage small-scale 
environmentally acceptable ways of disposing of household sewage in areas that are 
unlikely to be served by sewage treatment plants.   
 
Environmental Damage Charges and Fines. Charges and fines could be assessed in 
relation to the amount of environmental damage caused with the objective of 
internalizing these costs and thereby positively affecting behavior. 
 
Environmental Performance Bonds. Natural resource damage liability could be legally 
formalized for harm to national waters (surface and groundwater) to internalize these 
costs and positively affect environmental management behavior.  
 
Public Environmental Information Disclosure. Greater disclosure of environmental 
information could be required—including data from EIAs and water monitoring efforts—
to reduce uncertainty regarding releases of pollution and to empower agents in the labor, 
capital and product markets so that they may indirectly affect corporate decisions 
regarding the release of water pollution.  
 
 
Most Promising Instruments  
 
This study explored the applicability of economic instruments to help address Egypt’s 
current water management challenges. It resulted in an initial evaluation of twenty 
instruments that seemed most promising.  Screening criteria were developed and applied 
to assess the merits of each, and direction also was received from nearly 60 participants 
who attended the study’s concluding Workshop on Economic Incentives for Water 
Resources Management. 
 
The results of this evaluation are summarized in the table on the following page, which 
gives the overall assessment of each instrument as well as the major water management 
challenges it may help to address.   
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Summary Evaluation of Economic Instruments for Water Resources Management 
Economic Instruments 
Considered 
Evaluation of the 
Instrument 
 
Water Quantity 
 
Principal Problems 
Addressed by the 
Instrument 
Warrants 
study & 
action 
Deserves 
further 
study 
Not 
presently 
applicable 
Area-based Irrigation Charges for 
Smallholder Agriculture 
Irrigation service delivery 
Low farmer payment for upkeep  
 
X  
Priority Water Delivery for Smallholder 
Agriculture 
Threat of water shortages 
Irrigation service delivery   
 
X 
Create Market for Irrigation Improvement 
and Management Transfer Programs 
Irrigation service delivery 
High on-farm water use  
 
X  
Volumetric Charges Aside from Toshka Threat of water shortages 
Irrigation service delivery  
 
X  
Transferable Groundwater Extraction 
Rights 
Non-renewable groundwater use 
Subsidies affecting efficient use  
 
X  
Groundwater Extraction Charges Non-renewable groundwater use 
Subsidies affecting efficient use 
 
X   
Increased Urban and Industrial Water 
Service Tariffs 
Service delivery in water supply 
Subsidies affecting efficient use  
 
X  
Subsidized Urban Water Meters Threat of water shortages 
Service delivery in water supply 
 
X   
Subsidized Water-Conserving Equipment High on-farm water use 
Rising water tables 
 
X   
Reduced Subsidy on Fuel High on-farm water use 
Subsidies affecting efficient use   
 
X 
Water Quality     
Increased User Fees for Wastewater 
Treatment 
Pollution of river, canals and 
aquatic systems of  Nile Delta 
 
X   
Increased Subsidies for Wastewater 
Treatment Facilities 
Pollution of river, canals and 
aquatic systems of  Nile Delta 
 
X   
Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment Pollution of river, canals and 
aquatic systems of  Nile Delta 
 
X   
Increased Industrial Discharge Fees Adverse impacts of industrial 
pollution throughout country  
 
X  
Tradable Effluent Discharge Permits Adverse impacts of industrial 
pollution throughout country   
 
X 
Voluntary Agreements for Environmental 
Improvements 
Potentially address wide range 
of water quality problems 
 
X   
Subsidized Rural Sanitation Rural surface and groundwater 
pollution plus offsite impacts 
 
X   
Environmental Damage Charges and Fines Potentially address wide range 
of water quality problems  
 
X  
Environmental Performance Bonds Potentially address wide range 
of water quality problems  
 
X  
Public Environmental Information 
Disclosure 
Potentially address wide range 
of water quality problems X   
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Those water quantity management measures deemed of highest priority for follow-up 
analysis and possible policy action were: 
 
Groundwater Extraction Charges –More immediately promising than area-based 
charges for surface irrigation water service or tradable extraction rights for groundwater, 
groundwater extraction charges were judged as holding potential to help create incentives 
for water conservation by both industries as well as farmers and also to raise revenues.  It 
was noted at the workshop that new regulations are already in development to introduce 
extraction charges as tools for groundwater management in the Western Desert. 
 
Tariff Reductions for Imported Water Meters and Water Conserving Equipment – The 
reduction of protective import tariffs on both water meters and water-conserving 
equipment was identified as meriting careful further analysis and possible policy action. 
 
Other Measures Deserving Further Analysis – Though not chosen as the most 
immediately attractive instruments, several other measures were identified as warranting 
careful further analysis.  These include: area-based irrigation service charges; volumetric 
water delivery charges for large agricultural enterprises; and increased user fees for the 
supply of urban and industrial water services. 
 
Likewise, the most promising policy measures identified to address water quality 
problems were: 
 
Increased User Fees for Wastewater Treatment – In response to an unquestionable need 
for better handling of organic wastes from both urban and rural settlements coupled with 
chronic revenue shortages for such investments, further increases in wastewater user fees 
were recommended for strong consideration.   
 
Increased Subsidies to Finance Wastewater Treatment Facilities – As a potential 
corollary to enhanced revenues from higher service fees (and possible partial 
privatization), consideration of increased government subsidies for wastewater treatment 
system development—common in many countries—also was deemed to merit careful 
further analysis.   
 
Subsidized Rural Sanitation –Groundwater contamination has been observed from 
leaking septic fields and the dumping of waste from rural cesspits into canals.  It was 
considered timely for the government to explore provision of technical assistance and 
possibly subsidized sanitation technologies to rural communities to encourage small-scale 
environmentally acceptable ways of disposing of household sewage in areas unlikely to 
be served by sewage treatment plants.   
 
Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment – Analogous to the subsidization of water-
saving technologies, it was noted that the reduction of tariffs on the import of pollution 
control equipment could create incentives for increased pollution abatement and higher 
quality domestic production of environmental technologies.  
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Voluntary Agreements for Environmental Improvements – Various voluntary 
agreement options—such as enhanced self-monitoring of effluent discharges by 
industry—hold promise for introducing positive new relationships between the 
Government and individual enterprises, municipalities, industry associations, community 
groups and/or other entities to encourage less polluting behavior.   
 
Public Environmental Information Disclosure – Greater disclosure of environmental 
information—perhaps starting with public dissemination of data from environmental 
impact assessments and ambient environmental quality data collected by various 
agencies—can be used to hold those damaging the environment more accountable to the 
public and their financiers.  
 
General Lessons Learned 
 
It is noteworthy that none of the twenty instruments examined were completely rejected 
by either the screening process applied or the majority of participants at the concluding 
workshop.  While serious reservations were raised about the political feasibility of several 
measures, only three out of the twenty were tagged as not currently applicable.  This 
shows a fairly wide acceptance—at least among government water management 
officials—of the usefulness of this type of policy tool.  This result should not be too 
surprising, given that Egypt has in recent years been gaining increasing experience with a 
range of MBIs applied to environmental and natural resources management challenges. It 
also bodes well for the further development of such approaches. 
 
The participants who reviewed the twenty potential policy measures clearly were more 
comfortable with applying MBIs to water quality as opposed to water quantity 
challenges.  While there is no definitive means for determining the reasons for such a 
preference, there are at least two plausible explanations.  First, interviews during the 
study and discussions at the workshop made it plain that water pollution is widely 
recognized as a serious and growing problem facing the country.  Water management 
professionals, therefore, are eager to find new ways to address this burgeoning challenge.  
Second, most of the water professionals attending the workshop were water quantity as 
opposed to water quality experts.  This largely mirrors the degree to which these topics 
are covered within MWRI, but it may well be that water quantity professionals felt easier 
about recommending that MBIs be applied outside of their immediate areas of 
responsibility. Moreover, water quality problems increasingly affect the quantity of water 
that is available because of extensive reuse of irrigation water. 
 
Recommended Next Steps 
 
This study was initiated because there was insufficient knowledge of the range of market-
based incentives potentially applicable to addressing water management challenges in 
Egypt relative to other policy measures.  Hopefully this report and the associated 
dissemination efforts—including the workshop held to receive feedback on preliminary 
findings—have helped to fill this perceived gap.  The wide sweep of topics addressed by 
the study and short timeframe meant that the analysis was done in only an introductory 
manner, and this inevitably resulted in the study raising as many questions as it answered.   
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A certain degree of momentum now has been created at MWRI with respect to 
knowledge of and openness to the use of MBIs, and this should be maintained.  At least 
three areas for follow-up work in a next phase of work on this subject seem advisable. 
 
Integrating MBIs with other policy measures. The first priority should be to further 
refine the problem analysis presented in this report and to begin the process of blending 
this new understanding of MBIs into the mix of policy options available to the 
government to address its highest priorities for water resources management. It may well 
be that the best choices for policy responses will involve some mix of regulatory and 
market-based instruments, but this policy analysis must be done with respect to specific 
problems that need to be solved.  A more thorough inventory of current policies and 
regulations relating to water—beyond the cursory legal and institutional review presented 
in this report—also would be a useful precursor to this exercise.  This should yield a 
fuller understanding of regulatory options to be considered alongside the new range of 
MBIs identified in this report—again in the context of specific water management 
challenges to be addressed.  As the “future visioning” exercise at MWRI continues to 
define and refine approaches to deal with the emerging new generation of water 
management challenges, the potential application of MBIs certainly needs to be 
incorporated into the policy dialogue.  
 
Public acceptability. A recurrent objection to the wider application of MBIs in the water 
sector heard during the study and at the closing workshop relates to public acceptability.  
Assuming that the sample of water professionals represented by the study’s workshop 
participants is generally representative of these professionals in Egypt, then their 
receptivity to the use of MBIs shows that such measures are acceptable to the officials 
who would be responsible for their implementation.  What about the public?  Strictly in 
the context of analyses to find appropriate policy responses to a specific water 
management challenge, it would be very useful to have real data on questions of public 
acceptability in contrast to largely anecdotal concerns that often are raised.  Prior to the 
implementation of any MBI, careful study should be undertaken of both the ability and 
willingness to pay by those expected to bear the burden of new economic incentive 
measures.  Public acceptability also should be tested from the standpoint of social and 
cultural suitability as well as administrative feasibility.  This is particularly important in 
cases where legitimate equity concerns have been raised. 
 
Institutional strengthening. Significant institutional adjustments are required that will 
take time to address and, therefore, warrant immediate attention.  Within MWRI, there 
appears to be an acute shortage of professionals with training in resource and 
environmental economics requisite to the conduct of further MBI analysis.   Further 
information is needed on the availability of such staff in the context of a broader needs 
analysis for institutional strengthening of this type.  The same constraints and needs 
would seem to apply to other government agencies with water management 
responsibilities.  In the meantime, consideration should be given to creating temporary 
capacity for economic analysis of this type within MWRI, perhaps by adding a water 
economics section to the Water Policy Advisory Unit led by a senior economist.  This 
section could also be tasked with coordinating the needs assessment and even be drawn 
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upon to help with in-house training, where warranted.  A second set of institutional 
adjustments is needed to build a stronger working network of agencies responsible for 
water management within the country.  If acceptable, it would seem appropriate for 
MWRI to take the lead in this effort, but many of the MBIs identified in this study apply 
to problems that lie outside of the immediate mandate of MWRI.  With MWRI remaining 
as the lead authority in the water sector, much stronger outreach to and engagement of at 
least three key ministries and their associated bodies—Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reclamation, Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs and Ministry of Housing, New 
Communities and Public Utilities—is needed if the recommendations relating to specific 
MBIs identified as promising are to be acted upon in the interest of improving water 
resources management in the country. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview1 
 
The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) is the primary government 
agency charged with the management of water resources in Egypt.  Beginning in mid-
2001, and with assistance from the USAID-supported EPIQ/WPRP, the MWRI embarked 
on a wide-ranging policy, program and institutional review aimed at developing a “future 
vision” of water management for the country.  This Ministry-wide exercise was 
undertaken “to consider changes in policy orientation and to prepare an action plan 
consistent with Egypt’s long-term needs and MWRI’s own institutional mandate” 
(MWRI, 2001).   
 
The desire to develop new approaches to water management in the country is in 
acknowledgement of high population growth coupled with shifts in the structure of the 
economy that are causing increased municipal, industrial and tourism water demands 
relative to agriculture—all placing ever greater and new strains on limited water supplies.  
Special attention has been given to “supply stretching” measures to: deal with 
deteriorating water quality (which is diminishing the available usable supply); and further 
increase the efficiency of water allocation and utilization.  A draft “MWRI Future Vision 
Statement” has emerged that emphasizes “a future operational mode that is water 
conservation oriented, decentralized, environmentally sensitive, private sector oriented, 
equitable and operationally efficient” (MWRI, 2001).  Four approaches to positive 
change have been identified:  
 
· Expanded use of economic instruments. Assessing the use of economic 
incentives and disincentives for water management to protect its quality and 
allocate and use it more efficiently. 
 
· Public-private partnerships. Institutionalizing and expanding water user 
associations to achieve irrigation management transfer, to expand private 
participation in environmental protection, and to identify mechanisms to ensure 
appropriate benefits for participating private sector partners. 
 
· Institutional adjustments. Decentralizing decision making and institutionalizing 
environmental protection at MWRI to affect an organizational restructuring that 
will better reflect the changed role of MWRI, result in improved personnel 
policies and procedures, build capacity, and define a more central role for MWRI 
in macro-level decision making regarding uses of the Nile River. 
 
· Public awareness and stakeholder participation. Encouraging active stakeholder 
participation at all stages of policy formulation, implementation and assessment, 
to improve awareness of water resources and associated environmental issues in 
the public at large and in MWRI itself. 
 
                                               
1 This section is based on: MWRI Future Vision, MWRI: Cairo (draft).  
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Box 1. Environmental and Natural Resources 
Management Policy Measures 
 
Command & Control Instruments: 
 
Rationing water 
Crop restrictions 
Enforcement of pollution standards and penalties  
Technology mandates 
 
Mixed Instruments: 
 
Pollutant discharge concentration limits 
Management of delivery systems by WUAs 
Public awareness or education programs 
Voluntary measures to conserve water or pollute less 
 
Market-based Instruments: 
 
User fees and service charges 
Input and output charges 
Subsidies (for inputs, capital or behavior) 
Pollutant discharge fees 
Resource extraction charges 
Tradable rights (to resources or to pollute) 
Liability for environmental harms 
Deposit/refund and performance bonding 
Disclosure of pollutant releases 
1.2 Background, Purpose and Scope 
 
This report presents the 
findings of a study that was 
primarily initiated in 
response to the first action 
item given above calling for 
increased attention to the 
potential application of 
economic incentives for 
improved water resources 
management in the country.   
 
Interest in economic 
instruments2 for improving 
water management is not 
new in Egypt.  A variety of 
studies have been conducted 
over the past decade 
examining the potential for 
MBIs to address both water 
quantity and quality issues 
(see this report’s list of 
references). With respect to 
water quantity management, 
notable USAID-supported 
analyses were conducted in 
the early 1990s by the 
Irrigation Support Program 
for Asia and the Near East 
(ISPAN) and a follow-on set 
of analyses in the mid-1990s 
by the International Irrigation Management Institute.  Both studies dealt with the cost 
allocation of irrigation structures and canal systems and calculations to justify an 
irrigation service fee capable of recovering the costs of operating and maintaining the 
national irrigation system while simultaneously introducing incentives for more efficient 
use of irrigation water. 
 
In response to growing water quality management concerns, attention has been paid by 
the World Bank and the Danish aid agency (DANIDA)—in cooperation with the 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA)—to MBI possibilities for pollution 
control.  EPIQ/WPRP has been working for several years with MWRI to identify policies 
and practices for optimal drainage water reuse.  The Dutch assistance program (APP) to 
MWRI recently has laid plans for the establishment of a Water Quality Unit at the 
Ministry.  A study is currently underway by the USAID-supported Egyptian 
                                               
2 The terms “economic instruments” and “market-based instruments (MBIs)” will be used 
interchangeably in this report. 
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Environmental Policy Program (EEPP) Policy Support Unit (EEPP/PSU) on “using 
economic instruments as environmental management tools” (but it has specifically 
avoided giving much attention to water quality issues due to EEAA’s lack of focus on 
this subject and the anticipation that EPIQ/WPRP would examine this topic). 
 
The Government of Egypt has a range of policy options available to meet its water 
management objectives, of which MBIs are but a subset.  Some examples of various 
policy instruments are presented in Box 1.   
 
As will be observed in this report, there already is a growing list of MBI applications in 
Egypt—used in the water sector and addressing other natural resources and 
environmental management concerns.  It is hoped that the review of potential MBIs as 
options for improving water quantity and quality management in the country will both 
inform the water policy dialogue and lead to the wider and more effective use of such 
instruments. 
 
1.3 Organization of the Report  
 
The report begins with a review of the policies and institutions governing water 
management in the country.  Government agencies with water management 
responsibilities are described as is the legal basis for their mandates, and Chapter 2 also 
broadly reviews current water management policies.   
 
This introduction is followed by an overview of water management challenges currently 
facing the country and covering both quantity to quality issues.  Some readers very 
familiar with the Egyptian water sector may find Chapter 3 somewhat elementary, but the 
authors have been encouraged to retain this background review of water problems for 
those who are less well versed in the subject.  It provides a necessary basis for 
understanding why policy reform may be necessary and the underlying demand for 
information on the possible application of MBIs to the water sector. 
 
A general description of MBIs considered by the study is then presented in Chapter 4. 
Again, those familiar with the range of economic incentives employed in water 
management around the world may wish to skip parts of this section, but it lays the 
groundwork for the assessment of alternative policy measures. 
 
Chapter 5 introduces and then applies a screening process for evaluating the pros and 
cons of alternative MBIs applied to solving water management problems. In all, twenty 
policy measures (10 each for water quantity and quality) are evaluated on the basis of 
their acceptability, efficiency, equitability, implementability and other criteria. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations are presented in the final chapter, including a review 
of the most promising MBIs identified, observations on broader lessons that may be 
drawn from the study and some suggested next steps. 
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2 Water Management Institutions and Policies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Prior to assessing the relative merits of alternative policy measures, it is necessary to 
have a firm understanding of the legislation, rules and regulations already in place.  
While a thorough review of Egyptian water law and policy is well beyond the scope of 
this study, this chapter briefly reviews the key institutions involved in various aspects of 
water management as well as the basic legal underpinnings of their mandates.  It goes on 
to summarize some of the key elements of current water policy as the basis for a review 
of water management challenges facing the country as well as of new policy approaches 
that might be considered. 
 
2.2 Key Government Institutions Charged with Water Management3 
 
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation. The Ministry of Water Resources and 
Irrigation (MWRI) is the lead government body responsible for water resources 
management in the country.  As such, it is charged with the regulation and distribution of 
water resources throughout Egypt as well as with the management of its quality.  The 
ministry’s most important responsibility is for management of the waters of the Nile 
River that flow through Egypt.  Since completion of the High Aswan Dam (HAD) in 
1968, the Nile has been managed for the multiple uses of irrigation, transportation, power 
generation, urban and industrial use, and in-stream uses (supporting navigation, fisheries 
and coastal ecosystem health).  MWRI also is responsible for management of water 
outside the Nile basin—principally the deep groundwater resources in the Western 
Desert.  The current organizational structure of MWRI is given below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 This section draws heavily on the report: Assessment of Present Status of Water Quality in 
Egypt, March 1999, NWRC and Canadian Executing Agency. 
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MWRI has sole legal responsibility for water resources planning and management.  With 
respect to water quality, it issues licenses to commercial, industrial, and tourist 
establishments for the discharge of liquid waste into inland waterways. According to Law 
48/1982, industrial waste must receive treatment to the level of prescribed pollution 
standards before being discharged into inland water bodies, however this provision is 
often violated. MWRI is responsible for providing water of suitable quality to all users. 
To accomplish this goal, the Ministry must insure that appropriate measures are taken to 
protect water quality.  
 
MWRI also handles surface water and groundwater quality monitoring through the 
National Water Research Center (NWRC), which operates under its authority. Within the 
NWRC, water monitoring activities are implemented by three bodies:  
 
· Drainage Research Institute (DRI).  With respect to water quality, the DRI is 
responsible for monitoring the quantity and quality of drainage water in the Nile 
system. One of DRI's responsibilities is to provide MWRI with data on the 
availability of drainage water for reuse in irrigation, mainly for land reclamation 
projects. In this context, DRI has prepared guidelines for drainage water reuse. 
 
· Nile Research Institute (NRI).  NRI is responsible for protecting and developing the 
Nile River in a sustainable manner by (1) monitoring water quality in the river 
channels; (2) assisting in the enforcement of pollution control laws affecting the Nile 
system; (3) evaluating and assessing impacts of new developments and interventions 
on water quality; and (4) operating and maintaining a database on water quality of the 
Nile. The monitoring network of the NRI has 34 stations along the Nile and 60 
observation stations at key discharge sites. 
 
· Research Institute for Ground Water (RIGW). The RIGW carries out field 
investigations of groundwater throughout Egypt. Initially responsible mainly for 
groundwater development, RIGW now is charged with monitoring groundwater 
resources in order to assure their sustainable use by agricultural, domestic and 
industrial users. RIGW has approximately 500 wells for observing irrigation water 
abstraction and plans to install about 150 observation wells for drinking water. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR).   The MALR is the most 
important government water management stakeholder outside of MWRI, since irrigation 
accounts for about 84 percent of the consumptive uses of water in Egypt (and agriculture 
accounts for about 20 percent of both GDP and total exports and about 34 percent of total 
employment).  MALR is responsible for predicting cropping patterns and irrigation 
requirements used by MWRI to allocate water among the vast network of primary and 
secondary irrigation canals.  This has become more critical with liberalization of the 
agricultural sector since market forces rather than government policy determines what is 
planted.  MALR also participates with MWRI in the irrigation and drainage improvement 
projects with on-farm improvements such as laser land leveling and tiled drainage. 
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Through its Soils, Water and Environmental Research Institute (SWERI), the MALR also 
is responsible for performing research on the sustainable development in the agricultural 
sector.  In this capacity, SWERI has several responsibilities regarding water quality 
management: establishing policies for fertilizer use, classifying water resources and soils; 
and monitoring soil and water quality for agricultural uses. SWERI has a modern 
laboratory for physical, chemical and biological analysis of soil and water. 
 
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MOSEA). After MWRI, MOSEA is the 
most important government body for the management of the country’s water quality.  
Through the subsidiary Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) and in 
coordination with the Ministry of Health and Population (see below), MOSEA is 
responsible for inspections regarding compliance with environmental and occupational 
health and safety regulations. Among the approximately 700 EEAA employees are 18 
inspectors supplemented by a handful of additional inspectors in each of 8 local offices in 
the governorates, and they are charged with the oversight of compliance with all 
environmental and workplace standards. If inspectors find a problem, their options range 
from assessing a citation and levying a fine on the spot to granting a probationary period 
of 60-90 days to correct the problem before re-inspection. If the problem has not been 
corrected after the probationary period, a request is filed with the Ministry of Interior to 
write a citation. Governors and the State Minister for Environment can shut down severe 
polluters, however it is relatively easy for facilities to obtain a court order to reopen based 
on concerns over job loss and adverse economic impact (Khaled Fahmy, Monitoring, 
Verification and Evaluation Unit for EEAA, personal communication October 2001). 
 
Facilities are chosen for inspection based on a master plan prepared by MOSEA but also 
in response to governors' requests and citizen complaints. There are approximately 
23,000 industrial establishments in Egypt, however only about 400-500 are major 
polluters. In 2000, approximately 235 of these were inspected, but thousands of smaller 
establishments are inspected rarely, if at all (Fahmy). 
 
In most new industrial cities (e.g., 10th of Ramadan, 6th of October, and Sadat City) 
industries already are generally meeting discharge standards, and compliance is 
improving elsewhere. Along the Nile, for example, all industries now at least have 
effluent discharge facilities  (per. comm., Samia Galal Saad). 
 
Ministry of Health and Population (MHP).  MHP has a central role in water quality 
management, particularly with respect to standard setting for: quality of potable water 
sources (the Nile and canals); drain waters that can be mixed with fresh water; industrial 
and sewage treatment plant discharge; and wastes discharged from river vessels.  
 
In addition to developing standards, the ministry must sample and analyze all industrial, 
municipal, and wastewater treatment plant effluents. Two departments have the principal 
responsibility. The Environmental Health Department (EHD) under the Ministry is 
responsible for sampling intakes to drinking water treatment plants as well as discharges 
from wastewater treatment plants and industry. The Environmental Monitoring and 
Occupational Health Center (EMOHC) is responsible for environmental monitoring (air, 
water and soil).  
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Since 1998, the EMOHC has monitored Nile River and main canal waters in cooperation 
with the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency.  
 
Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth (MIMW). MIMW is responsible for 
overseeing the licensing and operation of firms in Egypt. Within the Ministry, the 
General Organization for Industrialization (GOFI) supervises pollution control activities, 
as well as safety and health issues. GOFI does not perform any inspections or verify 
whether industries are in compliance with license requirements. The Environmental 
Management Department within the Ministry is in charge of providing advice to 
industrial firms regarding compliance with a 1982 ministerial decree that all industrial 
facilities must install and operate water pollution control equipment in conformance with 
Law 48. According to Law 93/1962 and its Amending Decree 9/1989, industrial 
wastewater must receive pretreatment before discharge to public sewer systems.  
 
Ministry of Housing, New Communities and Public Utilities (MHNCPU).  MHNCPU 
is responsible for planning and developing water supplies and wastewater treatment 
facilities. MHNCPU and its affiliate agencies oversee construction of sewers and 
wastewater treatment facilities throughout Egypt.  The regional wastewater authorities 
and other bodies affiliated with MHNCPU that are responsible for both water and 
wastewater treatment include: 
· The National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD);  
· The General Organization for Sanitary Drainage in Cairo (GOSD) 
· General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply (GOGCWS 
· The Alexandria General Organization for Sanitary Drainage (AGOSD) 
· The Alexandria Water General Authority (AWGA) 
· The Suez Canal Authority; and  
· A number of private companies for wastewater treatment in Damietta, Kafr El Sheikh 
and Beheira. 
 
NOPWASD is responsible for the potable water and wastewater treatment systems 
outside of Cairo and Alexandria.  These government organizations get their water from 
the Nile and from groundwater.  In addition, groundwater-based systems are operated by 
various city councils. Water sources in industry vary according to the nature of the 
industrial activity.  Food and pharmaceutical industries, for example, require clean water, 
so they either tap municipal supplies or make use of their own groundwater wells.  Other 
industries may use Nile or canal water directly for cooling or washing purposes. 
 
Ministry of Scientific Research.  The Ministry of Scientific Research is responsible for 
monitoring a small number of water and wastewater treatment plants in the Greater Cairo 
area and a handful of pumping stations.  The primary purpose of these activities is to 
assure environmental protection from industrial wastes and the protection of potable 
water.  
 
Ministry of Electricity and Energy.  The Ministry of Electricity and Energy is 
responsible for power generation and coordinates with MWRI to maximize hydropower 
generation without harming irrigation.  Power generation and transportation are non-
consumptive uses but their needs are factored into decisions on Lake Nasser water levels 
APRP Water Policy Program                                                      Economic Incentives for Water Management 8 
 
and releases at the HAD.   The ministry also operates two thermal power plants that draw 
water from the Nile for cooling.   
 
Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Tourism.  These two Ministries are 
stakeholders interested in maintaining “in-stream flows” of the Nile River to provide 
sufficient depth for commercial and recreational navigation as well as for aesthetic 
purposes.  The River Transport Authority of the Ministry of Transport manages 
navigation activities along the course of the Nile River below the Aswan Dam and on 
main canals in coordination with MWRI.    
 
Ministry of Interior.  In coordination with technical agencies and the courts, the 
Ministry of Interior is charged with enforcing laws and with the collection of fines, 
including some relating to water extraction, pollution or other impacts. 
 
2.3 Legal Framework for Water Management 
 
MWRI derives its legal mandate as the lead governmental body for the water sector from 
Law 12/1984 on Water Management (primarily dealing with water for agriculture) and 
Law 48/1982 on Protection of the Nile River and its Waterways from Pollution.  The 
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs and its subsidiary body the EEAA also exert 
considerable influence over water quality management through authorities vested through 
Law 4/1994 on Environmental Protection.  The principal laws governing water 
management include: 
 
· Water Quantity Resources Management. Law 12/1984 and its supplementary Law 
213/1994 provide the basic legal structure for water quantity issues.  The basic law 
defines the use and management of the public and private sector irrigation and 
drainage network structures, including main canals, feeders, drains and tile drains.  It 
also provides legal direction for the use and maintenance of public and private canals 
and specifies arrangements for cost recovery in irrigation and drainage works.  In 
addition to Nile surface water delivery, the law also regulates: 
· groundwater and drainage water; 
· protection against flooding; 
· navigation; and 
· coastal protection. 
· Nature Protection. Law 102/1983 delineates nature protection areas, forbids actions 
that lead to destruction of the natural environment, including marine and freshwater, 
and proscribes fines and penalties for violators. Under this Law, the Government can 
pursue damage assessments for harms to the environment. 
· Wastewater Discharges into the Sewerage System. Law 93/1962 establishes 
standards for wastewater discharge into the sewer system. 
· Regulation of Water Resources and Treatment of Wastewater. Law 27/1978 
regulates public sources of drinking water. It instructs and empowers the MHP to set 
standards for potable water. 
· Protection of the River Nile and Its Waterways. Law 48/1982 regulates the 
discharge of waste and wastewater into the Nile and its waterways and sets standards 
for the quality of effluents. The law establishes the responsibilities of the MWRI and 
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the MHP in monitoring the quality of effluents discharged into the Nile River (and its 
associated drainage system, lakes and groundwater) to ensure that water quality 
standards are met. Industrial establishments are required to obtain pollution discharge 
licenses. A bond is required with the license application and a fee of L.E. 0.1 (one 
piastre) per cubic meter of effluent is levied according to Article 82 of the 
implementing regulations. Under this Law, the MHP has the obligation to carry out 
periodic sampling and analysis of wastewater and waste discharge from 
establishments that are licensed to discharge to waterways.   
· Environmental Protection Law. Law 4/1994 delineates the roles and responsibilities 
of EEAA, including its financing through the Environmental Protection Fund. The 
Law authorizes use of incentives for managing the environment and supports the 
provisions of Law 48 regarding the management of water resources.  
 
2.3 Principal Water Management Policies and Programs 
 
2.3.1 Nile Irrigation Management 
 
Most recent water policy analysis and practice has been directed primarily toward 
achieving increases in the effective supply of irrigation water and associated expansions 
of irrigated lands (see Box 2 for a brief history of water plans since 1977).  The current 
operating policy framework dates from 1997, when a Horizontal Expansion Plan was put 
forward. As shown in Table 1 below, this plan envisions an increase in irrigated lands of 
some 3.4 million feddan over a 20-year period. 
 
Table 1. Increases in Irrigated Land per the 1997 Water Management Plan 
Water Source Area Served 
(million feddan) 
Location 
1.20 To be reclaimed from previous plans 
0.55 Sheikh Zayed Canal (Toshka) 
0.50 Southern Egypt 
0.05 West Delta 
Surface water and reuse of 
agricultural drainage water 
2.30 Subtotal for Surface Irrigation & Reuse 
0.50 Western oases, east of Owainat & Darb El-Arbeen 
0.10 Sinai Groundwater in the Western Desert and Sinai 
0.60 Subtotal for Groundwater 
Treated sewage water from 
Greater Cairo and 
Alexandria 
 
 
0.25 
Greater Cairo: areas between Ismailiya & Suez 
Desert Roads and each side of Cairo-Alex Desert 
Road to the southern boundaries of Sadat City; 
Greenbelt contouring Southern Borg El-Arab City 
Water available after 
completion of the Joungli 
Canal Project 
 
0.25 
 
Middle Sinai 
TOTAL 3.40 Increase in Area Cultivated Nationally 
Source: Southern Egypt Development Project, 1998. 
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To meet the irrigated area expansion plans, savings have been projected to come from 
existing uses of Nile waters.  
Improved cropping patterns 
with limited use of high water-
consuming crops and 
introduction of short age 
varieties of crops have been 
projected to save 3 BCM.  
Irrigation improvement projects, 
including land leveling, 
improvements of surface 
irrigation in old lands, and use 
of drip and sprinkler irrigation 
in new lands, orchards and 
vegetable fields have been 
projected to save a further 4 
BCM.  Reduced losses in 
domestic water use are 
projected to save 1 BCM.   
 
Most of the responsibility for 
implementing the Horizontal 
Expansion Plan undertaken by 
the Government falls to the 
Irrigation Department under 
MWRI, which operates and 
maintains irrigation systems throughout Egypt.  This Department includes the following 
departments/sectors: 
· Reservoirs and Grand Barrages 
· Horizontal Expansion and Projects  
· Irrigation  
· Groundwater  
· Irrigation Improvement  
· Nile Protection  
· Financial and Administrative Affairs  
 
The Irrigation Sector is divided into a Central Directorate for Canal Maintenance and a 
Central Directorate for Water Distribution.  Water is managed by a hierarchical structure 
of administrative units: 
 
· 23 Irrigation Directorates: 250,000–500,000 feddan each 
· 64 Irrigation Inspectorates: 100,000–200,000 feddan each (2-3 per Directorate) 
· 202 Irrigation Districts: 30,000–70,000 feddan each (3-5 per Inspectorate). 
 
Each District Office is headed by a District Engineer responsible for operation and 
maintenance of the secondary level branch canals, which serve approximately 5,000-
10,000 feddans on average.   
Box 2. Recent Evolution of Egyptian Water Policy   
1977–Horizontal Expansion Policy: An ambitious plan to increase 
national cultivated area by about 2.80 million feddan from 1997 to 
2000, of which 0.50 million feddan were to utilize deep groundwater 
in the New Valley.  
1981–National Water Master Plan (NWMP): To implement the 
1977 policy, the NWMP took a 20-year planning horizon and 
evaluated alternatives for water supply augmentation and water 
conservation in agriculture, municipal use and industry.  
1982–Water Policies to Implement the NWMP: MWRI reset its 
water policy according to the results of the NMWP based on a goal 
of making 11.7 BCM of extra water available to satisfy future water 
demands.  
1994–Horizontal Expansion Policy:  An agreed comprehensive and 
ambitious plan of horizontal expansion to 2025 that set total targeted 
agricultural expansions through 2000 at 2.2 million feddan, 
comprising: 1.7 million feddan irrigated with Nile water, agricultural 
drainage, and the groundwater aquifer of the Nile Valley and Nile 
Delta; 0.3 million feddan using deep groundwater water; and 0.2 
million feddan using treated waste water. An additional 1.0 million 
feddan were to be developed during 2000-2025.  
1997–Draft Water Resources Strategy of Egypt to 2017: Based on a 
water balance analysis examining all sources in 1995/1996 and 
totaling approximately 73 BCM—with 61 BCM used in agriculture 
and 12 BCM in other sectors—the strategy lays out plans for 
meeting alternative 2017 water demand scenarios, the maximum 
being 97.8 BCM.   
 
Source: Allam, 2001. 
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Farmers are responsible for the operation and maintenance of mesqas, the tertiary canals 
from which farmers draw water for irrigation.  Mesqas are considered to be privately 
owned.  The traditional Below Grade System (BGS) of irrigation canals delivers water 
below the level of the farmers’ fields, requiring farmers to lift water onto their fields.  
Farmers primarily use pumps, although the traditional saqia is still used, mostly in 
Middle and Upper Egypt.  Informal farmers’ organizations have developed along some 
mesqas for maintenance and to resolve problems.   
 
Formal mesqa Water User Associations (WUAs) are being encouraged through the 
Irrigation Improvement Program (IIP).  A pilot program assisted by EPIQ/WPRP also is 
helping to build WUAs at the branch canal level, and it has now become government 
policy to extend this approach to the entire Nile Delta.  Branch canal WUAs have been 
organized in four pilot sites, but neither the planned improvements nor the full transfer of 
management has yet occurred.  In other branch canals, Water Boards are being 
established on a pilot basis.  Water Boards are modeled after the Dutch system of 
organizing stakeholders to coordinate and manage water resources within the Boards 
jurisdiction. 
 
The IIP program funds a package of improvements to the delivery system and on-farm 
facilities in order to improve agricultural productivity and irrigation efficiency.  The 
package includes renovation and improvement of branch and distributary canals, 
downstream water level control, conversion from rotational flow to continuous flow, 
mesqa improvements, and water management technical assistance through the Irrigation 
Advisory Service.  In old lands, the mesqas are raised and pumps installed so that water is 
delivered to farm plots by gravity flow.  In some new lands, pressurized pipelines deliver 
water underground to the field for use in drip and sprinkler irrigation.  WUAs are 
established and given the responsibility for maintaining the mesqa and managing for an 
equitable distribution of water from head to tail reaches. 
 
The WUAs are also responsible for collecting payments needed to pay for the IIP 
improvements.  Law 12/1984 establishes the terms for repayment: a 3-year grace period; 
zero interest payments; 10 percent administrative charge; and 20 years of constant annual 
payments.  Even in the absence of inflation (an heroic assumption), this constitutes at 
least a 32 percent subsidy on the capital provided for these investments.  The MWRI has 
authority to place repayments into a special fund to cover the costs of additional 
improvement projects. 
 
Supplementary Law 213/1994 provides the legal foundation for involvement of 
landowners at the mesqa and farm level for improving irrigation systems and establishes 
a fund to finance improved mesqas in Irrigation Improvement Project areas.  Law 213 
presently provides for WUAs above the mesqa level only on new lands.  Proposed 
Revised Law 12/1984 would allow for WUAs at the branch and district canal levels.   
 
2.3.2 Nile Basin Drainage and Groundwater 
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A significant proportion of Nile Valley and Delta lands are experiencing waterlogging 
problems, and MWRI has a Tile Drainage Improvement program to address this issue.  
Drainage Collector User Associations (CUAs), the counterpart of mesqa WUAs, are 
being established to maintain the on-farm underground drains.  Fees payed by 
participants in this program are collected by the Ministry of Finance and are remitted to 
the State Treasury. 
 
Conjunctive use of groundwater and drain water as a supplement to surface irrigation is 
common in the Nile Valley and Basin (see the next section for a discussion of drainage 
water use for irrigation).  To sink a well, a permit must be obtained from MWRI, and 
wells are prohibited in areas improved under Irrigation Improvement Program. 
 
Law 20/1953 specifies fees that owners of private pumps may charge and confers upon 
irrigation engineers the powers to enforce the regulations on all water-lifting machines.  
This law was enacted due to concerns that private well owners were overcharging 
farmers for irrigation water (APRP Report No. 48). 
 
2.3.3 Mega Projects 
 
There are two large horizontal expansion projects underway that utilize Nile waters that 
are not returned to the Basin.  The purpose of these so-called “mega projects” is to 
increase agricultural production, improve national income distribution, and generate 
employment opportunities in the project areas.  
 
· North Sinai Agricultural Development Project. This mega-project envisions 
cultivation of 620,000 feddan on both sides of the Suez Canal.  The source of water 
will be fresh Nile water mixed with drainage water at a 1:1 ratio and delivered via the 
El Salam Canal. When completed in 2002 or 2003, the project will utilize a total of 
4.45 BCM of Nile and drainage water. 
 
· South Valley Development Project (3 components) 
 
Toshka Project:  Water will be lifted via a pumping station on the left bank of Lake 
Nasser, 200 km south of the High Aswan Dam, into the 70 km Shiekh Zayed Canal, 
which will deliver water by gravity flow into four branch canals. The pumping 
stations are expected to be operational in October 2002.  The first branch of the canal 
is devoted to the reclamation of 100,000 feddan allocated to a principal investor, who 
is expected to complete full reclamation by 2010 (ArabNews.com, 9/27/2000). Large 
investors are being recruited to implement the other three branch canal reclamation 
areas. 
 
South Valley Wadies:  The wadies in El Nokra, Kobbania, Lakita, Saaidi, Komombo 
will be directly fed by Nile waters with a total area of cultivation projected to reach 
500,000 feddan. 
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New Valley Groundwater: Areas to be irrigated are in East Owainat, Darb El Arbien 
and the key oases (Kharga, Dakhla, Farafra, Baharia and Siewa) totaling about 
500,000 feddan.  This is discussed further in the section that follows. 
 
2.3.4 Western Desert Groundwater 4 
 
The major natural resource in the Western Desert is deep groundwater from the Nubian 
Sandstone Aquifer.  This is a vast aquifer underlying parts of Egypt, Chad, Libya and 
Sudan as depicted in Figure 1. The aquifer was formed over 8,000 years ago, is 
considered non-renewable, and much of it is under artesian pressure. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
                                               
4 Adapted from EPIQ/APRP, 1999a. 
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Prior to 1960 the water supplied by springs was supplemented by construction of shallow 
wells with depths of 50-70 meters.  After 1960, wells between 300-1200 meters in depth 
were drilled to provide water for proposed large scale irrigated agriculture and new 
settlements in the New Valley.  Groundwater extraction increased from 273 MCM to 950 
MCM from 1960 to 1997 (APRP, 1999a). 
 
The Government has established the following development objectives for the Western 
Desert: 
 
· Settling population away from the overcrowded Nile Valley and Delta. 
· Maximizing the use of existing natural resources in the isolated, vast desert areas. 
· Connecting these areas to the rest of the country. 
· Creating new job opportunities for unemployed youth. 
 
The General Authority for Rehabilitation Projects and Agricultural Development 
(GARPAD) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) was 
responsible for reclamation plans until 1994.  GARPAD instituted a policy that the area 
which the well can irrigate is determined by the production rate the well can efficiently 
maintain over its economic life (20-25 years).  Wells should be designed to accommodate 
the future required and expected pumping levels over the economic life of the well.   The 
newly reclaimed lands were then offered to small farmers, graduates, cooperatives and 
investors.   
 
The New Valley Water Resources Department under MWRI was created by Presidential 
Decree in 1994 with the responsibility for planning, operation, maintenance, management 
and monitoring of groundwater resources in the Western Desert.  Since 1997, MWRI also 
has had the overall responsibility for issuing well drilling and use permits.   
 
GARPAD is still responsible for design and implementation of desert reclamation 
schemes which are transferred to the private sector. Since 1997, the Government has 
encouraged private sector participation in different development sectors, such as land 
reclamation and mining activities in the Western Desert.  A total of 235,000 feddan were 
allocated to be reclaimed by the private sector. 
 
The New Valley Development Authority (NVDA) of the Ministry of Housing, New 
Communities and Public Utilities (MHNCPU) is responsible for the planning and 
construction of drinking water facilities, but design and construction of drinking water 
wells in Western Desert settlements is carried out by the Research Institute for 
Groundwater (RIGW) of the NWRC financed by NVDA.  MWRI is responsible for 
operation and maintenance of wells, well pumps, and the main irrigation and drainage 
networks and for replacement of wells in the old reclaimed areas tenured to graduates and 
small farmers (5-7 feddan).  
 
Policies for managing free-flowing groundwater in reclaimed areas were developed in 
1999 and comprise the following elements: 
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· Free-flowing well discharge will be adjusted monthly to match crop irrigation 
requirements within the command area of each particular well, with the maximum 
discharge not exceeding the well’s design future pumping rate. 
· Nighttime well flow will be stored on the land surface, either in the existing canals or 
new storage facilities, and daytime well flow will be controlled. 
· MWRI will establish a program of continuous groundwater monitoring for all wells 
(private and public). 
· Operating criteria will be defined for transition from free-flowing to pumped 
conditions of the wells. 
· MWRI will continue the program for establishment of water user organizations in 
accordance with Law 213. 
· No growth of unofficial irrigation will be allowed. 
· A working group with members from MWRI, MALR, and MHNCPU, chaired by the 
representatives of MWRI, will be established to provide continuing review of 
issues/conditions and policies for managing the groundwater resources in the Western 
Desert. 
 
Implementation of these policies is projected to lengthen the time period for economic 
pumping and use of deep groundwater to 100 years, though there is apparently no 
specific set of development plans to deal with the gradual loss of economically viable 
irrigation supplies in the oasis areas. 
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3 Principal Water Management Challenges 
 
3.1 Managing Water Supplies 
 
3.1.1 Threat of Water Shortage 
 
A looming water shortage represents perhaps the greatest medium-term water 
management challenge currently facing the country.  Agricultural water demand is 
projected to remain roughly steady in the Nile Delta and to expand in the new lands even 
as municipal, industrial and other uses continue to increase.  The ambitious plans for 
North Sinai and Southern Egypt will extract up to 10 BCM of Nile Basin water.  This 
represents almost 20 percent of Egypt’s internationally negotiated share of the annual 
storage releases from Lake Nasser.  None of this water will return to the Nile Basin for 
reuse (though there may be some limited reuse of drainage water within the mega-
projects).  The International Water Management Institute (IWMI) has classified all 
countries based on the degree of their likely water scarcity in 2025, and Egypt was placed 
in the group of countries likely to experience absolute water scarcity (Seckler, et al., 
1998).   
To grasp the impact of shifting demands on the Nile’s water resources, Table 2 presents 
water budgets estimated for 2000 and 2017, using pessimistic and optimistic assumptions 
(Allam, 2001).  Both sets of assumptions include implementation of the entire 1997 3.4 
million feddan horizontal expansion plan.  Assumptions are: 
Source Pessimistic  Optimistic 
Joungli Canal  Not completed  Completion of Phase 2 
Rainfall used in agriculture No change  Increase via water harvesting 
Desalinization No change  Develop 0.5 BCM capacity 
Irrigation efficiency No change  Major improvements 
Urban and industrial use High population growth Low population growth 
System evaporation losses No change  Reduction of 1 BCM 
 
Major plans for increasing irrigation efficiency in Nile-fed agriculture include: 
· Restriction of rice and sugar cane cultivation to a limited area  
· Conversion of irrigation in new lands, orchards and vegetable fields to modern 
systems (drip & sprinkler) 
· Improvement of surface irrigation in old lands 
· Encouragement of night irrigation and land leveling 
· Recycling of drainage water, treated sewage and industrial effluent. 
· Change of cropping patterns and planting and harvesting dates of crops 
· Introduction of short age varieties of crops. 
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Table 2. Water Balance Scenarios for 2000 and 2017 with Alternative Assumptions 
 
Water Sources and Uses 
Year 2000 
Estimate 
(BCM) 
Year 2017 
Pessimistic 
Assumptions 
(BCM) 
Year 2017 
Optimistic 
Assumptions 
(BCM) 
Nile Water Sources:    
- Nile Allocation 55.50 55.50 55.50 
- Joungli Canal   0.00   0.00   2.00 
- Utilized rainfall1     0.50   0.50   1.00 
- Desalinization1    0.00   0.00   0.50 
 TOTAL SOURCES 56.00 56.00 59.00 
Nile Consumptive Uses:    
- Nile Valley and Delta Agriculture1 (38.00) (38.00) (34.00) 
- North Sinai Project1 0  (4.20) (4.20) 
- Toshka Project, Phase 12 0  (4.50) (4.50) 
- Urban & Industrial Sector1  (1.75)  (4.50) (4.00) 
- Evaporation losses1 (3.00)  (3.00) (2.00) 
TOTAL CONSUMPTION (42.75) (54.20) (48.70) 
    
Net Flow to N. Lakes and Sea 13.25 1.80 10.30 
Flow needed to maintain Northern Lakes1 (8.00) (8.00) (8.00) 
SURPLUS OR (DEFICIT) 5.25 (6.20) 2.30 
Sources:  1 Allam (2001); 2 MWRI/NWRC (1998). 
 
Aggressive expansion of irrigated lands will reduce the allowable margin of error for 
allocating water throughout the Nile irrigation system.  Many of the improvements 
mentioned above need to occur to have sufficient water to serve existing users as well as 
planned new uses.  If not, the table above shows that there will be less than 2 BCM of 
base and return flow reaching the Northern Lakes and sea.  If all planned water savings 
and increased efficiencies are realized, then the water balance table shows a 2.3 BCM 
surplus of water over the 8 BCM assumed to be needed to maintain northern lakes and 
coastal ecology and to keep sea water intrusion in check.   
  
There also are risks to the long-term supply of water from storage in Lake Nasser.  From 
1998 up to the present, Egypt has enjoyed a supplemental allocation of HAD water 
releases due to a wetter than average climatic pattern (see Table 3 below, and the trend 
continues).  However, the estimates given above assume that a more typical climate will 
be realized, resulting in a release to Egypt from HAD storage equal to the agreed 55.5 
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BCM annually.  Prolonged drought could reduce Nile Basin rainfall to be utilized and 
also increase evapotranspiration losses.  Therefore, Egypt could experience moderate to 
severe shortages of water under conditions of prolonged drought within the next few 
years even if the most optimistic water balance scenario described above comes to pass.  
Base flows to the Northern Lakes would be inadequate in quantity and quality to maintain 
the coastal ecosystem’s balance and keep sea water intrusion into coastal groundwater 
within acceptable bounds.  Acute irrigation water shortages also could be expected for 
farms at the tail end of irrigation canals. 
 
     Table 3. Annual Releases from Lake Nasser, 1990-2000 (in million cubic meters) 
 
Year/ 
Month 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 
Total 
 
53,795 
 
54,245 
 
55,295 
 
55,465 
 
55,500 
 
55,500 
 
55,970 
 
55,500 
 
71,435 
 
67,060 
 
 
 Source: MWRI, Irrigation Department Data (2001). 
 
3.1.2 Service Delivery Problems in Municipal Water Supply Systems 
 
Despite rapid population growth, the percentage of the population with access to 
municipal water supply has increased substantially over the past two decades.  An 
estimated 95 percent of households in urban areas and almost 70 percent of households in 
rural areas now have access to piped water (Table 4).  This remarkable extension of the 
municipal water and wastewater system, however, has not been accompanied by adequate 
attention to maintenance—resulting in very high seepage losses of 40-50 percent. These 
losses have, in turn, caused a rise in the groundwater table, creating considerable 
environmental problems (described in subsequent sections of this report). 
A recent review of the municipal water supply sector identified three primary causes of 
piped water service deficiencies (Hoehn and Krieger, 1996): 
· inadequate water treatment capacity and deteriorating treatment plants; 
· inadequate storage capacity; and 
· deteriorating transmission and distribution networks that cannot withstand the 
pressures needed to provide reliable water service without rupturing. 
High system losses increase the strain on an already overburdened wastewater collection 
system and are a waste of costly treated water.  Leaks also allow contamination of the 
water delivered, defeating much of the purpose of providing treated supplies. 
Municipal water and wastewater services are heavily subsidized by the government.  
Estimates are given in Table 4 of delivery cost, level of subsidy, and revenue raised.  In 
the municipal areas outside of Greater Cairo and Alexandria, the subsidy level is almost 
75 percent.  Low recovery of costs from consumers reduces revenues generated that 
water and wastewater agencies can use to repair leaks and improve service.    
APRP Water Policy Program                          19         Economic Incentives for Water Management 
 
Table 4. Municipal Potable Water Systems in Egypt, Rates and Customer Base 
 
System NOPWASD1 
(Municipalities) 
GOGCWS2 
(CAIRO) 
AWGA3 
(ALEXANDRIA) 
L.E. per m3 
Estimated Capital, O & M costs  1.0 1.1 NA 
Subsidy  0.8 0.9 NA 
Average User Fee5 (tariff) 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Rate: piastre per cubic meter  4, 5 15–25 15–25 25–35 
% Of Customer Base 
Distribution of Customers Base 
% Served by House Connections5 Urban              92 
Rural                     70 
95 96 
% Multi–Unit Meters Urban               55 
Rural                     30 
50 48 
% Single–Unit Meters Urban               20 
Rural                     10 
33 40 
% Not connected legally or connected 
but meters are not working 5, 6 
Urban               18 
Rural                     30 
12 8 
% Served by Stand posts / donated Urban                 2 
Rural                     14 
1 1 
% Unserved 7 Urban                 6 
Rural                     16 
4 3 
 
Sources: 
NOPWASD, 1991.  Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Study for Egypt. 
NOPWASD, 2000.  Cost of Producing Potable Water. 
Personal Communication from Eng. Magda Gadalla of NOPWASD. 
Personal Communication from Dr. Adel Ramadan of GOGCWS. 
Personal Communication from Dr. Hanaa Aref of AWGA. 
World Bank, 1999.  Rural Water Supply and Sanitation in Egypt: Issues and Options. 
Notes:  
1. National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage. 
2. General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply. 
3. Alexandria Water General Authority. 
4. Wastewater tariff is 20% of water tariff for Cairo and 35% for Alexandria. 
5. These are applicable to the residential units, which have water meters.  Those who do not 
have meters, or their meters are not working, pay a fixed monthly charge for water 
consumption (L.E. 5–20 monthly/unit).  The charge changes with house area. 
6. No service charge for meters’ maintenance if meters are not working, it is difficult to repair.  
In Alexandria there is monthly maintenance charge for meters (a lump sum of 50 piastre).  
The life span of a meter is 7 years and costs L.E. 300 for ½ inch pipe.  In most cases when 
meter is not working, the client pays an estimated fixed charge. 
7. Unserved people extract either polluted groundwater or surface water from the Nile, canals 
or drains. 
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Some of the problems with weak revenue generation and collection stem from 
deficiencies in the metering of water use. There are three types of problems: some users 
have no meters; others have faulty meters, which forces the use of flat rate charges for 
water service; and multi-unit meters are in wide use, which reduce the economic 
incentive for individual units served by the meter to conserve water.   
 
As noted, even where metering does exist, tariff rates remain low.  For comparative 
purposes, municipal water tariffs in Europe and in the United States are in the range of 
US$ 1 to 5 per cubic meter—higher than anywhere in the Middle East and North Africa.  
But even within this region, Egyptian municipal rates are the lowest, as shown in Figure 
2.  Though the rates given are for 1993, they remain less than $0.10 per cubic meter. 
 
Figure 2. Water Tariffs in the Middle East and North Africa 
Source: World Bank, March 2001.  
 
The public municipal water and wastewater agencies are caught in a vicious cycle of low 
tariffs and poor service.   Revenues generated are insufficient to adequately maintain the 
existing water system—let alone provide for improvements or reconstruction.  There is 
good evidence that many people are willing to pay much more than they do now for 
reliable service.  For example, research by Hoehn and Krieger (1996) found that many 
Cairo households respond to unreliable service by investing in water-improving 
technologies such as storage tanks and electrical pressure boosting pumps.  They pay L.E. 
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3-5 per week for such measures, representing between 1.5 and 2.4 percent of average 
household monthly income.  This indicates both a willingness and ability to pay higher 
municipal water tariffs provided they are accompanied by good service. 
 
3.1.3 Irrigation Service Delivery Challenges 
 
Despite an abundant supply of water released from the HAD, feedback from farmers 
indicates that water is not being distributed efficiently.  A 1998 survey sponsored by 
USAID (Greencom/APRP; El-Zanaty and Associates) asked farmers about water 
resources practices and attitudes.  A similar USAID-sponsored survey was recently 
conducted by EPIQ/WPRP, for which preliminary data is available.   
 
A comparison of selected findings from the two surveys shows a significant drop in the 
proportion of farmers whose main concern is mistimed arrival of water to their fields (see 
Table 5 below).  However, the proportion of farmers concerned about the availability of 
clean water has increased three-to-four-fold among both men and women, and men also 
are increasingly concerned about salinity and the cost of irrigation. 
According to the 1998 survey, water shortages are a function of season and location on 
the mesqa. Farmers report a shortage of water more frequently in summer than in winter 
(85% versus 42%) and at the end of mesqas rather than the beginning (46% versus 35%).  
However, they indicate that significant shortages still occur in the winter and at the 
beginning of mesqas.   
Additional evidence of shortages occurring is found in the investments made in wells for 
groundwater use and pumping from drains that farmers have made in some areas.  Wells 
are expensive, and pumping either groundwater or drain water incurs significant energy 
costs. Yields also may be reduced from poorer quality water.  In all, 7 percent of farmers 
reported irrigating from well pumps in the 1998 survey. 
The reason for irrigation shortages does not appear to be inadequate water availability at 
the higher system levels.  The cause more likely can be attributed to the deteriorating 
conditions throughout the entire irrigation delivery system, as discussed below. 
 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Farmer Attitudes about Water, 1998 and 2001 
Questions Men Women 
 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Greatest concern for the future:     
  Water doesn’t arrive 76.4 57.7 64.9 54.5 
  Availability of enough clean water 15.5 43.3 11.7 41.9 
  Salinity 3.1 9.0 4.3 3.9 
  Cost of irrigation water 1.9 10.9 1.6 8.6 
 
  Source: El-Zanaty and Associates (1998); Preliminary data from EPIQ/WPRP Survey (2002). 
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3.1.4 Insufficient Irrigation System Upkeep 
It always seems easier to raise funds and to gain political support for the construction of 
new infrastructure than to operate, maintain, monitor and improve existing infrastructure.   
When you factor this in with the generally revenue-starved condition of the Egyptian 
Government, it is easy to understand how the main elements of the Nile irrigation system 
could fall into disrepair.  Some of the signs of system neglect are:  
· Existing canal cross sections exceed the original design by an average of 25 
percent.  This is due to over excavation during mechanical cleaning, erosion, and 
misuse of canal banks that contributes to changes in water levels and canal 
discharges. 
· Seepage losses from the irrigation system vary from one area to the other.  
Average conveyance losses between the irrigation outlets to the field are 
estimated at 10% while between the main canal and irrigation outlets are about 
25%.  Canal lining in some areas has been proven to be feasible. 
· Aquatic weeds are a major concern for efficient water management.  In 1990, an 
estimated 13,000 km of canals and drains were infested by submerged aquatic 
weeds, and another 1,900 km were covered by water hyacinths.  Water losses by 
transpiration are immense. 
· The recording and transmission of data such as water levels and discharges still 
depend on old methods.  Gradual improvement of the old system is taking place.  
Both automatic recording gauging stations and telemetric systems now exist in 
some locations. 
· In the absence of adequate maintenance of the physical infrastructure of water 
delivery, neglected systems deteriorate.  Needless to say, deteriorated systems are 
unable to meet water delivery schedules. 
· Water quality has a direct effect on the quantity available for specific uses.  As 
the quality of water diminishes, its scope of use narrows, thereby reducing 
supplies and intensifying shortages, resulting in increased competition. 
 
3.1.5 High On-farm Water Use 
The Nile irrigation system was designed to deliver water below the grade of farmers’ 
fields, requiring the farmer to lift water from the mesqa to the field.  Water is delivered 
on a rotational basis, adjusting water levels in the branch canals to get water into the 
mesqas.  The typical type of irrigation practiced by farmers in the old areas is flood 
irrigation, which requires a relatively high rate of water application, though the cost of 
pumping provides some incentive against extravagant water use.  
High on-farm water use leads to high water tables, waterlogging and increased soil.  
Reduced irrigation would lessen but not solve these problems in the slowly draining soils 
of the Nile Delta and upstream depressions.  Year-round irrigation is the primary culprit 
for these problems, as there is not sufficient time for the soils to drain and dry out.  Thus 
a drainage system is needed even if farmers become more efficient in water use.   
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The Irrigation Improvement Program, discussed in the previous section, changes the 
method of delivery to gravity flow with raised mesqas or pressurized pipes, which shifts 
the cost of lifting from the individual farmer to the water user association that is 
responsible for equitably distributing the water.  In a properly operated “improved” 
system, irrigation costs per feddan are about half of what they were before the IIP 
investments (APRP Water Policy Reform, Report # 7).  Costs are shared among farmers 
by area served, so that a farmer only recognizes a fraction of the cost each time he 
irrigates.  Under the new system, farm demand can be limited by rules set by the WUA. 
IIP-sponsored investments have been shown to be cost effective (Allam, 2001).  Benefit-
cost ratios have ranged from 1.3 to 1.9, depending on the area and the type of raised 
mesqa.  The higher cost of underground pressurized PVC pipelines in some areas have 
resulted in lower ratios, ranging from 0.9 to 1.5.  However, a more recent study (APRP 
Water Policy Reform, Report # 7) was not able to draw strong conclusions on cost 
effectiveness due to incomplete implementation of IIP in the areas studied.  The 
drawbacks to IIP are its high initial costs, slow rate of implementation, and the long 
period allowed for repayment (resulting in less than full cost recovery). 
When water is short, it is extremely difficult to provide a more efficient or equitable 
distribution of water along the mesqa in Egypt’s below grade system of delivery.  
Shortages occur even more frequently when the canals are poorly maintained.  WUAs at 
either the mesqa or branch canal levels may be able to provide a more equitable 
allocation if they are empowered to do so.   
 
3.1.6 Inadequate Farmer Contributions to Irrigation System Upkeep 
Prior to the socialist period in Egypt’s political history and construction of the High 
Aswan Dam, farmers were heavily involved in the management of irrigation and flood 
control systems.  The HAD was constructed and an extensive system of canals and drains 
was developed to provide water for irrigation the year around.  Later, responsibility for 
operating and maintaining the system of canals and drains was taken over by the central 
government, and farmers were only responsible for maintaining the mesqas.  
While farmers have never paid directly for irrigation water service, they previously were 
heavily taxed on their output.  Prior to agriculture sector liberalization, which began in 
1986, farmers were forced to grow government-mandated crops and to sell them at prices 
well below the world price.  While most inputs (fuel, fertilizer, seed, water) were 
subsidized, the revenue from output “taxes” easily exceeded the cost of subsidies.  Thus 
farmers were making a large contribution to the government’s ability to maintain the 
irrigation system.  Further, government policy during these times was to shift a portion of 
the net resources generated out of the agriculture sector to finance industrialization. 
The policy shift toward a market-based economy that started in the mid-1980’s has 
fundamentally altered this situation.  Farm prices and incomes per feddan have risen 
dramatically.  While liberalization has yet to be completed, government taxation of 
farmers is now far less than the cost of remaining subsidies.  Controls on crops largely 
have been eliminated, and the tax burden is light.  Remaining market distortions are in 
the form of government-guaranteed floor prices (rice and wheat have such arrangements).   
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Substantial subsidies on farming inputs also continue.  First and foremost, there is no 
service charge on the delivery of irrigation water.  There also remain fuel subsidies (of 
about 50%) and fertilizer subsidies (on the order of 30%).  In addition, farmers are 
provided with highly subsidized irrigation and drainage system improvements as 
described above.  
Egyptian farmers are only lightly taxed, with the agricultural land tax at almost a 
negligible level (Annex B).  Yet this tax is expensive to administer, with collection costs 
representing about half of the revenues generated.  There have been repeated 
recommendations in recent years to either eliminate the tax or to increase it to make it 
more efficient. 
Egyptian agriculture policy, therefore, has moved from a long history of heavy effective 
taxation of the sector to significant subsidization over the past two decades.  Farm 
incomes per unit of land have increased substantially, yet it remains politically difficult to 
remove remaining subsidies, including the introduction of charges for the delivery of 
irrigation water.   
Agriculture in the old lands is characterized by very small, highly fragmented parcels.  
Average farm size in the old lands is about 1 feddan, and it has been falling as land 
passes to succeeding generations.  High birth rates and a shortage of non-agricultural 
employment alternatives contribute to this trend.  Use of traditional farming practices at 
this size with no off-farm income can barely support a family; hence most farmers in 
Egypt remain poor.  This helps to explain the political reluctance to impose new financial 
burdens on farmers.  
At present, rather than introduce water service charges, the Government of Egypt is 
attempting to reduce its costs by transferring more responsibilities to the farmers 
themselves.  Experience now is being gained in projects that establish water user 
associations at the branch canal level for purposes of transferring management authority.  
Successful irrigation management transfer models of large, decentralized irrigation 
systems that exist in the United States, Mexico, and Turkey among other places are being 
emulated. 
In the same farm surveys reported above, attitudinal data show an increase in farmers’ 
willingness to share in the cost of upgrading irrigation and drainage systems as shown in 
Table 6, though willingness to cost share is higher among men than women.  A slight 
decline was registered in the proportion of farmers willing to join a WUA, but the 
proportions remain high among men.  
 
Table 6. Comparison of Farmer Attitudes about Cost Sharing, 1998 and 2001 
Questions Men Women 
 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Willing to share in costs of:     
  Upgrading irrigation system? 76.4 85.0 50.0 67.7 
  Upgrading drainage system? 72.7 82.7 47.3 65.9 
Would join if a WUA was formed nearby? 77.7 74.7 36.7 24.0 
Source: El-Zanaty and Associates (1998); preliminary data from EPIQ/WPRP survey. 
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The alternative to irrigation management transfer is to attempt to raise revenue directly 
from farmers.  While there have been many proposals made in the past concerning the 
introduction of area-based water charges, these have not been implemented.  The major 
reason is the widespread concern that smallholder and resource-limited farmers could not 
afford to make such payments (though there is little hard evidence to test the validity of 
this assertion).  Average farm size nationwide is an estimated to be 2.2 feddan, which 
means that many farm families have less than one feddan to cultivate.  Collection cost is 
another issue, since parcels in old lands are not only small but also are highly fragmented 
(a farm family with only 1 or 2 feddan of land may manage this land in three or more 
separate parcels).  This can lead to high collection costs (as experienced by the 
agricultural land tax).  
 
 
 
3.1.7 Weak Attention to In-stream Flows  
 
It often is forgotten that maintaining the base (“in-stream”) flow of the Nile River and 
minimum flows of irrigation and drainage canals has a value of its own (and should be 
considered a “use or user” in its own right).  In-stream flows primarily affect the 
Northern Lakes and coastal ecosystem as well as fishing and navigation on the Nile.  As 
irrigation delivery efficiency improves, the salinity of drain water comprising a large 
proportion of these base flows will increase.  The diversion of water for horizontal 
expansion plans means less water will be available for discharge to the river and lakes.  
Finally, drainage water is becoming increasingly polluted with sewage and industrial 
wastewater. The latter concern will hopefully decrease over time as the government 
expands its efforts to improve water quality.  But the quality and quantity of water to 
support the Northern Lakes will decline as land reclamation projects are implemented.   
An inadequate allocation of fresh water for the Northern lakes may occur in the future.  
About 50 percent of the national fish catch comes from the Northern Lakes and the fish 
farms around these lakes (Allam, 2001).  Estimates by Imam and Ibrahim (1996) place 
the base flow needed to sustain environmental conditions conducive to a healthy fishery 
to be 8 BCM of drainage water with reasonable quality per year flowing to the sea via the 
Lakes.   
Navigation depends on the volume of water in the river and the depths along the 
navigation course in addition to the operation of locks on the river and canals. The 
volume of boat traffic using the river is over 1400 transport units and nearly 600 steam 
launches. Nile tourism activities also have expanded, and there now are 310 tourist ships 
and floating hotels (Allam, 2001). Generally, releases from Lake Nasser and drainage 
discharges have been sufficient to enable navigation, but there has been recent experience 
with insufficient flows. 
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3.1.8 Non-renewable Groundwater Management in the Western Desert 
 
The oases of Egypt’s Western Desert are completely dependent upon deep and non-
renewable groundwater supplies for their survival.  There are three major problems 
concerning these supplies: uncontrolled free-flowing wells; how to effectively control 
groundwater extraction over the long-term; and insufficient cost-sharing by farmers.   
 
Because of problems with collapsing wells due to high back pressures during rapid valve 
closure, free-flowing wells can not be shut off even though irrigation does not occur at 
night.  The result is a high degree of water wastage, water logging and soil salinization in 
these arid regions.  MWRI’s policy is to control well output where it can, and for those 
wells that cannot be controlled, nighttime flows are to be stored in the canals or in new 
storage facilities.  This policy negatively affects farmers that irrigate from ponds that 
have been created by the excess flows. 
 
Over time, exploitation of the deep groundwater resources decreases artesian pressures.  
For most wells, water is initially free-flowing but increased abstraction eventually results 
in the need for pumping.   Evidence of falling pressures can be seen in records showing 
that the average daily discharge of free-flowing deep wells has decreased from 3,600 m3 
in 1960 to 1,400 m3 in 1999. As the level of groundwater drops, pumping costs increase.  
Eventually it will no longer be economical to pump water for agricultural use. 
 
The policy used to control groundwater extraction is to issue permits both for existing 
and new wells.  Extraction of groundwater in 1997 was an estimated 0.7 BCM per year. 
The present estimate of the maximum economic extraction rate is 2.4 BCM, which would 
be more than a three-fold increase from the current level.  Most of the additional water 
use would come from East Oweinat, which is outside of the New Valley.  Within the 
New Valley, an annual extraction rate of 0.6 BCM in 1997 compares with the estimated 
available economic rate of 1.0 BCM. 
 
Estimates of optimal use of deep aquifers will likely change over time as better 
information and models are developed.  At some point in the future, the four countries 
that overlie the aquifer—Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Chad—also may reach an agreement 
that defines Egypt’s share of the Nubian Aquifer.  Whatever the optimal rate of 
withdrawal, enforcement of laws related to water has been weak throughout Egypt and 
may indicate that rules will be poorly enforced here as well.  This raises doubts as to 
whether private well development and use can be effectively controlled by a permitting 
process.  
 
Cost sharing is another issue that will need to be addressed.  Presently the operation and 
maintenance of wells, pumps and main canals is solely the responsibility of government.  
MWRI is promoting the formation of associations of groundwater users to improve 
irrigation water delivery in accordance with Law 213. The first three Water User Unions 
were formed in the West Qasr El-Farafra area in 1999.  A November 1998 survey 
conducted in El-Farafra Oasis found support for granting user associations responsibility 
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for scheduling and distribution of well water and other functions.  However, nearly all 
respondents wanted the government to continue its role in operation and maintenance and 
replacement of wells and pumps.  Reducing operating subsidies will not be popular, but 
the cost will only grow as the pumping requirements expand over time. 
 
3.1.9 Subsidies Affecting Water Quantity 
 
A number of subsidies affecting water supply already have been mentioned.  For 
example, energy is heavily subsidized in Egypt. In the urban water sector, pumping is a 
major component of the cost of delivery. The present subsidy of urban water delivery 
costs would be even higher if energy prices were not subsidized. In the agricultural 
sector, increasing mechanization has led to greater consumption of diesel fuel, 
particularly for the operation of tractors and irrigation pumps. Diesel fuel is sold for 
about half of the world price. The subsidy amounts to 14 to 60 percent of net income 
across various crops, and its removal probably would increase net irrigation water use 
efficiency (see Annex B). Pumping is also a large expense for MWRI in Middle and 
Upper Egypt, where water must be lifted from the Nile or Lake Nasser to supply the 
adjacent agricultural lands. Reducing the subsidy on energy would provide an incentive 
for urban water supply agencies, farmers, and MWRI to conserve on energy use and 
hence increase the efficiency in which water is conveyed and consumed. 
 
3.1.10 Rainfall Capture and Flash Flood Protection 
 
Autumn and spring rainfall in Northern Egypt and Sinai causes flash flooding. Up to 
now, the preparation for and response to such events has been entirely a government 
responsibility. Rainfall harvesting schemes have been started in the wadis of desert areas 
and could be expanded.  Studies have indicated that enhanced rainfall harvesting could 
have a significant impact on water supply on a localized level. 
 
3.1.11 Negative Consequences of Rising Water Tables  
  
Year-round irrigation, high on-farm water use, canal leakage, and high urban water 
system losses have caused ground water tables to rise in recent years.  In some areas, the 
foundations of buildings and antiquities are being damaged. 
 
The expansion of irrigated agriculture, especially on the fringes of the Nile Valley and 
the Delta, and the construction of the High Aswan Dam have raised water tables 
significantly. High water tables allow salts to migrate to the surface where they damage 
and eventually destroy limestone. Whether this is termed a water quantity problem (from 
excessive use leading to high water tables) or a water quality problem (because of the salt 
content), the damage to structures—including irreplaceable antiquities—is severe and 
sadly disappointing in some areas. For example, at the Luxor Temple, several of the 
Sphinxes are disintegrating into powder, and nearly all are crusted in white near their 
base. 
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3.1.12 Institutional Constraints to Water Quantity Management 
 
There are numerous laws and rules prohibiting certain water use and abuse activities.  Yet 
enforcement remains weak.  This is a principal institutional constraint to improved water 
management.  For example, according to government regulations farmers are not allowed 
to grow rice outside designated areas.  Yet thousands of feddans of rice are illegally 
grown with penalties rarely being assessed.  Another example is the payment of 
electricity bills by farmers.  In one area in the Delta using pressurized pipes, farmers at 
the tail end of the system refused to pay their share of the WUA’s electric bill, since they 
weren’t getting a fair share of water. The whole WUA followed suit, and did not resume 
payments until the pumps were upgraded.  Enforcement of rules imposed on farmers is a 
problem in most countries, and Egypt is no exception. 
 
Other institutional constraints relate to the need for retooling of skills in key water 
management agencies—especially to reflect a better balance between engineering and 
socio-economics.  Past attention of MWRI and other agencies involved with water 
management has centered on organizing the physical aspects of the water delivery 
system.  Water professionals in Egypt now recognize that their strong engineering skills 
will not be sufficient to deal with the emerging next generation of water management 
challenges that are the subject of this report—requiring much greater attention to social, 
economic and environmental dimensions of water management.  The section which 
follows centers on one of these aspects, namely, growing concerns over pollution and 
water quality management in the country. 
 
3.2 Water Quality Management Challenges 
 
3.2.1 Overview 
 
Water quality problems in Egypt vary with location and depend on factors such as: water 
flow rates; water uses; population densities; sanitation systems; industrial discharges; 
demands for navigation; and agricultural runoff.  
 
There is increasing concern about the rising costs of environmental degradation to the 
country—including water misallocation and declining water quality.  Table 7 presents 
some preliminary figures associated with a range of environmental problems.  The point 
of presenting this data here is not to focus on the specific values, but rather to give a good 
indication of the potential magnitude of social costs associated with environmental 
degradation and the importance of attention to reducing these pressures on the economy. 
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Table 7. Costs of Environmental Degradation in Egypt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Pillet, Gonzague, 2001. Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation in the  
Mashreq and Maghreb Countries: Egypt Case Study, World Bank. 
 
It is useful to review the principal water quality patterns in the main waters of Egypt as a 
backdrop to the discussion of problems and possible solutions.  This brief survey begins 
upstream with Lake Nasser and concludes with the situation in the Nile Delta and along 
the Mediterranean coast including the Northern Lakes. 
 
3.2.2 Lake Nasser Pollution 
 
The most important “pollution” problem facing Lake Nasser is sediment deposition. 
When the high dam was constructed, the expectation was that the lake would have a 
useful life of at least 250 years. However more recent calculations predict the lake will 
fill with sediment within approximately 100 years (USAID-IRG, Nile Basin Initiative 
ETOCA Study, 2000). Sediment dredging may be required before the end of the 21st 
Century to maintain irrigation and hydropower capacities of the high dam. In fact, there 
are already discussions within the Government of Egypt to deal with this issue and 
develop markets for any dredged material. 
 
The Nile River water quality monitoring program within the National Water Quality and 
Availability Management Project (NAWQAM) collects samples at four locations in the 
lake within the territory of Egypt during the summer and winter seasons. In addition, the 
Nile Research Institute and the High Aswan Dam Authority collect water samples twice a 
year in both the Egyptian and Sudanese portions of the Lake. All samples show good 
Sector 
 
Economic Loss LE Billions 
 
Percent of GDP 
 
Air     
     Morbidity and mortality 8.4 2.3 
     Aesthetics (including tourism) 2.9 0.8 
Water     
     Water pollution 4.6 1.3 
     Water allocation inefficiencies 18.0 4.9 
     Water system losses 2.6 0.7 
Land     
     Productivity losses 5.8 1.6 
     Urban encroachment 4.0 1.1 
Waste     
     Solid waste 2.2 0.6 
     Hazardous waste 0.1 0.0 
     Amenity and tourism impacts 1.3 0.3 
Biodiversity losses 2.4 0.7 
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water quality that meets the water quality standards of Law 48, but growing human 
settlements on the shores of the lake may threaten water quality in the future. 
 
3.2.3 Nile River Water Quality from Aswan to Cairo 
 
Between Aswan and Cairo, water quality meets standards in several locations, but there 
also are areas where polluters are failing to meet established discharge standards. 
NAWQAM monitors ambient river water quality at several locations along the river.  
Ambient water quality generally meets standards (set in Decree 8/1983), but there also 
are areas where pollution levels are higher than the established norms. These polluted 
stretches of the river are primarily associated with industrial discharges. Some 34 large 
industrial facilities discharge into the Nile between Aswan and Cairo. All of these 
facilities now have installed effluent treatment facilities.  However, as of February 2000, 
ten of these facilities still were not in compliance with some of the effluent concentration 
discharge standards set in Law 48 (see Table 8). 
 
A comparison of ambient water quality data collected for this part of the Nile under 
different monitoring programs in 1977, 1986 and 1991 suggested that water quality had 
deteriorated slightly but remained satisfactory for most uses. NAWQAM data for the late 
1990s are not strictly comparable, so it is impossible to say much about recent trends. 
With respect to individual water quality parameters, effluents from sugar factories, pulp 
and paper and other industries contribute to the BOD load, but water quality remains 
within the standards of Decree 8/1983, which is 6 mg of O2/l. High loads of COD 
originate at a bottling plant, onion drying factories, and sugar mills, but water quality 
remains within the standard for this parameter (10 mg O2/l). Suspended solids 
demonstrate a slow but steady increase from Aswan to the Delta Barrage (Cairo). 
Dissolved oxygen does not decline below the standard of 5 mg/l all of the way to Cairo. 
Oil and grease is a growing problem, which is caused by the heavy use of the Nile as a 
waterway, and standards are exceeded for this parameter. Heavy metals are present in 
trace quantities but remain within the standards. At the Delta Barrage water has an 
average salinity of about 255 ppm. 
 
Table 8. Discharges of Nile River Industries Out of Compliance with Law 48  
 Law 48 Limits & Recorded Discharge Levels (exceeded standards in bold) 
Source of 
Pollution 
PH 
(6 – 9) 
BOD 
30 
mg/l 
COD 
40 
mg/l 
TDS 
1200 
mg/l 
TSS 
30 
mg/l 
Oil & 
Grease 
5 mg/l 
Nitrate 
30 
mg/l 
Inorgan 
Phosp 
1 mg/l 
Fe 
1 mg/l 
Kima 
Factory 
(Aswan) 
 
9.4 
 
4 
 
55 
 
1920 
 
15 
 
6.4 
 
450 
 
0.20 
 
0.11 
Kom Imbou 
Sugar 
Factory  
 
5.7 
 
83 
 
657 
 
410 
 
67 
 
9.3 
 
2.1 
 
0.06 
 
0.85 
Idfou-1 
Sugar 
Factory 
 
9.3 
 
410 
 
1440 
 
365 
 
65 
 
5.6 
 
2.2 
 
0.04 
 
0.23 
Idfou-2          
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 Law 48 Limits & Recorded Discharge Levels (exceeded standards in bold) 
Source of 
Pollution 
PH 
(6 – 9) 
BOD 
30 
mg/l 
COD 
40 
mg/l 
TDS 
1200 
mg/l 
TSS 
30 
mg/l 
Oil & 
Grease 
5 mg/l 
Nitrate 
30 
mg/l 
Inorgan 
Phosp 
1 mg/l 
Fe 
1 mg/l 
Sugar 
Factory 
5.2 81 600 225 42 5.6 1.3 0.04 0.74 
Qous  
Sugar 
Factory  
 
7.5 
 
77 
 
189 
 
240 
 
22 
 
-- 
 
1.0 
 
0.15 
 
0.40 
Sohag  
Oil  
Factory  
 
7.6 
 
8.5 
 
33 
 
1374 
 
145 
 
7.3 
 
3.5 
 
0.04 
 
0.39 
 
Coca Cola 
Bottling 
Factory 
 
11.3 
 
83 
 
256 
 
737 
 
39 
 
5.9 
 
3.5 
 
0.14 
 
0.27 
 
Elhwamdia 
Sugar 
Factory 
 
1.1 
 
440 
 
3850 
 
8192 
 
60 
 
17.6 
 
10 
 
7.50 
 
-- 
Salt and 
Soda 
Factory 
 
-- 
 
130 
 
155 
 
-- 
 
387 
 
9.4 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
Talkha 
Fertilizer 
Factory 
 
10.2 
 
98 
 
204 
 
1350 
 
67 
 
7.6 
 
128 
 
-- 
 
-- 
Notes: Data as of February 2000; dash (--) indicates information not available. 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation. March 2001, "A Memorandum to be presented 
to the Ministerial Committee for River Nile Protection from the Pollution of Canals, Drains and 
Groundwater" (in Arabic). 
 
3.2.4 Water Pollution in the Delta from Cairo to the Sea 
 
Irrigation canals in the Nile Delta region are becoming increasingly polluted, particularly 
those that pass through villages, towns and residential areas. Because of a lack of 
alternative disposal options, both solid and liquid wastes routinely are dumped into 
irrigation canals in violation of existing laws.  As explained below, they are also 
receiving increasing volumes of polluted drainage canal water under official drainage 
water “reuse” programs meant to supplement irrigation supplies. 
  
Untreated and partially treated municipal wastewater and industrial wastewater from the 
Giza area is discharged directly into the Muheet and Rahway Drains. Toxic chemicals are 
discharged by industry at Kafr El-Zayat Drain that takes the effluent down the Rosetta 
Branch to be discharged to the Sea above Alexandria. Many villages discharge raw or 
partly treated sewage into irrigation and drainage canals.  The Damietta Branch receives 
nutrients (primarily in the form of ammonia) and organics from the Delta Company for 
Fertilizer and Chemical Industries (in Talkha) and saline agricultural drainage water in 
the vicinity of the Faraskour Dam. Raw sewage from Al-Kholei village also drains into 
the Damietta Branch.  Water quality for the Damietta and Rosetta Branches deteriorates 
rapidly downstream of Cairo, and is especially acute during low flow conditions. At 
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about 120 km downstream from Delta Barrage, the Rosetta Branch receives polluted 
inflows from five drains (El Rahawy, Sabel, El-Tahreer, Zaweit El-Bahr and Tala).  
 
The principal purpose of the agricultural drainage system is to maintain proper soil 
moisture levels in fields and to remove accumulated salts.  In Upper Egypt, the drainage 
network discharges directly to main canals of the Nile Valley and to the Nile River.  In 
the Nile Delta, the network collects irrigation drainage water and transfers salts (as well 
as sediments and other accumulated pollutants) from the soils of cultivated lands to the 
Northern Lakes in the coastal region and through Rosetta Branch Canal to the 
Mediterranean Sea.   
 
Since the 1980s, efforts have been underway to extend available irrigation water supplies 
by mixing drainage water in the Delta with fresh water. When this policy was first 
conceived, the principal goal was to supplement irrigation canal waters with drainage 
water of low enough salinity levels to allow—through mixing—for better and additional 
irrigated lands.  Salinity of drainage water upstream of the Delta is relatively low (below 
1,000 ppm), but it increases in downstream drains to 2,000-5,000 ppm.  Since uses of 
water for irrigation become quite limited at salinity levels exceeding 2,000 ppm, Delta 
drainage water must be “mixed” with “fresh” canal water before use.  
In practice, many drains in the Delta region are used to collect not only irrigation and 
stormwater run-off but also industrial and municipal wastes, and this has seriously 
complicated implementation of the drainage water reuse policy.  For example, in Shoubra 
El-Kheima, a heavy concentration of industry—including metal fabrication, food 
processing, textiles finishing, paper production and detergent and soap manufacturing—
discharges large volumes of wastewater into agricultural drains. The water contains 
chemical and biological pollution that can seriously limit its reuse potential for 
agriculture.  
The Drainage Research Institute has established 140 stations for monitoring agricultural 
drains. Monthly samples taken at these stations are analyzed for 32 elements such as 
salinity, BOD, COD, organics, heavy metals and DO. Levels of COD and BOD exceed 
national ambient water quality standards at every monitoring station, and there also is a 
deficiency of DO relative to these standards. Certain locations have been deemed so 
polluted as to pose hazards to public health.  The consequence has been the closure of 
some drainage canal mixing stations or of water treatment plants with intakes on main 
canals receiving polluted drainage water.  An extensive network of 25 mixing stations has 
been established in the Delta to transfer drainage water back into irrigation canals for 
reuse, but five reuse stations have had to be closed due to these excessive pollution levels 
(see Table 9).  Several others are threatened with closure (MWRI, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APRP Water Policy Program                          33         Economic Incentives for Water Management 
Table 9. Mixing Stations for Drainage Water Reuse in Nile Delta and Fayoum 
 
Pumping Station 
 
Drain  
 
Mixing 
Location 
Annual 
Discharge 
(MCM) 
Current 
Status 
East Delta:      
Wadi  Qaliobia East Wadi 200 Shut down 
Bahr Elbaqar Bahr Elbaqar Elbateekh 20 Operating 
Belad Elayed Belad Elayed  East Wadi 150 Operating 
Hanout  Hadous Bahr Mouis 250 Operating 
Geneina Emoum Elbeheira Elbahr 
Elsaghir 
215 Operating 
Saft  Saft Elbahry Daffan 130 Operating 
Elmahsama Elmahsama Ismailia 200 Shut down 
Upper Elserw  Serw Damietta 
Branch 
275 Operating 
Elsalam 1  Lower Serw Elsalam 650 Operating 
Elsalam 3 Hadous Elsalam 1350 Operating 
     
Middle Delta:     
Upper (1) Number 1 Damietta 
Branch 
60 Shut down 
East Menoufia  Elqarenein Abbasi Rayah 50 Operating 
Mahalet Rouh  Mahalet Roh Mit Yazid  90 Operating 
Elhamoul  Gharbia Main Bahr Tira 400 Operating 
Elgharbia Drain Gharbia Main Bahr Tira 800 Operating 
Elmahalla Elkobra  Omer Bey Damietta 
Branch 
100 Operating 
Boteita  Gharbia Main Elzawia 100 Shut down 
     
West Delta:     
Elemoum  Elemoum Nobaria 1000 Shut down 
Itay Elbaroud Itay Elbaroud East Khandak 60 Operating 
Idkou Idkou Mahmoudia 90 Operating 
Dalangat  Dalangat Elhager 235 Operating 
West Khandak  West Khandak Abou Deyab 60 Operating 
Bostan  Bostan Nobaria 55 Operating 
Dalangat Extension Dalangat Ext. Nobaria 80 Operating 
Mariout  Elemoum Nobaria 60 Operating 
Fayoum:     
Elbats  Elbats Bahr Wahbi 80 Operating 
Eltagen  Elwadi Bahr Elnazla 100 Operating 
Elgharak  Elgharak Bahr Elnazla 45 Operating 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation, March 2001. 
 
Each year a total of about 5 BCM of drainage water is reused in the Delta, and another 
4.7 BCM of agricultural drainage water returns to the Nile upstream of Cairo. Official 
reuse in the Delta is expected to rise to about 7 BCM over the near term and 9 BCM by 
2017.  In addition to threatened agricultural water supplies, unauthorized use of polluted 
drainage water to irrigate fields also constitutes a growing health concern. Farmers 
APRP Water Policy Program                          34         Economic Incentives for Water Management 
illegally remove approximately 3-4 BCM of drainage water annually to apply to their 
fields. When contaminated with human waste and/or toxic and/or heavy metals, this 
poses troublesome health issues. It also adds to rising salinity and pollution levels in 
agricultural drainage water of the Delta, presenting one of the most important water 
management challenges facing the country. 
 
As noted in the previous section, the government is now attempting to implement a new 
policy on “intermediate reuse” of drainage water that emphasizes the recycling of water 
upstream of significant pollution discharge points to reduce problems of cross-
contamination and the accumulation of pollutants in drainage canal water that is used to 
supplement irrigation water.  
 
3.2.5 Pollution of Lakes 
 
The Northern Lakes are the eventual sink for most of the Nile’s agricultural drainage, and 
they also receive untreated municipal and industrial waste from Cairo and Alexandria. 
Lake Manzala and Lake Mariout receive the majority of these wastes with resulting 
dramatic declines in their water quality in recent years. These lakes were reduced in size 
by approximately 75 percent during the 20th Century as part of an explicit program to 
increase agricultural land area. All of the Northern Lakes previously were important 
fisheries, however catch has decreased by 70-90 percent over the past twenty years—
causing dislocations in the communities previously dependent upon these fisheries for 
their livelihoods and giving a good indication of the extent of the pollution problems.  In 
sum, the water quality situation in the country’s main lakes is as follows: 
 
· Lake Mariout is highly polluted.  It receives untreated municipal wastewater from 
Alexandria as well as industrial effluents from over 60 factories that discharge 
directly or indirectly to the lake. The Lake has high concentrations of heavy metals, 
fecal coliform and a high BOD. Mercury levels in fish have been recorded at over 
1,000 ppm compared to a World Health Organization norm of 1 ppm (Cedare, 1998).  
 
· Lake Manzala in the Eastern Delta near Port Said receives untreated municipal and 
industrial wastewater from Cairo through the Bahr El-Baqar drain and from other 
settlements in the Delta.  
 
· Lake Qarun, the drainage sink of the Fayoum area, once served as a popular tourist 
destination, supported a fishery and was an important habitat for migratory 
waterfowl. Over the years, use of the lake as a depository for drainage water and 
largely-untreated municipal wastewater has had severe adverse effects on all of these 
former uses. 
 
· Lake Bardawil (now called the Zaranik Protected Area) on the Sinai coast of the 
Mediterranean contains one of Egypt's two internationally-recognized wetland sites 
(under the Ramsar Convention). Lake Burullus is the other Ramsar site, and is located 
on the Mediterranean coast in the central portion of the delta where it receives 
industrial effluent principally through the Nashart Drain. 
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3.2.6 Groundwater Contamination  
 
Groundwater in the Delta, largely a shallow underground aquifer fed by of the Nile river, 
receives pollution from a variety of sources.  Excessive withdrawals, especially from 
coastal aquifers, increases groundwater salinity with negative long-term impacts on water 
use and soil pollution.  Along the Mediterranean coast, high salinity levels occur from 
seawater intrusion when groundwater withdrawals exceed recharge capacity.  In newly 
reclaimed areas of the Delta’s fringes, shallow soils do little to protect the aquifer from 
pollution seeping from agricultural drains and irrigation canals.  Groundwater salinity in 
reclaimed lands—such as El Busstan, North of Tahreer and El Salhyiah—is more than 
1,500 ppm. Salinity levels along the coast are even higher.  Industrial waste sometimes is 
discharged into unlined lagoons (as in 10th of Ramadan City) where it easily leaks into 
shallow aquifers. Bacterial contamination of groundwater from raw sewage also is 
common in many parts of the densely populated Delta.  Nitrate concentrations in 
reclaimed areas range from 70-100 ppm, which poses additional health concerns.     
In the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer formation of the Western Desert, iron concentrations 
are high at El Farafra Oasis, and the lower part of the reservoir has high salinity. Control 
of groundwater withdrawals at Siwa Oasis is necessary to protect groundwater quality as 
well as its availability.  
 
3.3 Institutional and Policy Issues Affecting Water Quality Management 
 
3.3.1 Institutional Constraints 
 
A number of institutional limitations, budgetary constraints, and other factors limit 
current capacity to adequately address water quality concerns. For example, planning and 
development of water and wastewater plants has not been guided by a comprehensive 
assessment of Egypt's environmental protection needs. While a relatively large share of 
GDP has been invested in the construction of municipal wastewater plants, the impacts of 
these investments on the environment have been limited by their inefficiencies and other 
factors. Rural water supply and sanitation as well as industrial pollution control have 
received low policy attention. Charges for municipal water supply and wastewater 
service, while recently increased, cover only about one-third of operating and 
maintenance costs—suggesting that the financial viability of these systems is doubtful. 
Some recent interest in privatization has been directed at solving this problem—the 
theory being that rate increases and staffing reductions might allow for break-even or 
even profitable operations.  
 
Law 4 directs EEAA to supervise and operate the national water quality monitoring 
network through an Environmental Information Center within EEAA. Law 48 appears to 
assign the same responsibility to MWRI, creating duplicative requirements for data 
collection, processing and analysis that require resolution.  Within both EEAA and the 
MWRI, there is limited capacity to enforce water quality regulations. Government-owned 
enterprises, which are the main industrial polluters, often appear to receive special  
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treatment because they are difficult to fine or otherwise force into compliance with water 
pollution standards. Many of these enterprises also fail to pay what they should for water 
deliveries. The primary reason given is the fear of creating unemployment should they be 
closed or their production inhibited. The gradual privatization of some enterprises 
(notably cement) has improved the situation modestly, but privatization efforts are 
moving slowly. 
 
Many wastewater treatment plants in the Delta (some of which are partly or wholly 
financed by external donors) are only partially completed, and others are finished but lack 
discharge permits from the Ministry of Health and/or MWRI. Finding financing to 
complete these plants is a high priority as is the permitting of those ready to operate—
even if their discharges cannot meet present standards (even limited treatment will 
certainly be better than none). 
 
In general, better coordination and communication is needed among Government of 
Egypt initiatives to improve water quality management.  Some examples of concurrent 
efforts follow: 
 
· The High Committee for the Nile, chaired by the Minister of MWRI and represented 
by MOI, MALR, MHP, MIMW, MHNCPU and MOSEA, is responsible for 
protecting the quality and quantity of the entire Nile system. 
· The National Water Quality Conservation Unit (NWQCU), is the focal point on water 
quality information in Egypt and attempts to bridge between entities that generate 
data and users of information. 
· The National Water Quality Conservation Program Advisory Committee was 
instituted to guide the program of the NWQCU and has representatives from EEAA, 
DRI, RIGW, NRC and other government agencies. 
· The Central Directorate for Waterways Maintenance in the Irrigation Sector of 
MWRI, which has responsibility for issuing licenses (permits) for sources of 
municipal and industrial wastewater discharge under Law 48, supervises irrigation 
and drainage to prevent inappropriate activities by other parties and carries out the 
necessary legal follow-up actions. 
· The Water Communication Unit attached to the MWRI has responsibilities for raising 
public awareness regarding water scarcity and the risks of polluted water resources. 
· EEAA oversees implementation of requirements under Law 4 for the conduct of 
Environmental Impact Assessments of projects with the potential to cause significant 
adverse environmental impacts, including the operation of industrial and wastewater 
treatment plants. 
· A new Water Quality Unit is being established under the Minister’s Office in MWRI 
partly to address some of these coordination issues.  
 
 
3.3.2 Budgetary Considerations 
 
The Government’s current Five Year Plan allocates L.E. 26 billion for environmental 
management, about half of which is for municipal water supply provision and wastewater 
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treatment. This amounts to approximately 1.2 percent of GDP each year, an amount that 
compares favorably with countries such as China, but is lower than the U.S. and most 
Western European nations (which average 1.5% to 2%). About 0.4 percent of this 
budgeted amount is for EEAA.  Limited resources are currently allocated for water 
quality management in MWRI’s budget. 
 
3.3.3 Subsidies Affecting Water Quality 
 
Fuel price and water delivery cost subsidies affect water use and, indirectly, water 
quality. Diesel and mazut (No. 6 Fuel Oil) are priced domestically at approximately one-
half of their world prices. Water is delivered free to agricultural users.  Large industrial 
users located on the Nile pay only modest prices for their water deliveries.  In the past, 
fertilizer and pesticides were heavily subsidized, leading to high use and water quality 
impairment, and some market distortions and resulting pollution still remain. 
 
Water service is very cheap for some of the largest industries, so it is not surprising that 
they often meet required limits on effluent discharge concentrations through dilution 
rather than actual pollution load reductions (Samia Galal Saad, per. comm.).  As noted in 
the previous section, the free provision of irrigation service in the agricultural sector leads 
to excessive use and contributes to a range of problems, including waterlogged soils.  
 
3.4 Summary of Key Water Management Challenges 
 
A number of important water management challenges have been identified relating to 
both water quantity and quality management.  With respect to water quantity 
management, it has been noted that the inability to adequately maintain the irrigation 
infrastructure because of funding constraints will make it increasingly difficult to 
distribute water efficiently or equitably.  The areas where shortages will be most felt are 
in old lands where irrigation improvement programs have yet to be implemented.  Where 
there is no effective WUA, farmers at the end of mesqas also will suffer 
disproportionately when there are water shortages.  Improved areas are more likely to 
have formal WUAs and are physically and institutionally better able to distribute water 
equitably.  There remains a strong reluctance to ask poor farmers to pay for water service, 
and there also is a high cost of collecting revenue.  However, the low level of cost sharing 
for irrigation service has reduced the ability of government to maintain the delivery 
system.  Some of the water quantity challenges identified reflect an immediate problem 
faced in the field while others relate more to the underlying causes of water management 
problems. In contrast, the presentation of water quality issues has been arranged largely 
by the locations where problems are currently being experienced or may be in the future. 
Water pollution and related management problems have been reviewed from upstream to 
downstream along the Nile as well as in the country’s lakes and groundwater reservoirs. 
Finally, inadequate enforcement of both water quantity and quality regulations has been 
identified as an important cross-cutting concern affecting any discussion of new policy 
approaches.    
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In sum, the following challenges have been highlighted: 
 
Table 10. Summary of Egyptian Water Management Challenges 
Water Management Challenges Identified 
Water Quantity Water Quality  
Threat of water shortages By Location: 
Service delivery in municipal water supply  Lake Nasser pollution 
Irrigation service delivery challenges Nile River pollution above Cairo 
Insufficient irrigation system upkeep Water pollution in the Nile Delta 
High on-farm water use Pollution of lakes 
Low user contribution to irrigation system upkeep Groundwater contamination 
Weak attention to in-stream flows By Impact: 
Nonrenewable groundwater management  Adverse effects on human health 
Subsidies affecting water use efficiency Reduced agricultural productivity 
Rainfall capture and flash flood protection Threats to aquatic ecosystems 
Negative consequences of rising water tables Negative impacts on aesthetics (incl. tourism)  
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4 Alternative Economic Incentives for Improving 
Water Resources Management  
 
 
4.1 Overview 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, there is a wide range of policy approaches and options available to 
address the water management challenges facing Egypt.  Market-based Instruments 
(MBIs) are nothing new in Egypt, and there already are a number in use.  The challenges 
of their use or the implications for associated institutional reform should not be 
minimized, but it is useful to note the Egyptian experience that already exists. MBIs 
currently being applied in the water sector include: 
 
· Water quantity management: 
o Charges for municipal water supply 
o Charges for industrial water supply 
 
· Water quality management: 
o Charges for wastewater services 
o Performance bonds and fees for point source pollution 
o Grants and soft loans from EPF and SDF for water quality improvement 
o Reduction/elimination of input subsidies on fertilizer and pesticides 
 
MBIs also are in widespread use outside of the water sector, including: 
 
· Liability for coral reef damage 
· Subsidies for natural gas use 
· Subsidies for field drains and charges for their cleaning 
· Tariff reductions for the import of environmental equipment 
· Voluntary deposit refunds (for bottles and batteries) 
· Cement production fee for government-owned producers (for pollution control) 
 
The remainder of this report will focus on identifying and evaluating market-based 
incentives as potential water policy tools.  This chapter presents a brief description of 
potential MBIs for water management.  Chapter 5 then goes on to introduce and apply an 
evaluation or screening process to appraise the merits of alternative policy approaches. 
Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions and recommendations reached by the study. 
 
4.2 MBIs for Water Quantity Management 
 
4.2.1 Area-based Irrigation Service Charges 
 
Area-based charges are the most common method of recovering operation and 
maintenance costs in irrigated agriculture. Under this mechanism, users are charged for 
the area irrigated.  Rates often vary according to crop choice, the extent of crop irrigated, 
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irrigation method and season. This method is relatively easy to implement and administer 
and is best suited to areas where water already is equitably distributed.  A fixed irrigated 
land charge is the easiest to administer.  Varying the rate by crop and basing it on crop 
water consumption can provide some efficiency benefits, but it requires greater 
administrative effort, since reliable records of crops planted each year or season are 
required.  The equivalent of area-based charges in municipal systems is a periodic (e.g., 
monthly) flat rate for water service, independent of the amount used.  Flat charges are 
necessary when the volume used cannot be measured (e.g., because there are no working 
meters), but they create no incentive to conserve. 
 
4.2.2 Volumetric Service Charges 
 
Volumetric pricing methods charge for water service using a measurement of the volume 
of water delivered, consumed or withdrawn. In municipal systems, a precondition is that 
consumers’ use is metered.  Municipal water tariffs often are either flat or vary by 
volume-based blocks.  Block tariffs that increase by the volume of water used (charging 
very low or no fees up to a certain threshold of use) have become more popular, 
particularly in developing countries.  In irrigation, volumetric charges require information 
on the volume of water delivered to each user or group of users or some other way to 
infer a measurement of water consumption. Implementation costs associated with 
volumetric pricing are relatively high and require the central water authority or water user 
association to set the fee, monitor use, and collect revenue. Volumetric pricing is most 
feasible under demand-based or closed pipe irrigation systems.  It is difficult under a 
rotation system and nearly impossible under a continuous flow system. 
 
4.2.3 Formal and Informal Water Markets–Water Rights and Use Permits 
 
Water markets can be distinguished on a spectrum from informal to formal. Water 
markets often are established informally when scarcity occurs. Typically such informal 
trades consist of farmers making some economic arrangement for the trade or transfer of 
surplus ground or surface water for a period of time (often a crop season) to a 
neighboring farm or town. For formal water markets to work there must be buyable and 
sellable water rights. A transferable water permit or right can provide permission to use a 
specified amount of water and the right to sell that right at a price which is determined by 
the market. Markets can provide a more flexible and efficient mechanism to allocate 
water than administrative means. 
 
Tradable rights and permits address the “tragedy of the commons” problem (whereby 
individual users lack a conservation incentive even though such action would clearly 
serve the common good) by rationing access to the resource and privatizing the resulting 
access rights. The first step involves setting a limit on user access to the resource. For a 
given source of water supply, this would involve limiting the amount of water that can be 
extracted. This limit defines the aggregate access to the resource that is authorized. These 
access rights are then allocated on some basis to potential individual users, and they can 
either be made transferable to other users and/or bankable for future use. Users who 
exceed limits imposed by the rights they hold may face penalties, including the loss of the 
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right to participate in the scheme. 
 
Water access rights can be financially valuable if the resource is managed efficiently such 
that owners of these rights acquire substantial economic returns. Protecting the value of 
that right motivates the holder to regulate others.  But the ethical issues raised by the 
distribution of wealth among completing claimants are a significant source of 
controversy.  Externalities, such as the effect of water withdrawals on downstream users, 
also must be considered in right transfers. 
 
4.2.4 Charges for Groundwater Use 
 
Groundwater charges are sometimes applied in areas where the seepage of irrigation 
water into aquifers replenishes groundwater pumped by another party.   The distributor of 
the irrigation water, which may be an individual or an irrigation association, may seek to 
recover some of the (downstream) benefits enjoyed by the groundwater user.  For 
example, some California water districts have been given statutory authority relating to 
groundwater extraction and groundwater re-charge.  That authority allows the districts to 
raise revenues through assessments to groundwater users as well as by charging fees for 
groundwater extraction and for groundwater recharge.  
  
4.2.5 Subsidies, Tax Reductions or Fees on Inputs 
 
Subsidies can be given for the use of inputs that improve water management and/or 
economic efficiency.  Examples include state support to water users for the installation of 
water-saving devices such as: water-efficient toilets; low-flow showerheads; low-flow 
faucet aerators; or drip irrigation equipment. Imported water meters are subject to a tariff 
designed largely to protect domestic meter manufacturers.  However, in the absence of 
competition, Egyptian meters are poorly made and quickly fall into disrepair.  Reducing 
the tariff on meters should increase the availability of better quality equipment—either 
through imports or from Egyptian manufacturers who upgrade quality of their products.  
Tariffs were reduced significantly recently on solid waste transport equipment. Similar 
tariff reductions could be given to a wide range of pollution control and water saving 
devices. 
 
Subsidies or taxes on efficiency-reducing inputs also can be removed or reduced.  For 
example, fuel subsidies result in a price to consumers of only about 50 percent of the 
world price equivalent.  Increased fuel prices would raise the cost of pumping water in 
agriculture and create an incentive to reduce water use. Reducing present subsidies for 
the growing of sugar cane, a crop that requires relatively large amounts of water, also 
would create water saving incentives by encouraging the planting of less water-intensive 
crops.  
 
Many nations impose fees, charges and taxes on inputs to production and on emissions 
and effluents. In most cases these fees are set at a level intended to generate a 
predetermined stream of revenue, with the funds collected earmarked to cover 
administrative costs and related program activities—especially natural resources 
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management or pollution control.  Only rarely are fees set high enough to exert a 
significant impact on the choice of input, the nature of the production process, or the use 
of pollution abatement measures.  
 
Input charges can be used to influence the choice of crop and indirectly affect the demand 
for water. For example, seed costs could be increased for water-thirsty crops. Input fees 
also can be designed to influence pollution. For example, placing a surcharge on fertilizer 
prices would tend to reduce its use and lessen pollution from fertilizer runoff.  
 
4.2.6 Effluent Fees 
 
As noted, effluent fees are another common use of economic incentives to discourage 
polluting behavior.  Like input fees, they must be set high enough to make it cheaper for 
polluters to abate than to pay the fee if they are to positively influence environmental 
quality, but even low levels of charges can raise significant amounts of revenue.  Egypt 
already has in place a form of effluent fee.  Industrial discharge to the Nile and to 
drainage canals that meets standards of Law 48 currently are subject to a fee of one 
piastre per cubic meter. This fee is scheduled to increase fifteen-fold according to a 
proposal awaiting legislative approval to become a reality.  To be effective as a deterrent, 
the fee should be based on the total pollutants discharged and not on the concentration 
levels of discharges (per the current system).  Such fees are a direct means of affecting 
polluting behavior, however they require careful oversight and enforcement as well as 
routine measurement of both the volume and concentration of effluents.   
 
4.2.7 Priority Water Users 
 
Similar to the manner in which postal service, airplane service and rail passenger services 
differentiate by quality of service, with better service commanding higher fees, water 
deliveries could be made first in times of shortage to those who are willing to pay for 
priority treatment.  The intent of this instrument would be to create two or more different 
classes of water delivery service, with a fee imposed for priority service.   
 
Currently users in Toshqa pay a fee of LE 100 per feddan for guaranteed water delivery 
of 4,000 to 7,000 m3 per year. This is equivalent to approximately L.E. 0.025 per cubic 
meter at the low end of the guaranteed delivery. A priority users’ contract (akin to an 
insurance policy) would extend the Toshqa guarantee approach to others (probably 
WUAs) who are willing to pay a premium for guaranteed delivery even during periods of 
drought. 
 
4.2.8 Financing Wastewater Treatment 
 
Expanded wastewater treatment plant construction, operation and maintenance is of high 
priority in Egypt because of the high levels of untreated organic sewage currently finding 
its way to irrigation and drainage canals as well as directly into the Nile. Presently 
residential users (who account for about 80% of average system use) pay only about 35 
percent of the operation and maintenance costs attributable to their use and nothing 
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toward the capital costs of sewage treatment plants. These payments must rise if existing 
plants are to be properly maintained and be able to provide service throughout their 
useful economic lives. Privatization is being tested as to its political acceptability for 
increasing these user fees and assuring long-run maintenance.  The capital costs of 
wastewater treatment plants presently are financed mainly through donor grants and 
loans. If the collection and treatment system is to be expanded, prospective users and the 
government will need to assume a larger share of the burden to meet public health needs. 
 
4.2.9 Tradable Permits  
 
Relative to command-and-control regulatory alternatives, tradable discharge permits can 
reduce the costs of achieving a given level of pollution control. They operate as follows. 
Sources are required to meet limits on the quantity of effluent they may discharge. A 
pollution control authority distributes (through auction, allocation to permitted sources, or 
other means) tradable permits to discharge a fixed total quantity of pollution. Sources 
then are free to buy or sell permits among themselves provided they have permits for the 
total quantity of effluent they discharge over a year.  
 
Tradable permits reduce compliance costs because pollution sources with low abatement 
costs will abate more than is required and sell the excess permits to sources with high 
abatement costs, who find this cheaper than reducing their pollution discharges. Trading 
requires a knowledge of the total mass of effluents that a water body can tolerate and still 
meet applicable water quality standards. Trading also requires the regulation of mass 
releases of specific pollutants from individual sources.  At present, Egyptian Law 48, 
which governs the discharge of industrial effluents to Egyptian waters, specifies 
concentration limits for a wide range of pollutants. Concentration requirements can be 
met by reducing pollution discharge or by increasing the volume of wastewater (i.e., 
dilution). Law 48 and its implementing regulations would have to be revised to specify 
both concentrations and volumes of discharge if an effluent trading program were to be 
implemented. 
 
To date, just the United States and Australia have fully implemented tradable discharge 
permit programs, and then only in relatively narrow geographical areas (though pilots are 
underway in several other countries, including the Philippines and Sri Lanka). It also 
should be noted that trading in these programs is much less than had been anticipated 
when the programs were established. The principal reason is high transaction costs. 
Effluent trading would appear to impose too many administrative burdens to be feasible 
in Egypt at this time, but it still should be considered alongside other options.  
 
4.2.10 Damage Charges or Fines 
 
Unless environmental regulations are in place and enforced, sources do not bear the costs 
of the pollution they release.  As a result, they have little motivation to reduce pollution. 
One solution is to make sources liable for the damage they cause. The purpose is twofold: 
to make sources more careful about the pollution they release; and to compensate those 
who are harmed. Damage can be assessed on a case-by-case basis or according to a 
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predetermined schedule of fines. If sources are liable and must pay for the damage they 
cause, they will control pollution to the point where the marginal pollution damage equals 
the marginal costs of control. At this point their total payments for controlling pollution 
and compensating for harm will be minimized. 
 
Many nations have environmental laws that establish liability for harm to natural 
resources and the environment or set forth a schedule of fines and penalties for exceeding 
permitted releases. Annex A to this report describes a number of programs of this nature, 
including coral reef damage assessment in Egypt. One option for wider application of this 
approach in Egypt would involve expanding damage assessments authorized by statute in 
Law 102/1983 (for protected areas) to include harm to surface water bodies or 
groundwater resources. 
 
4.2.11 Voluntary Agreements 
 
Voluntary pollution control agreements feature prominently in the United States, several 
nations of Western Europe, Japan and elsewhere. Such agreements attempt to motivate 
firms and individuals to reduce pollution, promote conservation of materials, water and 
energy, and increase recycling.  
 
There are several reasons for the popularity of voluntary programs. First, a voluntary 
approach gives the pollution control authorities a means of seeking improvements in 
areas where statutory authority is nonexistent or already fully implemented. Second, 
voluntary programs are thought to have low cost, because firms and individuals 
undertake measures on a purely voluntary basis. They would be unlikely to agree to 
costly measures that are not otherwise mandated by law and regulation. Third, voluntary 
programs are sometimes used to experiment with new approaches to pollution control. If 
successful, the experiments may be mandated later by law and regulation. 
 
What incentives do firms and individuals have to participate in a voluntary program? For 
some programs, such as curbside separation of solid waste for recycling, the incentive is 
limited to the reward of doing a good deed. In some voluntary programs participants 
receive free technical advice -- on topics such as energy conservation and cleaner 
production options. Other voluntary programs offer more tangible rewards, such as 
accelerated permitting or public recognition.  
 
Potential applications for water quality improvement in Egypt could take many forms.  
For example, industry could be encouraged to improve the quality of its water discharge 
monitoring in terms of the frequency at which effluent samples are taken, the number of 
substances that are monitored, and the accuracy of equipment that is used for measuring 
pollutant concentrations. Rewards could be in the form of public recognition for firms 
that both improve monitoring methods and meet all applicable discharge limits. Another 
approach would be for government to provide education and free technical assistance to 
small rural communities regarding environmentally sustainable methods for disposing of 
household sewage.  Currently households pay to have sewage pumped from cesspits, 
however those hired to do the pumping often find it convenient and less expensive to 
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dump their loads in drainage (or irrigation) canals instead of sewage treatment facilities. 
Discouraging this practice would provide significant public health benefits. 
 
4.2.12 Performance Bonds 
 
Some countries require performance bonding of firms that engage in mining, timber 
harvesting, oil and gas exploration and production and other activities on government-
owned lands. Performance bonding also is commonly used at construction sites.  The 
purpose of the performance bond is to assure that environmental and other requirements 
are satisfied. A baseline is established, and then once the activity is completed, the 
oversight authority conducts an inspection.  The bond is refunded (normally with interest) 
if all operating and remediation conditions are satisfied.  
 
Performance bonding has the potential to be applied to a wide range of activities in Egypt 
including barges and cruise ships that ply the Nile, ships transiting coastal waters and the 
Suez Canal, oil and gas exploration and production, and mining. 
 
4.2.13 Public Information Disclosure 
 
Information disclosure regarding pollution can be structured as a voluntary measure but 
more commonly is made a requirement through laws and regulations. The approach is to 
disclose information regarding the environmental characteristics of products, of 
emissions from a factory, or of workplace conditions to reduce uncertainty and improve 
the functioning of labor, capital, and product markets. With better-informed consumers, 
workers and lenders, firms will more likely bear the true costs of their pollution and thus 
have an incentive to make appropriate improvements in environmental performance. 
 
Mandatory reporting of toxic releases was first instituted in the United States in the mid-
1980s and now is found in at least a dozen developed and a handful of developing 
countries. Environmental labeling is required in many developed and developing nations. 
Categorization of firms according to their environmental record is an easily-understood 
format (by color-coding, from green/best to black/worst) and was first implemented in 
Indonesia. It now is being used in the Philippines and parts of India and China. 
 
Specific environmental disclosure initiatives that could be considered in Egypt include 
public access to environmental impact assessments filed with EEAA, disclosure of 
routinely measured ambient environmental quality (e.g., the River Nile, irrigation and 
drainage canals, the Northern Lakes and Lake Qarun), disclosure of the magnitude of 
discharge of various substances by individual industrial sources, and disclosure of the 
compliance status of individual sources with respect to their effluent discharges. 
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5 Evaluating Alternative Policy Instruments 
 
5.1 Criteria for Evaluating Instruments 
 
Policy approaches to water management—using command and control, market-based 
incentives and mixed mechanisms—will vary in terms of their costs, environmental 
consequences, administrative requirements and in other important respects.  Thus, it is 
useful to evaluate the pros and cons of different policy tools using some common criteria 
or parameters.  It is suggested that these criteria be divided into two groups: those that 
relate primarily to the nature of the instrument itself; and those that are a function of the 
circumstances in which it would be applied.   
 
However, prior to applying this two-step screening process, the proposed policy measure 
should be subjected to a superceding test of its consistency with national economic and 
social policy goals.  Any policy initiative is highly unlikely to go forward if it 
undermines one or more of the four current overriding policy goals of the Government: 
increased employment; more stable currency value; increased exports; and increased 
tourism. Beyond neutrality, a new water management measure preferably would directly 
contribute to the accomplishment of one or more of these broad policy goals. Subsidiary 
goals—such as privatization, improved education, and increased agricultural output—
also may be important.  Instruments that fail at this stage probably should receive no 
further analysis.   
 
The purpose of the overall screening process is to narrow down the number of potential 
MBIs to those deemed to be intrinsically superior or dominant to others, and then to 
submit this shorter list of measures to a subsequent and more detailed set of quantitative 
and other analyses as well as a thorough vetting by stakeholders.  Within the present 
study, this process of analysis and vetting began with a draft report that screened 
potential MBIs applied to water management.  It continued through the convening of a 
workshop of stakeholders to review and revise the initial findings, the results of which 
have been incorporated into this final report. 
 
5.2 Screening Process 
 
The screening process involves two steps.  First, each instrument is evaluated in terms of 
its intrinsic characteristics and qualities.  Assuming that the proposed policy measure 
passes the first tests, the instrument is then submitted to a second review in which it is 
evaluated in terms of its ease, cost and likelihood of being implemented.  
 
Screen 1: Criteria Intrinsic to the Instrument. The first set of evaluative criteria 
concern the intrinsic characteristics of a particular MBI that can be compared to and 
evaluated against a purely command-and-control (C&C) mechanism.  Five such criteria 
are suggested: 
1. Economic efficiency or cost-saving potential. What are the real resource gains or 
savings from using an economic instrument alone or in conjunction with a C&C 
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measure rather than a purely C&C alternative? Included in this criterion would be 
costs (private as well as governmental) for administration and enforcement. 
2. Environmental or resource management effectiveness. Does the economic 
instrument result in the same or greater protection of the environment or wise natural 
resource management relative to the “pure” C&C alternative? If there are 
uncertainties, what are the tradeoffs between cost savings and potential environmental 
degradation or resource management? 
3. Distributive effects. Who bears the financial costs of the economic instrument 
versus the C&C alternative? How are resource and environmental gains distributed by 
income group and by location under the alternative approaches? 
4. Revenue raising potential. What impact does the economic instrument have on 
governmental budgets compared to the C&C approach? 
5. Technological change and innovation. Sometimes termed "dynamic efficiency,” 
this criterion asks whether the mechanism for securing resource management and 
environmental improvement is likely to stimulate the search for more effective and/or 
less expensive approaches. Does the C&C alternative offer any stimulus to innovation 
and technical change? 
Screen 2: Contextual Criteria. A second set of criteria is related more to the 
institutional setting in which the MBI or C&C alternatives would be instituted.  These 
seven contextual criteria (numbered in sequence following from the previous set) include: 
6. Political acceptability. Assuming the instrument has passed through the 
superseding test of consistency with overarching government goals, who might be 
politically opposed to the policy and what obstacles would this present? Who would 
favor using the instrument? Are the winners or the losers well-connected or politically 
powerful?  Is the proposed system perceived as fair? 
7. Social and cultural acceptability. Social and cultural traditions place limits on the 
acceptability of various policy instruments. 
8. Geography and existing infrastructure. These considerations can affect how much 
control one has over the system into which the MBI would be placed. 
9. Institutional capacity. Are institutions capable? What additional burdens, if any, 
would an economic instrument approach place on the government’s capabilities and 
capacities compared to the C&C alternative? Can private sector institutions help? 
10. Legal framework. Are existing laws adequate, or would new legislation or 
implementing regulations be required? If new legislation would be needed, what is 
the prognosis for successfully passing it? 
11. Administrative ease of implementation. Would new regulations be required for 
the economic instrument? How much effort would be required? What about 
monitoring requirements? How would compliance be accomplished, and what will be 
the likely enforcement requirements? 
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12. Experience from other nations? What does the record in other countries reveal 
regarding probable institutional burdens, potential pitfalls, and the ultimate 
probability of successful implementation? 
 
5.3 Application of the Evaluation Process  
 
This screening process was applied as described below to twenty MBIs holding the 
potential to improve water management in the country.  To ensure that the pre-test of 
consistency with broad national goals is met, the main objectives of each instrument are 
first reviewed.  This is followed by an application, in turn, of the first and second screens 
described above (reference numbers to the 12 screening criteria are given in the text). 
 
Initial recommendations are given for each candidate MBI followed by a summary of the 
guidance received at the stakeholders’ workshop.  The participants at that meeting were 
drawn from all parts of MWRI and from a number of other agencies involved with water 
management in the country.  Their suggestions were recorded through plenary 
discussions, four small group discussions (two each on water quantity and water quality 
issues) and on individual questionnaires (see Annex C for further workshop information). 
 
5.3.1 Instruments with a Primary Goal of Improved Water Quantity Management 
 
Area-based Irrigation Charges for Smallholder Agriculture 
 
Description/Objective:  Water delivery charges could be assessed on individual farms 
using the agricultural land tax or charges based on irrigated feddans.  For the latter, the 
rate could vary by type of crop and region to account for differences in delivery cost, 
water quality, and other factors.  The primary objective is to generate revenue to fund 
irrigation system rehabilitation and improved maintenance, resulting in increased 
agricultural productivity, though some incentives for water conservation may be built into 
the policy.  
 
First screen: (1) slight improvement in efficiency benefits over C&C if crop charges are 
tied to water consumption of the crop; (2) resource management impact is positive if 
improvements in the distribution system result from increased revenue; (3) distributive 
effects are negative for very smallholding and resource-limited farmers, who have limited 
ability to pay; (4) revenue raising is excellent, but link between charges paid and quality 
of service is severed if the Ministry of Finance collects revenue and doesn’t earmark for 
MWRI; (5) impact on technological change and innovation – slight, and only in the case 
where charges are linked to the water consumption of crops. On balance, the instrument 
receives only a low pass for this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) Politically difficult to assess poor farmers; (7) resistance from all 
farmers to paying without improved service, (8) works with present system of irrigation 
supply; (9) no new capability needed if the Ministry of Finance collects the fee as an add-
on to agricultural land tax, but requires new capability if collected by MWRI, and can 
expect poor enforcement capability; (10) law would probably need to be revised to allow 
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for government assessment of irrigation user charges; (11) administrative cost significant 
if MWRI collects, moderate if collected by Ministry of Finance as part of the agricultural 
land tax; flat land charge inexpensive; crop-based charges more expensive; (12) 
international experience supports most of the conclusions drawn above.  This screen 
detects significant barriers to implementation.  
 
Recommendation:  None prior to workshop, though it was considered still a potentially 
attractive MBI option. 
 
Workshop results:  There were mixed impressions expressed by workshop participants 
on the potential applicability of the instrument.  Some felt it would only be useful as a 
means for WUAs to raise revenue to finance O&M.  It was suggested that ways might be 
sought to link MBIs to ongoing privatization efforts in the agriculture and water sectors 
and the empowerment of resource users, including the possible widening of authorities 
for WUAs to assess fees and organize the use of revenues collected for irrigation system 
operation, maintenance and improvement.  Others recommended adapting the existing 
agricultural land tax—considered too low and in need of reevaluation—to include an 
area-based charge linked to water.    
 
Priority Water Delivery for Smallholder Agriculture 
 
Description/Objectives:  WUAs could pay a fee for guaranteed supply of irrigation water, 
as an insurance policy of sorts.  This would encourage greater cost sharing by farmers. 
 
First screen: (1) fair for efficiency-enhancing; (2) no significant impact on resource 
management; (3) areas with larger, higher income, better educated farmers will adopt 
faster, so there is risk of adverse distributive effects (or certainly the perception of same); 
(4) good for revenue raising; and (5) impact on technological change and innovation – 
none. The instrument receives a pass using this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) Politically difficult since it could negatively impact poorer farmers; 
(7) in times of water shortage, poorer farming areas will suffer larger water cutbacks and 
reduced yields; (8) could elevate head-tail disparities to the branch canal level;  (9) 
MWRI would need to establish a special fund and collect revenue from WUAs; (10) 
would need legal changes to implement; (11) moderate administrative cost; (12) there is 
little directly relevant international experience except crop insurance schemes.  The 
instrument receives a low pass of the second screen. 
 
Recommendation: In need of careful review at the workshop and probably a less 
attractive MBI option. 
 
Workshop results:  Workshop participants were supportive of this instrument only in the 
mega-projects, due to equity implications.  Some recommended further study for use with 
small farmers and in the delta.  Individual participant evaluations were unsupportive, with 
nearly two-thirds rating the instrument as not presently applicable. 
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Creating a Market for Irrigation Improvement and Management Transfer Programs 
 
Description/Objectives:  This MBI package would involve selecting areas for IPP, DIP or 
IMT programs—such as mesqas within branch canals where WUAs have been 
established—on the basis of their willingness to accept faster and less subsidized 
repayment terms for participation in these programs.  Faster repayment would increase 
domestic funding available for IIP, DIP or IMT programs—some of which could be used 
to target the poorest agricultural communities for participation in the programs.  The 
objective is to more finely tune the supply of these services/investments with demand, 
resulting in better management of the irrigation delivery system, increased agricultural 
productivity and greater ability to allocate scarce water efficiently. 
 
First screen: (1) good potential to enhance efficiency via improved distribution of water;  
(2) positive effect on system O&M and on ability to manage water under scarcity; (3) 
distributive effects – good; (4) revenue raising – lowers government O&M costs; and (5) 
impact on technological change and innovation – none likely.  The instrument receives a 
pass for this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) politically acceptable; (7) organizational difficulties in areas of 
conflict; (8) potential to improve present system of irrigation supply; (9) Need to invest in 
development of WUAs; self-enforcement of rules; (10) Revised law 12 needed to 
authorize district WUAs; (11) administrative costs shifted to private sector; capacity of 
water user associations to manage irrigation systems in Egypt still being tested; (12) 
successful applications in United States, Mexico, Turkey.  Second screen finds no 
significant barriers, and gives a pass to this instrument. 
 
Recommendation: Deemed to merit further detailed analysis for use in smallholder 
agriculture as a potentially attractive MBI. 
 
Workshop results:  Both break-out groups recommended the MBI for further study.  It 
was noted that cost savings from implementing government programs in areas where 
subsidies are reduced should be channeled to support expansion of IMT and other 
programs—especially to poorer communities.   
 
Volumetric Irrigation Charges Aside from Toshqa 
 
Description/Objectives:  Water delivery charges to large farmers or investors could be 
based on quantity of water supplied, modeled after contracts being written in Toshqa.  
Further study would identify those areas with sufficiently large farms to allow for cost-
effective implementation.  The objective is recover at least O&M costs and perhaps part 
of the infrastructure costs of water delivery. A secondary objective is to provide 
incentives for more efficient use of water. 
 
First screen: (1) efficiency-enhancing potential – excellent; (2) unsure of in how many 
areas outside of Toshqa the instrument can be applied; (3) charges on wealthier investors, 
so distributive impacts are excellent; (4) revenue raising – excellent; and (5) impact on 
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technological change and innovation – excellent. The instrument receives a pass using 
this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) unsure if local investors will oppose or support; (7) socially and 
culturally acceptable, since dealing only with large farmers and  investors; (8) metering 
can be cost-effective for large users; (9) within Government capability; (10) water 
delivery charges are negotiated and formalized in contracts; (11) low administrative cost; 
(12) successful international implementation in in other countries.  Second screen finds 
no significant barriers and gives a pass to this instrument. 
 
Recommendation: Deemed to merit further detailed analysis as a potentially attractive 
MBI for use in mega-projects.   
 
Workshop results:  There were mixed reactions to the instrument among workshop 
participants, with some finding this policy measure not applicable because of concern 
over potentially high transactions costs.  Others recommended that it be given further 
study. 
 
Transferable Groundwater Extraction Rights 
 
Description/Objectives:  Deep groundwater in the Nubian Aquifer is largely a non-
renewable resource.  MWRI is looking for alternative institutional approaches to wisely 
manage the transition from continuous artesian free-flowing wells to controlled flow by 
pumping and eventually to the end of their economic life.  The establishment of 
transferable groundwater extraction rights could create value for permit or rights holders, 
thereby creating incentives for them to better manage the resource, including the 
monitoring of groundwater pumping and violations by others. 
 
First screen: (1) fair efficiency-enhancing potential; (2) resource is being mined, but 
instrument could slow the process and reduce other negative environmental impacts; (3) 
distribution of benefits favors early users; (4) revenue raising – none; (5) impact on 
technological change and innovation – fair.   The instrument receives a low pass using 
this screen. 
 
Second screen:  (6) probably politically acceptable as long as distinctions are drawn 
between rights to water versus extraction; (7) Traditional practices in oases indicate likely 
social acceptability, though some controversy possible; (8) appropriate to nonrenewable 
groundwater use;  (9) needs institutional development for recording of trades and legal 
foundation; (10) legal changes probably needed to develop formal markets; (11) modest 
administrative cost; (12) successful implementation in fisheries, oil extraction. Second 
screen finds no significant barrier. 
 
Recommendation: Deemed to merit further detailed analysis as a potentially attractive 
MBI option. 
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Workshop results:  Both working groups at the workshop found this instrument worthy 
of further study.  Some proposed using newly formed holding companies for 
implementation, while others suggested investigating how rehabilitation of wells would 
be managed and financed. Privatization of well construction and management also was 
suggested as an alternative approach. 
 
Groundwater Extraction Charges 
 
Description/Objectives: Industries that pump groundwater could be assessed an 
extraction charge.  With respect to Western Desert groundwater, extraction charges for 
irrigators and others would encourage conservation and prolong the economic pumping 
of the aquifer as well as raise revenue for system O&M.  Extraction charges are an 
alternative to area-based charges or tradable extraction rights.  
 
First screen: (1) efficiency is unknown.  (2) instrument is likely to have a positive impact 
on management of the resource; (3) distributional impacts are acceptable for use with 
industries but may not be acceptable in Western Desert agriculture; (4) good for revenue 
raising; (5) impact on technological change and innovation is good, since it encourages 
investments in water conserving technologies.   This instrument receives a pass using 
this screen. 
 
Second screen:  (6) large industries have political clout to resist additional charges; 
instrument may not be considered fair if applied differentially to desert farmers versus 
Nile farmers; politically difficult in Western Desert since GOE is encouraging greater use 
of groundwater for irrigated agriculture; (7) cultural resistance to paying for water service 
by farmers and desert population groups; culturally more acceptable by industries; (8) see 
notes above on geographic factors; (9) no further institutional development needed; (10) 
some version of this is already in use, so legal issues should not be binding; (11) modest 
administrative cost to monitor groundwater extraction and collect revenue; (12) 
successful implementation in many places around the world, though not commonly used 
in agriculture.   The instrument receives a pass for application in industrial extraction, 
but for use in desert groundwater extraction, the instrument fails this screen. 
 
Recommendation: Deserving of careful and critical review at the workshop as a still 
promising instrument. Separate consideration should be given to its use in urban 
industrial extraction versus in desert agricultural areas.    
 
Workshop results:  Participants raised questions about this instruments applicability, but 
they also found it warranting further study.  One working group favored its application to 
industry and urban withdrawals but not for Western groundwater.  The other small group 
questioned how rehabilitation of wells would be managed and financed. 
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Increased Urban and Industrial Water Service Tariffs 
 
Description/Objectives: Urban and industrial water rates could be increased to fund 
system O&M, rehabilitation and expansion in order to improve service and reduce 
leakage.  Another objective for urban supplies would be to ensure provision of basic 
water requirements to the poor through the use of increasing block rates or similar 
alternatives.   
 
First screen: (1) fair for efficiency-enhancing but potential is limited by poor metering  
(2) should reduce environmental health risks; (3) favorable distribution of cost across 
income groups, with wealthier paying more, though literature is split over whether 
increasing block rates help the poor; (4) good for revenue raising; (5) impact on 
technological change and innovation is good, since it encourages investments in water 
conserving technologies.   Despite limitation of poor metering, the instrument receives a 
pass using this screen. 
 
Second screen:  (6) politically difficult; (7) resistance to paying more for water deliveries 
more in poorer areas with poor service; (8) appropriate for metered areas;  (9) no further 
institutional development needed; (10) no new legislation anticipated to be needed; (11) 
modest administrative cost; (12) successful implementation in many cities of the region 
and around the world.   Despite political and equity concerns related to charging the 
poor, the instrument receives a pass using this screen. 
 
Recommendation: Deemed to merit further detailed analysis and consideration as a 
potentially attractive MBI. 
 
Workshop results:  Workshop participants generally were supportive of this instrument.  
One break-out group favored investigating the whole tariff structure, while the other was 
more specific in advocating a tariff like in electricity pricing, where increasing block 
rates are used.  Individual evaluations were supportive of further study, with about one-
half favoring action. 
 
Subsidized Urban Water Meters 
 
Description/Objectives:  Tariffs on imported water meters and water-conserving devices 
would be lowered or eliminated to encourage water conservation and to achieve greater 
cost recovery. 
. 
First screen: (1) efficiency impacts are good; (2) will reduce water consumption and 
increase revenue to utilities; (3) unknown distributional effects; (4) revenue loss in import 
tariffs but increases in municipal user fee collection; (5) impact on technological change 
and innovation is good.   The instrument receives a pass using this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) could be politically difficult to remove protective tariffs due to  
resistance from domestic meter manufacturers; (7) not at issue; (8) not at issue; (9) no 
further institutional development needed; (10) revised import duties would need to be 
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agreed; (11) easy to administer; (12) international experiences in tariff reductions are 
favorable in terms of improving product quality.   Despite political concerns related to 
protection of domestic manufacturers, the instrument receives a pass using his screen. 
 
Recommendation: Deemed to merit further detailed analysis as a potentially attractive 
MBI option. 
 
Workshop results:  Workshop participants generally found this instrument to be 
applicable to Egyptian circumstances.   
 
Subsidized Water-Conserving Equipment 
 
Description/Objectives:  Cost recovery and conservation of urban water could be 
improved by reducing protective import tariffs on water conserving equipment or 
introducing other means to subsidize the purchase of such equipment. 
 
First screen: (1) good for improving efficiency in water use; (2) good for improved 
resource management; (3) non-issue for distributive impacts; (4) revenue loss to 
government; (5) good for encouraging investments in water conserving technologies by 
users.   The instrument receives a pass using this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) can be politically difficult to remove protective tariffs if there are 
influential domestic beneficiaries, but this may not be an issue in this case; (7) not an 
issue; (8) not an issue; (9) further institutional development not needed; (10) revised 
import duties would need to be agreed; (11) easy to administer; (12) international 
experiences in tariff reductions are favorable in terms of improving product quality and 
adoption of less expensive technologies.   Despite potential political concerns related to 
protection of domestic manufacturers, the instrument receives a pass using his screen. 
 
Recommendation: The instrument was deemed to merit further detailed analysis as a 
potentially attractive MBI option. 
 
Workshop results:  Workshop participants generally found this instrument to be 
applicable to Egyptian circumstances. 
 
Reduced Subsidy on Fuel 
 
Description/Objectives:  A gradual reduction in the subsidy on fuel, currently sold at 
about half the world price, would increase the cost of pumping water for irrigation and 
encourage greater water use efficiency.  As differentiated fuel pricing schemes are 
impractical, this would need to be implemented economy-wide 
 
First screen: (1) fair for efficiency-enhancing when applied in all sectors, (2) within 
water sector, modest improvement in water use efficiency; (3) equity concerns for small, 
poor farmers; (4) increases central government revenue (foregone subsidies), but 
provides no direct revenues for MWRI; (5) impact on technological change and 
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innovation is good–encourages investments in energy and water conserving technologies. 
The instrument receives a pass using this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) politically extremely difficult since it is broadly unpopular; (7) 
concerns may be raised by transportation industry and about poor farmers facing higher 
energy costs; (8) little effect; (9) very simple to implement; (10) no known legal barrier; 
(11) low administrative cost; (12) successful implementation in many countries around 
the world.  Due to unlikely political feasibility at this time, this instrument does not pass 
the second screen. 
 
Recommendation: The instrument was included in workshop discussions with 
recognition of constraints, though it was not considered to be an attractive option at this 
time.   
 
Workshop results:  Workshop participants generally evaluated this instrument as 
infeasible at present. 
 
5.3.2 Instruments with the Primary Goal of Improved Water Quality Management 
 
Increased User Fees for Wastewater Treatment 
 
Description/Objectives:  There is an undoubted need for greater sewerage coverage in the 
country and increased wastewater treatment capacity.  One way to help finance this 
would be to increase wastewater user fees—namely greater cost-sharing from residential 
and industrial users to fund wastewater treatment system operation and maintenance.  
 
First screen: (1) cost saving potential – some; while this initiative would not reduce 
wastewater treatment costs in the short run, it should increase significantly the useful life 
of existing plants; (2) should result in lower municipal wastewater pollution, so 
environmental effectiveness is good; (3) distributive effects are likely to be favorable, 
since those receiving service are likely to be in higher income groups than those that do 
not yet have service, and those unconnected to the system also benefit from improved 
water quality resulting from keeping plants in good operating condition; (4) excellent for 
revenue raising; (5) will provide funds, but not incentives, for technological 
improvements.  On balance quite good, and instrument passes this screen.  
 
Second screen:  (6) likely to have some political difficulties; (7) resistance to paying 
higher rates in the absence of good service; (8) should favor relatively well off service 
areas;  (9) should largely make use of existing institutional capacity; (10) no new 
legislation anticipated to be needed; (11) administrative ease of implementation is below 
average due to difficulties with measurement of use and collecting amounts due; (12) 
successful implementation in many cities of the region and around the world.   The 
instrument receives a pass using his screen. 
 
Recommendation: The approach was deemed to merit further detailed analysis as a 
potentially promising measure. 
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Workshop Results: The instrument received a generally favorable evaluation by 
workshop participants.  
 
Increased Subsidies for Wastewater Treatment 
 
Description/Objectives:  While the general notion of increasing government spending on 
a particular program may not seem at first glance to have much to do with MBIs, this 
issue under consideration is whether the proposed increase in user fees described above is 
the best approach relative to government subsidization—common in many countries—of 
these investments and other costs.   
 
First screen: (1) significant efficiency gains when viewed from the perspective of social 
costs and social benefits; (2) significant improvements in environmental quality; (3) 
impacts on individuals at varying levels of income are difficult to determine without 
detailed analysis; (4) potentially large cost burden to the GOE; (5) no impacts expected 
on technological change and innovation. The instrument is quite attractive except for the 
GOE budgetary cost. More analysis is warranted. 
 
Second screen: (6) political implications are difficult to assess, particularly given the 
potentially large budgetary impacts; (7) consistent with social and cultural values which 
tend to favor subsidies for worthwhile activities; (8) highly site specific in terms of 
impacts; (9) minimal institutional challenges; (10) no significant legislative or regulatory 
requirements; (11) no significant administrative challenges; and (12) many successful 
applications elsewhere in the world as well as related activities in Egypt.  On balance the 
instrument receives a passing score on this screen. 
 
Recommendation: The measure was deemed to require further analysis, especially 
relative to or possibly in combination with other options. 
 
Workshop Results:  The measure received highly positive support from the workshop 
participants. 
 
Subsidized Rural Sanitation 
 
Description/Objectives:  The Government could provide technical assistance and 
possibly subsidized sanitation technologies to rural communities to encourage small-scale 
environmentally acceptable ways of disposing of household sewage in areas that are 
unlikely to be served by sewage treatment plants.  This responds to the realities of 
widespread groundwater contamination from leaking septic fields and the dumping of 
waste from cesspits into canals. 
 
First screen: (1) should be cost-effective since all actions are voluntary; (2) could result 
in major improvements in environmental quality; (3) no measurable impacts on income 
distribution; (4) costs the government a modest amount; and (5) has minimal impact on 
innovation and technological change. The instrument passes the initial screen. 
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Second screen: (6) politically acceptable since everything is voluntary; (7) acceptable; 
(8) not applicable; (9) institutions could implement rather easily; (10) seemingly would 
not require legislative or regulatory changes since many voluntary programs already exist 
in Egypt; (11) low administrative costs; and (12) many examples exist elsewhere 
(however few can claim to be having a large impact on pollution). The instrument passes 
this screen. 
 
Recommendation: The instrument was deemed worth pursuing, even if the expected 
results are modest.  
 
Workshop Results: Participants supported further study leading to action that would 
implement this instrument. 
 
Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment 
 
Description/Objectives:  Analogous to the subsidization of water-saving technologies 
with respect to water quantity management, increased pollution abatement and higher 
quality domestic production of environmental technologies could be encouraged through 
the reduction of tariffs on the import of pollution control equipment.  
 
First screen: (1) modest to possibly significant efficiency gains through the use of more 
advanced pollution control technologies, (2) modest to significant improvements in 
environmental quality; (3) minimal impacts on the distribution of income; (4) would cost 
the government some foregone revenue; and (5) modest to possibly significant impacts 
on innovation and technological change. The instrument passes this screen if the 
foregone revenue is not too large. 
 
Second screen: (6) should be acceptable politically since related examples already exist, 
namely the reduction in solid waste hauling equipment; (7) seems to be consistent with 
social and cultural values by subsiding worthwhile activities; (8) not applicable; (9) 
minimal institutional challenges; (10) would not require legislative and/or regulatory 
changes; (11) no significant administrative challenges; and (12) many successful 
applications elsewhere. The instrument passes this screen. 
 
Recommendation: Deemed to merit further detailed analysis as a potentially promising 
MBI option. 
 
Workshop Results:  The measure received generally favorable support from the 
workshop participants. 
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Increased Industrial Discharge Fees 
 
Description/Objectives:  Fees for industrial discharges to Egyptian waters as governed by 
Law 48 could be adjusted. A proposal currently under consideration would increase these 
fees from 1 piastre per cubic meter to 15 piastres per cubic meter. 
 
First screen: (1) no anticipated cost savings; (2) some environmental benefit however the 
response of industry to the proposed level of charges is unknown.  A greater impact may 
arise in terms of water use by firms that take water from the Nile and canals.; (3) 
distributive impacts likely favorable since this impacts industry first; (4) would raise 
revenue; (5) potential for modest impacts on technical change and innovation. The 
instrument passes this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) political acceptability uncertain as large state owned industries may 
object; (7) social and cultural values appear to be consistent with the measure; (8) 
probably not relevant; (9) no impact since it would build upon an existing instrument; 
(10) adjustments to Law 48 are in process, though any switch to load-based fees probably 
would require new legislation; (11) administrative burden need not be high; (12) there is 
limited experience from several countries on which to draw. 
 
Recommendation: Deemed to merit further analysis as a potentially promising MBI 
option. 
 
Workshop Results: As there already is a well vetted proposal for increased fees under 
consideration, workshop participants were generally supportive of this instrument. 
 
Tradable Effluent Discharge Permits 
 
Description/Objectives:  Tradable discharge permits could offer a means of lowering 
compliance costs for industrial dischargers, and they would appear to be consistent with 
broad themes of GOE policy, namely finding low cost means of improving the 
environment. 
 
First screen: (1) high marks for improving efficiency -- or in this case improving cost 
effectiveness; (2) neutral with respect to environmental impact; (3) should have no 
adverse impacts on income distribution; (4) no revenue raising potential; (5) generally 
positive impact on incentives for technical change and innovation. The instrument 
receives a passing score on this screen, however the anticipated cost savings are likely 
to be illusory in the absence of effective enforcement of existing discharge regulations. 
 
Second Screen: (6) politically should be acceptable; (7) no obvious social or cultural 
obstacles; (8) not applicable; (9) difficult to implement because it would require mass-
based permitting; (10) would require changes to laws and regulations; (11) uncertain 
administrative costs; and (12) few examples worldwide of successful implementation. On 
balance, the instrument fails this screen due to significant new program requirements.  
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Recommendation: Considered premature for now, though at a later date, when 
compliance costs are much higher than they are today, the measure would be worth 
revisiting.  
 
Workshop Results: The instrument was presented to but not evaluated by workshop 
participants. 
 
Voluntary Agreements for Environmental Improvement 
 
Description/Objectives:  Various options exist for the introduction of voluntary 
agreements between the Government and individual enterprises, municipalities, industry 
associations, community groups and other entities to encourage them to reduce their 
polluting behavior to below levels required by current law.  The specific instrument 
evaluated was enhanced self-monitoring of discharges by industry. 
 
First screen:  (1) could induce some low cost voluntary pollution reductions; (2) 
potential for environmental improvement; (3) no obvious distributive impacts -- burden 
falls on industry; (4) no impact on GOE revenues; and (5) modest positive impacts on 
technical change and  innovation due to availability of better information. The 
instrument passes this screen. 
 
Second screen:  (6) likely to be politically acceptable; (7) appears to be socially and 
culturally acceptable; (8) no obvious geographical implications; (9) some institutional 
issues regarding standards and protocols; (10) probably would not require legislative or 
regulatory changes since the program would be voluntary; (11) minor administrative 
costs; (12) some similar examples of this type of instrument found elsewhere. The 
instrument passes this screen. 
 
Recommendation:  No significant barriers were identified, and this instrument was 
deemed promising.   
 
Workshop Results: The initiative was supported strongly by workshop participants as 
meriting study and action. 
 
Environmental Damage Charges and Fines 
 
Description/Objectives:  Natural resource damage liability could be formalized for harm 
to national waters (surface and groundwater).  The purpose of this instrument would be to 
internalize the cost of pollution and thereby affect polluting behavior. Improving 
environmental quality without adversely affecting employment, exports and other key 
parameters is consistent with GOE policy. 
 
First screen: (1) having polluters bear the cost of pollution should enhance efficiency; 
(2) should result in improved environmental quality; (3) positive impact on income 
distribution if victims are compensated and neutral otherwise; (4) provide a source of 
government revenue and also a means of providing compensation to victims; and (5) 
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provides some positive incentives for improving pollution control technology.  On 
balance the instrument passes this screen.  
 
Second Screen: (6) politically this is acceptable since it already is used to some extent; 
(7) may be difficult to apply to government-owned firms, some of which are major 
polluters; (8) not applicable; (9) hard to apply to government-owned firms and to the 
thousands of small firms; (10) exists to some extent already so legal changes might not be 
large; (11) moderate to high administrative costs; and (12) many examples of successful 
implementation worldwide. The instrument passes this screen. 
 
Recommendation: The instrument was deemed highly promising. 
 
Workshop Results:  It received favorable support from workshop participants who 
recommended that the instrument should be evaluated further, particularly with respect to 
necessary legislative and regulatory changes. 
 
Environmental Performance Bonds 
 
Description/Objectives:  The definition of environmental damage liability expressed in 
Law 102/1983 could be modified so that entities must put up a bond that would be 
forfeited if harms to surface and groundwater are not mitigated.  The objective is to 
ensure that firms perform according to agreed upon conditions when operating on public 
lands and carrying out other permitted activities. 
 
First screen: (1) modest improvement in efficiency expected; (2) modest improvement in 
environmental quality expected; (3) no measurable impacts on income distribution; (4) 
provide no government revenue; and (5) have no impact on technological change and 
innovation.  Instrument passes this screen. 
 
Second screen: (6) politically acceptable -- the instrument already is used for point 
sources; (7) no obvious social or cultural issues; (8) not applicable; (9) institutions could 
implement rather easily since one such instrument already is in use; (10) possible would 
require legal or regulatory changes depending upon the application; (11) relatively low 
administrative costs; and (12) successful applications found elsewhere in the world. The 
instrument passes this screen. 
 
Recommendation: The instrument was deemed to be promising. 
 
Workshop Results: It was recommended for further study by workshop participants. 
 
Public Environmental Information Disclosure 
 
Description/Objectives:  Greater disclosure of environmental information could be 
required, likely starting with EIAs and ambient environmental quality data and gradually 
expanding over time to cover data on releases from individual sources and compliance 
information on individual sources.  The goal would be to reduce uncertainty regarding 
APRP Water Policy Program                          61         Economic Incentives for Water Management 
releases of pollution and to empower agents in the labor, capital and product markets so 
that they may indirectly affect corporate decisions regarding the release of water 
pollution.  
First screen: (1) modest to significant improvement in economic efficiency can be 
expected; (2) modest to significant improvement in environmental quality can be 
anticipated; (3) no adverse impacts on income distribution; (4) no affects on government 
revenue, and (5) modest impacts on innovation and technological change. The 
instrument passes this screen easily. 
 
Second screen: (6) could have serious political problems and would need further 
investigation; (7) unclear regarding interface with social and cultural values; (8) not 
applicable; (9) would seem to impose few requirements on existing institutions; (10) 
might require legal or regulatory changes; (11) relatively low administrative costs; and 
(12) many successful applications elsewhere in the world. The instrument needs further 
evaluation because of uncertain political and social acceptability. 
 
Recommendation: The instrument was deemed potentially applicable but in need of 
further evaluation due to potential political and social acceptability problems. 
 
Workshop Results: Workshop participants, however, generally supported this instrument, 
with only three of the individual responses suggesting that it was not acceptable. 
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6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
6.1 Summary of Instruments Evaluated  
 
6.1.1 Overview  
 
This study has explored the applicability of economic instruments to help address Egypt’s 
current water management challenges. It has resulted in an initial evaluation of twenty of 
those that seemed most promising.  Screening criteria were developed and applied to 
assess the merits of each, and direction also was received from nearly 60 participants who 
attended the study’s concluding Workshop on Economic Incentives for Water Resources 
Management.5   
 
The results of this evaluation are summarized in Table 11 on the following page, which 
gives the overall assessment of each instrument as well as the major water management 
challenges it may help to address.   
 
6.1.2 Most Promising Water Quantity Management Instruments 
 
Those water quantity management measures deemed of highest priority for follow-up 
analysis and possible policy action were:  
 
Groundwater Extraction Charges –More immediately promising than area-based 
charges for surface irrigation water service or tradable extraction rights for groundwater, 
groundwater extraction charges were judged as holding potential to help create incentives 
for water conservation by both industries as well as farmers and also to raise revenues.  It 
was noted at the workshop that new regulations are already in development to introduce 
extraction charges as tools for groundwater management in the Western Desert. 
 
Import Tariff Reductions for Imported Water Meters and Water Conserving 
Equipment – The reduction of protective import tariffs on both water meters and water-
conserving equipment was identified as meriting careful further analysis and possible 
policy action. 
 
Other Measures Deserving Further Analysis – Though not chosen as the most 
immediately attractive instruments, several other measures were identified as warranting 
careful further analysis.  These include: area-based irrigation service charges; volumetric 
water delivery charges for large agricultural enterprises; and increased user fees for the 
supply of urban and industrial water services. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 Held on 24 March 2002. 
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Table 11. Summary Evaluation of Economic Instruments for Water Resources 
Management 
Economic Instruments Considered Evaluation of the Instrument 
 
Water Quantity 
 
Principal Problems Addressed 
by the Instrument 
Warrants 
study & 
action 
Deserves 
further 
study 
Not 
presently 
applicable 
Area-based Irrigation Charges for 
Smallholder Agriculture 
Irrigation service delivery 
Low farmer payment for upkeep 
  
X 
 
Priority Water Delivery for Smallholder 
Agriculture 
Threat of water shortages 
Irrigation service delivery 
   
X 
Create Market for Irrigation Improvement 
and Management Transfer Programs 
Irrigation service delivery 
High on-farm water use 
  
X 
 
Volumetric Charges Aside from Toshka Threat of water shortages 
Irrigation service delivery 
  
X 
 
Transferable Groundwater Extraction 
Rights 
Non-renewable groundwater use 
Subsidies affecting efficient use 
  
X 
 
Groundwater Extraction Charges Non-renewable groundwater use 
Subsidies affecting efficient use 
 
X 
  
Increased Urban and Industrial Water 
Service Tariffs 
Service delivery in water supply 
Subsidies affecting efficient use 
  
X 
 
Subsidized Urban Water Meters Threat of water shortages 
Service delivery in water supply 
 
X 
  
Subsidized Water-Conserving Equipment High on-farm water use 
Rising water tables 
 
X 
  
Reduced Subsidy on Fuel High on-farm water use 
Subsidies affecting efficient use 
   
X 
Water Quality     
Increased User Fees for Wastewater 
Treatment 
Pollution of river, canals and 
aquatic systems of  Nile Delta 
 
X 
  
Increased Subsidies for Wastewater 
Treatment Facilities 
Pollution of river, canals and 
aquatic systems of  Nile Delta 
 
X 
  
Subsidized Rural Sanitation Rural surface and groundwater 
pollution plus offsite impacts 
 
X 
  
Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment Pollution of river, canals and 
aquatic systems of  Nile Delta 
 
X 
  
Increased Industrial Discharge Fees Adverse impacts of industrial 
pollution throughout country 
  
X 
 
Tradable Effluent Discharge Permits Adverse impacts of industrial 
pollution throughout country 
   
X 
Voluntary Agreements for Environmental 
Improvements 
Potentially address wide range 
of water quality problems 
 
X 
  
Environmental Damage Charges and Fines Potentially address wide range 
of water quality problems 
  
X 
 
Environmental Performance Bonds Potentially address wide range 
of water quality problems 
  
X 
 
Public Environmental Information 
Disclosure 
Potentially address wide range 
of water quality problems 
X   
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6.1.3 Most Promising Water Quality Management Instruments 
 
Likewise, the most promising policy measures identified to address water quality 
problems were: 
 
Increased User Fees for Wastewater Treatment – In response to an unquestionable need 
for better handling of organic wastes from both urban and rural settlements coupled with 
chronic revenue shortages for such investments, further increases in wastewater user fees 
are recommended for strong consideration.   
 
Increased Subsidies to Finance Wastewater Treatment Facilities – As a potential 
corollary to enhanced revenues from higher service fees (and possible partial 
privatization), consideration of increased government subsidies for wastewater treatment 
system development—common in many countries—also was deemed to merit careful 
further analysis.   
 
Subsidized Rural Sanitation –Groundwater contamination has been observed from 
leaking septic fields and the dumping of waste from rural cesspits into canals.  It was 
considered timely for the government to explore provision of technical assistance and 
possibly subsidized sanitation technologies to rural communities to encourage small-scale 
environmentally acceptable ways of disposing of household sewage in areas unlikely to 
be served by sewage treatment plants.   
 
Subsidized Pollution Control Equipment – Analogous to the subsidization of water-
saving technologies, it was noted that the reduction of tariffs on the import of pollution 
control equipment could create incentives for increased pollution abatement and higher 
quality domestic production of environmental technologies.  
 
Voluntary Agreements for Environmental Improvements – Various voluntary 
agreement options—such as enhanced self-monitoring of effluent discharges by 
industry—hold promise for introducing positive new relationships between the 
Government and individual enterprises, municipalities, industry associations, community 
groups and/or other entities to encourage less polluting behavior.   
 
Public Environmental Information Disclosure – Greater disclosure of environmental 
information—perhaps starting with public dissemination of data from environmental 
impact assessments and ambient environmental quality data collected by various 
agencies—can be used to hold those damaging the environment more accountable to the 
public and their financiers.  
 
6.1.4 General Lessons Learned 
 
It is noteworthy that none of the twenty instruments examined were completely rejected 
by either the screening process applied or the majority of participants at the concluding 
workshop.  While serious reservations were raised about the political feasibility of 
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several measures, only three out of the twenty were tagged as not currently applicable.  
This shows a fairly wide acceptance—at least among government water management 
officials—of the usefulness of this type of policy tool.  This result should not be too 
surprising, given that Egypt has in recent years been gaining increasing experience with a 
range of MBIs applied to environmental and natural resources management challenges. It 
also bodes well for the further development of such approaches. 
 
The participants who reviewed the twenty potential policy measures clearly were more 
comfortable with applying MBIs to water quality as opposed to water quantity 
challenges.  While there is no definitive means for determining the reasons for such a 
preference, there are at least two plausible explanations.  First, interviews during the 
study and discussions at the workshop made it plain that water pollution is widely 
recognized as a serious and growing problem facing the country.  Water management 
professionals, therefore, are eager to find new ways to address this burgeoning challenge.  
Second, most of the water professionals at the workshop were water quantity as opposed 
to water quality experts.  This largely mirrors the degree to which these topics are 
covered within MWRI, but it may well be that water quantity professionals felt easier 
about recommending that MBIs be applied outside of their immediate areas of 
responsibility. 
 
 
6.2 Recommended Next Steps 
 
This study was initiated because there was insufficient knowledge of the range of market-
based incentives potentially applicable to addressing water management challenges in 
Egypt relative to other policy measures.  Hopefully this report and the associated 
dissemination efforts—including the workshop held to receive feedback on preliminary 
findings—have helped to fill this perceived gap.  The wide sweep of topics addressed by 
the study and short timeframe meant that the analysis was done in only an introductory 
manner, and this inevitably resulted in the study raising as many questions as it answered.   
 
A certain degree of momentum now has been created at MWRI with respect to 
knowledge of and openness to the use of MBIs, and this should be maintained.  At least 
three areas for follow-up work in a next phase of work on this subject seem advisable. 
 
The first priority should be to further refine the problem analysis presented in this report 
and to begin the process of blending this new understanding of MBIs into the mix of 
policy options available to the government to address its highest priorities for water 
resources management. It may well be that the best choices for policy responses will 
involve some mix of regulatory and market-based instruments, but this policy analysis 
must be done with respect to specific problems that need to be solved.  A more thorough 
inventory of current policies and regulations relating to water—beyond the cursory legal 
and institutional review presented in this report—also would be a useful precursor to this 
exercise.  This should yield a fuller understanding of regulatory options to be considered 
alongside the new range of MBIs identified in this report—again in the context of 
specific water management challenges to be addressed.  As the “future visioning” 
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exercise at MWRI continues to define and refine approaches to deal with the emerging 
new generation of water management challenges, the potential application of MBIs 
certainly needs to be incorporated into the policy dialogue.  
 
Second, a recurrent objection to the wider application of MBIs in the water sector heard 
during the study and at the closing workshop relates to public acceptability.  Assuming 
that the sample of water professionals represented by the study’s workshop participants is 
generally representative of these professionals in Egypt, then their receptivity to the use 
of MBIs shows that such measures are acceptable to the officials who would be 
responsible for their implementation.  What about the public?  Strictly in the context of 
analyses to find appropriate policy responses to a specific water management challenge, 
it would be very useful to have real data on questions of public acceptability in contrast to 
largely anecdotal concerns that often are raised.  Prior to the implementation of any MBI, 
careful study should be undertaken of both the ability and willingness to pay by those 
expected to bear the burden of new economic incentive measures.  Public acceptability 
also should be tested from the standpoint of social and cultural suitability as well as 
administrative feasibility.  This is particularly important in cases where legitimate equity 
concerns have been raised. 
 
Finally, significant institutional adjustments are required that will take time to address 
and, therefore, warrant immediate attention.  Within MWRI, there appears to be an acute 
shortage of professionals with training in resource and environmental economics requisite 
to the conduct of further MBI analysis.   Further information is needed on the availability 
of such staff in the context of a broader needs analysis for institutional strengthening of 
this type.  The same constraints and needs would seem to apply to other government 
agencies with water management responsibilities.  In the meantime, consideration should 
be given to creating temporary capacity for economic analysis of this type within MWRI, 
perhaps by adding a water economics section to the Water Policy Advisory Unit led by a 
senior economist.  This section could also be tasked with coordinating the needs 
assessment and even be drawn upon to help with in-house training, where warranted.  A 
second set of institutional adjustments is needed to build a stronger working network of 
agencies responsible for water management within the country.  If acceptable, it would 
seem appropriate for MWRI to take the lead in this effort, but many of the MBIs 
identified in this study apply to problems that lie outside of the immediate mandate of 
MWRI.  With MWRI remaining as the lead authority in the water sector, much stronger 
outreach to and engagement of at least three key ministries and their associated bodies 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Ministry of State for Environmental 
Affairs and Ministry of Housing, New Communities and Public Utilities—is needed if 
the recommendations relating to specific MBIs identified as promising are to be acted 
upon in the interest of improving water resources management in the country.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Market Based Instruments (MBI), and Economic Incentives (EI) more broadly, have a 
number of advantages over traditional CAC methods for controlling pollution. One, 
these tools give those responsible for sources of pollution (hereafter referred to as 
“sources” or “polluters”) an incentive to reduce pollution below permitted amounts 
when it is relatively inexpensive to do so. That feature, in turn, provides a motivation 
for sources to become smarter regarding pollution control options and costs. 
Technological improvement and innovation will be stimulated, resulting in greater 
opportunities to reduce pollution at low cost. Finally, MBI are uniquely well suited to 
many of the pollution problems the world now faces. The more widely dispersed and 
smaller the sources, the more difficult it is to rely on traditional CAC methods of 
source-specific limits, inspections and enforcement. MBI harness forces of the market 
to give all sources, large and small, the motivation to find the least cost means of 
limiting their polluting activities. In principle, environmental inspections and 
enforcement become less necessary as sources pursue their own self interest and 
control pollution.  
 
MBI also are widely used for allocating natural resources to competing users. Long 
ago, farmers in England recognized the problem of communal grazing lands. Without 
charges to control use, or fences to delineate private property, the common grazing 
lands were over grazed and unproductive. Similarly, groundwater tables in many parts 
of the world are declining rapidly because the water is free except for the cost of 
operating one's pump.  
 
This paper reviews a number of worldwide experiences with MBI for managing water 
quality and water quantity. As revealed in Table 1, the guiding definition of MBI for 
this paper is quite broad: any instrument that makes the responsible party pay for part 
or all of the cost of pollution or the cost of providing a natural resource such as water. 
This definition includes fees, charges and taxes, charges on polluting inputs and 
outputs, tradable permits, subsidies, deposit-refund systems, as well as reporting 
requirements, and liability for harms.  
 
Worldwide experience with these instruments is quite extensive. A truly 
comprehensive treatment could occupy several large volumes. Because the resources 
available for this review were limited, the review is limited to a few examples of each 
type of instrument. The intention is to provide some depth of treatment for each of 
those examples to provide the reader with an understanding of how the instrument is 
designed and how it performs. Among the instruments mentioned in the introduction, 
deposit-refund systems have been omitted from the review since they appear most 
applicable to solid waste management and have only indirect connections to water and 
water quality.  
The paper concludes with a brief assessment of the potential applicability of these 
tools in Egypt. 
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Table 1. Economic Instruments for Managing the Environment 
Instrument Situation Where 
Instrument Works 
Best 
Examples Pros and Cons 
Pollution 
charges, 
taxes and fees 
· Damage function 
relatively flat 
· Monitoring data 
available 
· Emission 
charge 
· Effluent charge 
· Sewage charge 
· Solid waste 
charge 
Pros:   
· Stimulates new 
technology 
· Useful if damage per 
unit of pollution 
varies little 
Cons:   
· Limited control over 
the quantity of 
pollution 
· Potentially large 
distributional effects 
Input or 
output 
charges, 
taxes and fees 
· Numerous sources 
· No monitoring data 
· Damage function 
relatively flat 
· Linkages between 
input or output and 
environment 
· Carbon tax 
· Leaded gas tax 
· Fertilizer tax 
· Water user fee 
· Sewer fee 
· CFC tax 
Pros: 
· Simple to administer 
· Raises revenue 
Cons: 
· Weak incentive 
effects for pollution 
control 
· Potentially limited 
environmental 
impacts 
Subsidies for 
environment
ally friendly 
activities 
· Monitoring data 
available 
· Subsidy is not likely 
to stimulate new 
entrants 
· Industrial 
pollution control 
· Agricultural 
activity 
· Municipal 
sewage plant 
Pros: 
· Politically popular 
Cons: 
· Potentially large 
budgetary cost 
· Uncertain effects 
· May stimulate too 
much of the activity 
Removal of 
environment
ally harmful 
subsidies 
· Environmental 
harms from the 
subsidies can be 
documented 
· Political will exists 
to remove subsidies 
· Fuel subsidies 
· Agricultural 
subsidies 
Pros: 
· Should improve 
efficiency and welfare 
Cons: 
· Unpopular with 
those receiving 
subsidies 
Deposit-
refund 
· No monitoring data 
· Recyclable product 
 
 
· Beverage 
container 
· Lead-acid 
batteries 
· Automobile 
bodies 
Pros: 
· Deters littering 
· Stimulates recycling 
Cons: 
· High administrative 
costs 
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Instrument Situation Where 
Instrument Works 
Best 
Examples Pros and Cons 
 
 
 
Performance 
bonds 
 
 
 
· Specific actions 
desired 
 
 
 
· Mining 
· Timber harvesting 
 
 
 
Pros: 
· Can stimulate 
desired actions 
Cons: 
· High administrative 
costs 
Tradable 
permits 
· Damage function 
steeply sloped 
· Precise control 
over amount of 
pollution important 
· Marginal control 
costs vary across 
sources 
· Emission 
· Effluent 
· Water rights 
· Fisheries access 
Pros: 
· Good control over 
amount of pollution 
· Stimulates 
technological change 
Cons: 
· Little control over 
amount spent on 
pollution control 
· Potentially large 
transactions costs 
Liability · Large impacts · Natural resource 
damage 
assessment 
Pros: 
· Strong incentive 
Cons: 
· High transaction 
costs 
· Difficult burden of 
proof 
Information 
provision 
· Recipients 
understand 
information  
· Toxic releases 
· Product 
characteristics 
 
Pros: 
· Low cost 
Cons: 
· Uncertain results 
Voluntary 
mechanisms 
· Firms willing to 
exceed applicable 
standards 
· Energy 
conservation 
· Water 
conservation 
· Pollutio
n 
preventio
n 
Pros: 
· Low cost 
Cons: 
· Uncertain results 
 
FEES CHARGES AND TAXES 
 
A. Fees, charges and taxes for water and wastewater services 
Many countries levy water service fees, however the fees vary substantially across user classes (agriculture, 
industry, and households). Eighteen of 21 industrialized countries surveyed by OECD (all but Austria, 
Iceland, and Japan) reported user fees for water. In the case of industrial users, water fees are usually based 
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on quantities of water consumed. Water charges for residential consumers are set at flat rates in some areas 
and based on amounts consumed in others.  
 
Consumption-based rates are more likely to influence water use than flat rates, but 
relatively large price increases might be needed to induce changes in consumer 
behavior. A number of studies have found water consumption to be negatively related 
to unit-based prices. In 1982, for example, the Hunter and District Water Board in 
Australia replaced its fixed-rate pricing system with a pay-for-use system. Water 
consumption subsequently declined by 20-30%, a decline that allowed the deferral of 
water supply construction projects. Another study found that increases in water prices 
in Athens in 1990 led to significant decreases in water use. Although some of the 
decreases have been attributed to public education campaigns, the price increases 
have also been credited with significant incentive effect. In the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, increases in water charges since 1991 have led to significant falls in water 
consumption. In Bogor, Indonesia, water rates were increased by 200-300% in 1988 
and a conservation campaign was implemented in 1989. Domestic and commercial 
water use fell by 30% within nine months. This implies a price elasticity of demand of 
-0.10 to -0.15. 
Water charges are imposed for the cost of treating and delivering water to agricultural, 
industrial and household users. The World Bank recently completed a survey of water 
charges in 22 nations some of which were developed and others are still developing. 
The results of that survey are summarized in table 2, supplemented by data for 
additional countries from the World Bank web site. Industry generally pays the 
highest fees, followed by households. Agricultural users typically pay the lowest 
rates. A tremendous variation in rates charged is observed, however neither the state 
of development nor the availability of water appears to explain observed patterns. 
Water charges for domestic uses in Egypt are among the lowest in the world and well 
below prevailing rates in neighboring Middle East and North African countries. 
Table 2. Water Charges (1996, in $US per m3) 
 Agriculture Domestic Industry 
Country (incremental 
use) 
(incremental 
use) 
(incremental 
use) 
Algeria 0.019-0.22 0.057-0.27 4.67 
Australia 0.0195 0.23-0.54 7.82 
Botswana  0.28-1.48  
Brazil 0.0042-0.032 0.040  
Canada 0.0017-0.0019 0.34-1.36 0.17-1.52 
Egypt  0.03-0.07 0.40-0.90 
France 0.11-0.39 0.36  
India                               0.0095-0.082 0.136-0.29 0 
Israel 0.16-0.26 0.36 0.26 
Italy  0.14-0.82  
Jordan  0.23  
Lebanon  0.32  
Madagascar  0.325-1.75  
Morocco  0.53  
Namibia 0.0038-0.028 0.22-1.38  
New Zealand  0.31-0.69  
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 Agriculture Domestic Industry 
Country (incremental 
use) 
(incremental 
use) 
(incremental 
use) 
Pakistan  0.06-0.10 0.38-0.97 
Portugal 0.0095-0.0193 0.1526-0.5293 1.19 
Spain 0.0001-0.028 0.0004-0.0046 0.0004-0.0046 
Sudan  0.08-0.10 0.08-0.10 
Taiwan  0.25-0.42  
Tanzania  0.062-0.241 0.261-0.398 
Tunisia 0.020-0.078 0.096-0.529 0.583 
Uganda  0.38-0.59 0.72-1.35 
United States 0.0124-0.0438 0.40-1.50  
United 
Kingdom 
 0.0095-0.0248  
 
Source: Dinar and Subramanian (eds), 1997. Water Pricing Experiences: An 
International Perspective. World Bank Technical Paper 386;  
 
Charges on surface and groundwater abstraction (withdrawal) differ from the water 
supply charges described above in that they can be regarded as taxes on the use of a 
natural resource rather than payments for services provided. Charges on surface and 
groundwater use have been imposed in several countries, including France, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. The Netherlands imposes a ground water tax of 0.15 EUR 
($0.14) per cubic meter, while Denmark imposes a tax on household and some service 
sector water users of 0.84 EUR ($0.72) per cubic meter. Both of these charge levels 
are thought to be high enough to influence behavior. 
 
In the United States, fees are imposed on households and businesses for discharges of 
wastewater into Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs). Frequently, the water 
and wastewater utilities that service a household or business are one and the same. 
When a single invoice includes both services, users may be able to distinguish 
discharge fees from water user fees only by careful attention to line items. Wastewater 
discharges are not directly metered in most cases; rather they are assumed to be equal 
in volume to water consumption, which is measured. Some discharge fees for larger 
businesses are based not only on water use but also on discharge toxicity, which 
provides them with a separate incentive to reduce the toxicity of their discharges.  
With respect to water user fees, EPA’s 1995 Community Water System Survey 
estimated that 95% of residential water customers and 98% of nonresidential water 
customers are metered. They pay water charges based directly on their use. 
 
Whether a water user fee has a greater effect in terms of raising revenue or reducing a 
potentially polluting activity depends largely on the elasticity of the demand for water, 
that is whether demand is responsive to changes in price. If the demand is inelastic, an 
increase in user fees will raise revenue. User fees will not, however, affect 
consumption behavior in a significant way. If demand is elastic, however, 
consumption behavior is likely to be changed by a water fee, but the revenue-raising 
prospects are limited. Although water demand is often assumed to be inelastic, studies 
that separate water demand by season have found that household water demand is 
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inelastic in winter but elastic in summer. Others have found that water demand by 
industrial and agricultural users is sensitive to price changes. 
 
To promote water conservation, many have suggested the use of rate schedules that 
impose higher rates per 1,000 cubic feet as use increases. Two periodic surveys give 
an indication as to the type of rates that water utilities use. The Ernst & Young survey 
focuses on only the largest urban utilities, while the EPA Community Water System 
Survey is a more comprehensive, random-sample survey that includes smaller 
utilities. The Ernst & Young survey of residential rates for about 130 utilities reported 
that 38% use decreasing rates, 37% use uniform rates, and 22% use increasing rates. It 
also shows two trends over time: a greater use of increasing rates and a lesser use of 
decreasing rates.  
 
EPA’s Community 
Water System Survey 
obtained residential rates 
from more than 1,000 
systems: 49% use 
uniform rates, 16% use 
decreasing rates, and 
11% use increasing 
rates. Since utilities 
could report more than 
one type of rate per class 
of customer, the total for 
all rate types is more 
than 100%. Taken 
together, these two 
surveys suggest that 
smaller utilities in 
general are less likely to 
use increasing or decreasing rates than larger utilities. 
As shown in Figure 1, periodic surveys of selected water utilities indicate that water 
and wastewater fees have risen significantly since 1986. These price increases have 
exceeded the rate of inflation. In addition, EPA’s Community Water System Survey 
notes the tendency for large utilities to raise rates more frequently than small utilities. 
Smaller utilities raise rates by a greater amount when they do raise rates, but the 
differences are less dramatic when reported in annualized terms. 
 
In addition to water and wastewater charges, storm water charges have been imposed 
in a number of areas. Ernst & Young found that the number of utilities with such 
charges increased significantly from 1992 to 1994. Their use varies significantly 
across regions: They are used by over half of all utilities surveyed in the West but by 
none surveyed in the Northeast. In some areas, reduced storm-water fees are assessed 
in return for measures that promote storm water management. 
 
Many other OECD nations and also a number of developing nations impose charges 
for the use of municipal sewer systems. As is the case in the US, wastewater discharge 
fees are based on metered water consumption since discharge itself is not measured. 
Figure 1. U.S. Water and Wastewater Charges 
(monthly average fee) 
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Source: Ernst & Young. 1994. (3) 
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B. Industrial Effluent Fees 
Effluent discharge fees are found in many nations of Europe and also in a number of 
developing nations. This section describes systems in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, as well as effluent discharge fees in several developing nations. The 
intent here is to describe systems where fees are set high enough to have a positive 
impact on environmental quality. Many effluent fee systems in Europe and the former 
Soviet Union impose very modest fees with revenue raising for administrative cost 
recovery the primary objective, not improving environmental quality. 
France 
France's six river basin authorities, each with a committee and an agency, have been 
levying effluent charges since 1968. Each river basin's committee functions like a 
parliament, while each agency serves as an executive body. Each river basin board 
sets its own charge rates annually, subject to approval by the basin committee. 
The original basis for assessment was weight of suspended matter and weight of 
organic matter, since these two pollutants were relatively easy to detect and control. 
Charge parameters were later expanded to include salinity (1973), toxicity (1974), 
nitrogen and phosphorus (1982), and halogenated hydrocarbons, toxics, and other 
metals (1992). Discharges are estimated based on the emissions class and activity 
level of the discharger or, in the case of municipalities, on the basis of population and 
daily discharge per inhabitant. The basin authorities and dischargers may request 
actual measurement, the costs of which are borne by whoever makes the request.  
The charge applies to all municipalities with more than 400 inhabitants and to all non-
municipal facilities discharging at least 200 population equivalents a year. For 
facilities connected to a public sewage system, the charge applies only if discharges 
exceed 6,000 m3 per year. 
 
It is not clear to what extent the charges have discouraged pollution since the charges 
are designed primarily as revenue-raising instruments. Charge levels are based not on 
perceived environmental costs of discharges but rather on the revenue needs of the 
river basin authority. The effluent charges, as well as fees for extracting ground and 
surface water, generate revenues that are used mainly to finance water pollution 
control investments by farmers, industry, and municipalities. Some of the assistance 
takes the form of low-interest loans, but most of it is grants that usually cover 30%-
50% of the total cost of a given investment. During the period 1982-1991, $6 billion 
in assistance was provided for projects totaling $14 billion in expenditures. The 1992-
96 action plan provided for $6.5 billion in assistance for projects costing a total of $15 
billion. 
Germany 
Based on the 1976 Federal Effluent Charge Law, effluent charges have been collected 
by German states (Länder) since 1981. Although collection is left to the states, the 
charge calculation rules, charge amounts, and damage unit parameters are determined 
at the federal level. German states do not have the autonomy to set effluent charges 
that U.S. states have in setting the NPDES permit fees. 
 
Effluent charges for point sources are based on "damage units" dependent on 
quantities and types of pollutants. One damage unit is defined as 50 kg organic matter 
(COD), 3kg phosphorus, 25 kg inorganic nitrogen, 2 kg halogenated hydrocarbons 
(AOX), 20 g mercury (and compounds), 100 g cadmium (and compounds), 500 g 
chromium, nickel or lead (and compounds), 1 kg copper (and compounds), or 3,000 
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m3 of wastewater divided by T(f), where T(f) is the dilution factor by which the waste 
water must be diluted in order to lose its acute toxic effect on fish. Separate 
assessment methods are used for stormwater and for discharges from inhabitants not 
connected to the sewage system.  
Charge assessment is based on discharges allowed in state-issued permits. Dischargers 
without permits or with permits lacking discharge limits pay charges based on their 
declared discharges. Charges are raised if permitted discharge limits are exceeded. 
Most monitoring is left to polluters with random spot checks by the authorities. 
However, if a polluter declares in advance that its discharge levels will be at least 
20% below levels allowed in its permit over a period of at least three months, the 
charge is assessed on the basis of the projected reduced discharge level. 
 
The charge amounts can be reduced in several ways. If a discharger uses Best 
Available Technology for hazardous pollutants and Generally Agreed Technology 
Standards for non-hazardous pollutants, its charge per damage unit is reduced by 
75%. In addition, investments in treatment facilities are rewarded by reduced charges 
for a period of three years prior to completion of the new facility, provided that the 
facility will reduce pollution by at least 20%.   
The Netherlands 
Introduced in the 1970 Pollution of Surface Waters Act, effluent charges in the 
Netherlands are believed to have significant incentive effect on polluters. For 
discharges into federal waters, charges are imposed and collected by the federal 
government. For discharges into regional waters and into sewerage, charges are 
imposed and collected by regional water boards, which are also responsible for 
building and operating wastewater treatment plants. Regional charges are the same for 
indirect as for direct discharges and vary by region. The main reason for the variation 
is not regional differences in impacts of pollution but rather differences in costs 
associated with wastewater treatment. 
 
Charge revenues have risen significantly since they were first introduced. The 
revenues cover nearly all public wastewater treatment plant construction and 
operation costs. Charge administration costs have been estimated at 3.5% of revenues. 
Charges are based on pollution units. For oxygen-consuming substances, a pollution 
unit is defined as the average amount of oxygen-consuming material produced by one 
person in one day, which is further defined as 136 g of oxygen-producing material. 
For heavy metals discharged into federal waters, one pollution unit is defined as 100 g 
of the sum of mercury, cadmium and arsenic, and 1,000 g of the sum of copper, zinc, 
lead, nickel and chromium. For discharges to sewerage and regional waters, arsenic 
discharges are included in the latter group.  
 
For charge assessment purposes, there are three groups of dischargers: 
1. For households and businesses generating fewer than 5 pollution units per day, 
charges are usually fixed at 3 pollution units. This group accounts for about 65% of 
charge revenues. 
 
2. For dischargers of 5 to 1,000 pollution units (in some industries, the maximum is 
100 pollution units) of organic pollutants per day, charges are determined by 
combining an industry coefficient with easily obtainable data such as water use and 
amounts of raw materials. Facilities that believe they are being overcharged can, at 
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their own expense, conduct sampling and measurement and be charged according to 
the findings. This group contributes approximately 15% of charge revenues. 
 
3. Industrial facilities and municipal sewage treatment plants generating more than 
1,000 pollution units per day of organic pollutants or more than 10 pollution units of 
heavy metals are charged according to actual discharge, which they are expected to 
measure. Municipal treatment plants are not charged for discharges into regional 
waters and pay a reduced rate for discharges into federal waters. This group accounted 
for approximately 20% of charge revenues. 
 
The first two groups face a pollution charge that is not directly linked to pollution. 
The third group, however, faces pollution charges directly linked to the quantity of 
pollution they discharge.  For this group, the effluent fees are believed to have a 
significant effect on the quantity of pollution discharged.  
Developing Countries 
Egypt imposes effluent fees on industrial discharge equal to one piastre (about one-
fourth of one U.S. cent) per cubic meter. Several Eastern European countries have 
imposed effluent fees on industrial discharge. These countries, as well as China and 
most of the former Soviet Union, also impose non-compliance charges for discharge 
in excess of certain specified amounts. Revenues from most of these charges are used 
to fund environmental protection activities, but Slovenia's charge generates revenues 
for the general federal budget. 
 
Like other environmental charges in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
many of the effluent charges are limited in their effectiveness by problems such as 
weak enforcement, polluters' inability or unwillingness to pay, and inflation. In 1993, 
for example, Poland's charge collection rate was only 53%. Slovak charge revenue fell 
in local currency by 28% from 1992 to 1993 because of polluters' financial hardships 
and recession. Lack of widespread interest in environmental issues, limited experience 
with incentive mechanisms, and complicated charge mechanisms have also been cited 
as problems with charges in Eastern Europe. 
 
Four states in Brazil have introduced (or begun to introduce) charges for industrial 
sewage treatment based on pollution content. Sewage charges in Sao Paulo State, 
which are based on pollution content, have been found to have a significant impact on 
pollution. Reductions had been achieved through changes in production methods, use 
of cleaner inputs, and recycling. Having significantly underestimated the 
responsiveness of polluters to increased charges, the state sewage treatment company 
now suffers from excess capacity at a treatment plant. 
 
China, India, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are among the Asian 
countries to have imposed effluent fees.  
Malaysia 
Palm oil and rubber factories in Malaysia have been subject to a variable fee for BOD 
discharge. For land discharges, the fee is purely volumetric; for water discharges, the 
fee is based on quantity of BOD discharged and varies with BOD concentrations.  The 
fee is two-tiered: a low level up to the concentration standard, and a higher level 
above the standard. There is a minimum fee of RM150; charges are RM 0.05/ton of 
wastewater for land discharges; RM 10/ton of BOD for water discharges up to the 
standard; and RM 100/ton of BOD for water discharges above the standard.  Starting 
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in the second year of the regulations, the standard became mandatory.  The two-tiered 
charge system continued, but mills that violated the standard faced a real threat of 
being shut down (between 1991 and 1994, 27 crude palm oil mills had their licenses 
temporarily suspended for violations; in 1996 licenses of another 4 crude palm oil 
mills and 4 raw natural rubber factories were suspended).  In 1995, effluent charges 
on crude palm oil and raw rubber generated RM 1,031,439, equal to 6% of the 
Department of Environment’s annual budget. 
 
The regulations produced a dramatic drop in BOD emissions: a 2/3 reduction in the 
first year, and a 99% reduction after 7 years.  Vincent et al. (1997) argues that 
relatively little of this can be attributed to the effluent charges, however, as it was the 
threat of shutdown that appears to have motivated most action.  Some mills might 
have reduced their concentrations below the standards due to the charges, but because 
of the minimum payment, this was probably negligible. There were several problems 
with the use of the BOD charges as an incentive to reduce emissions. First, due to the 
minimum charge, mills had no incentive to reduce water discharges below 15 tons. 
Second, when the standard became mandatory, the main instrument became the 
standard and threat of shutdown, not the charge. Third, charge levels were not linked 
to any estimate of marginal benefits and marginal costs of pollution abatement, but 
were instead based on agency estimates of the level that would reduce discharges 
without imposing a major burden on industry. 
Philippines 
Laguna de Bay, also known as Laguna Lake, covers 90,000 hectares making it the 
second largest freshwater lake in southeast Asia. Located partially within the confines 
of Metro Manila, the lake is an important fishing area for the local people, provides 
water for commercial, industrial and household use, and also serves as a disposal area 
for liquid wastes. Over time, the lake was overwhelmed with wastes, resulting in 
polluted water and large-scale fish kills. The Laguna Lake Development Authority 
(LLDA) was created by a Republic Act in 1966 as a quasi-governmental agency to 
manage development activities within the lake basin. A 1975 executive order 
expanded the role of LLDA to include environmental protection and sustainable 
development of the water, fisheries and shore lands.  
 
LLDA’s jurisdiction includes twenty-one river tributaries of Laguna de Bay, five 
provinces (referred to as CALABARZON), sixty-six municipalities, and nine cities 
(including the capital, Manila). Within this area, LLDA identified fifteen industrial 
estates with approximately 3,200 facilities, as well as about 10,000 stand-alone 
manufacturing facilities. Although the Philippine Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources supervises LLDA, it remains an independent body through a 
special charter. The government owns 94 percent of it and private investors own the 
rest. LLDA receives no funds from the national budget. As such, it retains, invests, 
and uses collected fees without turning them over to the national treasury.  
 
A World Bank study conducted by Hagler Bailly reviewed effluent charge systems 
used in France, Germany, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and the United States as 
possible mechanisms for improving water quality in Laguna Lake. The study showed 
that charge systems can be very effective tools in stimulating effluent reductions. The 
bank recommended that LLDA be allowed collect fees at Laguna Lake because it is a 
government-operated and -controlled corporation with its own budget and board of 
directors. It is an attached agency of the Department of Environment and Natural 
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Resources (DENR), but unlike DENR, LLDA can directly use revenues from the fee 
to pay for the administration of the program and finance wastewater treatment 
programs. 
Officially launched on January 29, 1997, the user's fee program focused on reducing 
the biological oxygen demand (BOD) of wastewater flowing into the lake by charging 
industries and commercial operations a pollution fee. Initially, the program targeted 
industries in sectors responsible for 90 percent of the industrial wastewater flowing 
into the lake and its major tributaries. These include food processing, beverage firms, 
hog raisers, slaughterhouses, and textile mills. Later, the program will also include 
major municipal and household sources of wastewater.  
 
LLDA requires that firms pay their estimated user fees for the year before a discharge 
permit is issued. LLDA established its fee schedule using a numerical model of 
discharge activities and the objective of achieving a 50 percent reduction in the BOD 
load of the lake water within the first year of implementation. To achieve this 
reduction, the fees had to be higher than the incremental costs of pollution prevention 
or treatment for many sources. 
 
LLDA assesses two concurrent fees at the plant level on pollution discharges based on 
both volume and pollution load, providing incentives for water conservation and 
pollution abatement. LLDA levies a fixed fee based on the volume of wastewater 
discharged by the facility and a variable fee based on the amount of BOD discharged. 
The fixed fee is P5,000 for daily discharge up to 30 m3, P10,000 for discharges 
between 30 and 150 m3 per day, and P15,000 per year for more than 150 m3 per day 
(P35 ~ $1 at the time the program was implemented). For wastewater that meets the 
government Class C standard of less than 50 milligrams per liter BOD concentration, 
the variable fee is P5 for every kilogram of BOD released. Wastewater that does not 
meet the standard is charged P30 per kilogram. For existing industries, the P30/kg rate 
is higher than the cost of installing wastewater treatment facilities, giving firms a 
financial incentive to invest in treatment or pollution prevention.  
 
LLDA maintains an environmental fund to help administer the system. Fee revenues 
are placed here to (1) subsidize owners’ clean technology investments through grants 
or loans, (2) recover the costs of administering the system (data management, 
monitoring, and so on), and (3) obtain loans in the capital market to build domestic 
wastewater treatment plants. In 1998, LLDA collected P6.7 million ($174,000 at 1998 
exchange rates) through its Environmental User Fee Program. As fees are collected, 
LLDA has hired more staff and added more firms to the system. By December 2000, 
659 of the 4,000 firms in the basin were covered by the discharge fee system.  
Relative to a 1993 baseline, the program had achieved a reduction in BOD of 73.6% 
by 1999. As of December 2000 the lake had maintained its Class C status -- indicating 
it was suitable for fish culture and industrial use.  
 
The effort to improve environmental conditions in the Laguna Lake watershed also 
involves a number of voluntary efforts. LLDA enlists the support of local industries, 
communities, media, and NGOs to help improve the water quality of the lake and its 
twenty-one major tributaries. LLDA recruited industries along the tributaries to work 
with local governments, local fishing organizations, and environmental and church 
groups to devise and implement a rehabilitation plan for their adopted tributary. 
Activities include collecting baseline data, cleaning solid waste from the tributary and 
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its banks, planting vegetation along the banks, installing low-cost garbage traps at the 
mouth, and dredging where necessary. 
China 
The PRC initiated the pollution levy system in 1978, based on the “polluters pay 
principle”. First stipulated in the Environmental Protection Law of the People's 
Republic of China (tentative) in 1979, the system is referred to in subsequent 
legislation on air pollution, water pollution and waste. In the Tentative Regulation on 
Levying Discharge Fee (1982) and the Tentative Regulation on the Repayable Usage of 
Specific Fund for Pollution Sources Control (1988), the State Council describes the 
levying targets, levying scope, levying standards, fee calculation methods, levying 
procedure, and fee management and use. The system now is operational in all the 
provinces, cities, and counties in the PRC. The pollution charge system may be 
characterized as a comparatively mature and effective environmental management 
system, though a number of reforms are planned.  
From the outset, the PLS was viewed as a means of legitimizing the polluter-pays 
principle and providing a source of funding for provincial and local Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPB). Another important feature of the PLS is that a large portion 
of the funds that are collected are returned to the enterprises for pollution control 
investments. 
 
The air and water laws establish a system of concentration-based standards for 
emissions and effluents from point sources. For effluents, pollution levies are imposed 
on all releases for the substance that exceeds the standard by the greatest amount. For 
emissions to the air, pollution levies again are applied to the substance most in excess 
of the standard and only to the above-standard amount. For example, a fee of 0.04 
yuan/kg applies to SO2, Cl2, CS2, CO, HCl, fluoride, and NOx emissions in excess of 
the standards.  For coal dust and cement dust, the fee is 0.02 yuan/kg. Coal is charged 
a fee of 3.0 yuan/kg if  emissions exceed standards by no more than four times. In 
1993 the effective levy rate on wastewater discharges not meeting the standard was 
0.13 yuan per cubic meter.  
 
The first formal indication of interest in limiting SO2 emissions in the PRC is the 
State Council's 1990 "Suggestions on the Development of Acid Rain Control." The 
document recommends the creation of two control areas or zones, one for acid rain in 
the south of the PRC where the pH of precipitation is below 4.5 and one for SO2 in 
several industrial cities in the north where ambient concentrations exceed Class II 
standards. Together the two control zones cover approximately 11.2% of the territory 
of the PRC and include over three-fourths of the population. A total of 47 of the 275 
municipalities within the two control zones were declared "key" and they are targeted 
for the most ambitious control efforts. 
 
National minimum rates were increased once in 1991; however, many provinces 
impose higher rates. In the recently designated SO2 and acid rain control zones, excess 
SO2 emissions have incurred a fee of 0.20 yuan/kg since 1998. Several large cities in 
the SO2 and acid rain control zones also have raised their rates above 0.20 yuan/kg. 
Beijing's is the highest at 1.2 yuan/kg (equivalent to $150 per metric ton and 
approximately the same price as SO2 allowances in the US Acid Rain trading 
program). 
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Many of the important polluters in the PRC are state-owned enterprises (SOE) and 
many Township and Village Enterprises (TVE) operate in a financial collaboration 
with local government authorities. While the PRC has freed most internal prices, the 
profit motive of an SOE or a TVE that is run in cooperation with a local government 
cannot be as strong as in a private company. Consequently, the response of firms in 
the PRC to a pollution levy also may not be as strong as it would be in other 
economies. While the PLS seems to have been reasonably effective in reducing 
pollution, other factors such as responsibility contracts signed by enterprise managers 
and local government officials as part of the five-year planning process may be more 
important in determining the pollution intensity of industrial activity.   
 
As originally implemented, the PLS had the following features:  
· It applied to 113 items that belonged to one of five groups of pollutants: air 
emissions, effluents, solid waste, noise and radioactive substances. 
· The amount of levy was based on pollutant concentrations at the point of release, 
rather than mass or volume. In 1993 volume became a determinant of the levy on 
wastewater and in 1998 mass emissions of SO2 were subject to the levy. 
· Generally the levy applies only to the portion of discharges whose concentrations 
exceed national or local emission standards, however this changed for effluents in 
1993 and for SO2 in 1998, as noted above, and now applies to all releases of these 
substances.  
· For sources releasing several pollutants into the same medium, only the most 
highly-taxed pollutant was levied.  
· The magnitude of the levy is much lower than incremental pollution control costs, 
suggesting that the levy itself cannot have a major influence on polluting 
behavior. 
· The pollution levy was assessed only on industrial sources. Sources such as 
municipalities, hospitals and schools are exempt. 
· Discharge concentration standards apply nationally, however provincial and local 
governments may adopt more stringent standards 
· Other charges (known as the “four small pieces”) provide further incentives for 
sources to comply with the PLS. 
 
Environmental supervision and management divisions of local Environmental 
Protection Bureaus collect the levy. Generally about 80% of the amount collected is 
returned to sources to help finance pollution control investments. The remainder is the 
principal source of income for local and provincial EPBs. The partial recycling of 
PLS revenue to polluting enterprises finances between 20% and 25% of total PRC 
investment in pollution abatement. The PLS revenue retained by local and provincial 
EPBs contributes importantly to environmental management capacity in the PRC.  
 
Since the early 1990s, the PLS has been the subject of several evaluations by the 
Chinese Research Academy for Environmental Science (CRAES) and the World 
Bank. While recognizing its important positive role, these reviews have identified 
several deficiencies. The deficiencies may be grouped in three categories: 1) design of 
the pollution levy, especially the tax base and charge rate; 2) extent to which the 
pollution levy applies to polluters and pollutants; and 3) mechanisms of distributing 
levy revenues.   
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While many reviewers have criticized the Pollution Levy System, analysis of plant 
cost functions suggests that it should achieve positive results. A World Bank study 
(Dasgupta, Huq, Wheeler, and Zhang, 1996) shows that effluent charges as low as $1 
per ton should induce an 80% abatement of suspended solids. If charges were $3, $15 
and $30 per ton respectively for TSS, COD and BOD, firms would have an incentive 
to reduce effluent by 90%. This suggests that the current pollution levy should have a 
significant effect on cost-minimizing PRC firms, an effect that could be strengthened 
by increasing charge levels and, especially, applying charges to all effluents, not just 
effluent in excess of the standard. A recent paper by Wang and Chen (1999) notes that 
the recycling of about one-half of charge revenues for pollution control at the paying 
facilities should further increase pollution control efforts. 
 
By 1996, the PRC had imposed pollution levies on 496,000 polluting units with 
charge collections that year of 4.1 billion yuan and accumulated charges of 29.06 
billion yuan. About 25% of the country's industrial enterprises currently are levied. 
Collections and the number of firms levied are shown in the accompanying figure. 
Levy collections have not kept pace with the value of industrial output because the 
charge rates have been fixed while price changes have been significant. Also, some 
enterprises have complied with emission standards because of enforcement and as a 
result are not subject to levies for air pollution. Many Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVE) are not levied at all because local Environmental Protection 
Bureaus (EPB) do not have the resources to pursue all sources within their jurisdiction 
or find that the potential revenues from levying smaller sources does not justify the 
effort. 
 
During the ten years from 1986 to 1995, charge revenue increased about four-fold in 
nominal terms, but just 2.13 times in real terms. In the whole country, the proportion 
of total charge revenue to the value of industrial output decreased from 0.106% in 
1986 to 0.040% in 1995. For TVEs, the proportion of charge to TVE industrial output 
value decreased from 0.025% in 1986 to 0.009% in 1995. Since TVEs generally use 
less advanced technologies, one would expect them to be paying relatively more in 
pollution levies, not less than average. This suggests the desirability of increasing 
efforts to impose the pollution levy on a larger proportion of the TVEs. 
 
C. Fees, Charges and Taxes on Inputs 
 
1.  U.S. Superfund Taxes 
Until the end of 1995, the federal government imposed taxes on oil, chemicals, and 
business profits to fund the cleanup of inactive hazardous wastes designated under 
Superfund. This activity was financed by taxes on crude oil (9.7 cents per barrel), 
chemicals ($0.22-$4.87 per ton), and gross business profits (0.12% of amounts over 
$2 million). Congress did not extend the tax after its scheduled expiration. The oil and 
chemical taxes could be regarded as product charges or raw material input taxes. 
Their primary purpose, however, was to raise revenue, rather than to prevent 
pollution. 
 
2. Charges on Agricultural Inputs 
Several countries have imposed product charges on pesticides and fertilizers. 
Estimates of price elasticity of demand for these products vary widely, depending 
perhaps on the time period studied, crops, geographic area, and other factors. 
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However, some of these charges are more likely to have incentive impact than the 
relatively low charges imposed on these products by U.S. states. Norway has levied 
charges on fertilizers and pesticides since 1988. The fertilizer taxes are NKr 1.17 
($0.18) per kg of nitrogen and Nkr 2.23 ($0.35) per kg of phosphorous, resulting in 
average taxation of approximately 7% of the wholesale price. The pesticide tax is 
13% of the purchase price. In Finland, charges of Mk. 1.5 ($0.32) per kg were 
imposed on phosphate fertilizers in 1990. Relatively low charges on fertilizers in 
Austria, which are no longer in effect, are reported to have had a significant impact on 
fertilizer use. 
In Denmark, retail sales of pesticides are subject to a 20% tax. One study estimated 
the price elasticity of demand for pesticides in Denmark at -0.3. This estimate 
suggests that the 20% tax reduces pesticide use by roughly 7%. 
Sweden imposed two different charges on fertilizers in the 1980s. At their highest 
level, in 1991, the charges equaled 30-35% of the sales price of phosphate and 
nitrogen. The charges have had a significant impact on fertilizer use with its use 
falling by more than one-third. The amount of land under cultivation has also 
decreased but not in the same proportion as fertilizer use. The reduction in use appears 
to be most significant during the period when the tax was at its highest. The Swedish 
Board of Agriculture administers the charge. Its annual administrative costs associated 
with the charge have been estimated at 500,000 SEK ($74,000), roughly 0.4% of total 
annual charge revenues. Revenues from the price regulation charge have been used to 
subsidize agriculture, while revenues from the environmental charge have been used 
to promote sustainable agriculture, including investments in manure management and 
research and educational programs. Some of the reductions in fertilizer use can 
probably be attributed to the educational activities funded by the environmental 
charge. 
 
At least 46 states in the United States impose charges on the sale of fertilizers. 
Nebraska’s fee of $4 per ton is one of the highest; most are below $1 per ton. 
Assuming fertilizer prices of $150-$200 per ton, the charges are too low to 
significantly influence the use of fertilizer. The most common use of these charge 
revenues is the inspection of fertilizers and fertilizer storage by state agencies. 
TRADING 
Trading Water Rights 
Trading in water rights is a relatively new phenomenon, with most examples dating 
from the 1980s or 1990s. Three cases are discussed here: the Murray-Darling Basin in 
Australia, Chile, and California's Central Valley. Until a few years ago, tradable water 
rights were an important feature of water management at some of the oases in the 
Western Desert of Egypt. 
 
1. Australia 
The Murray-Darling Basin has tradable water rights and also has periodic water 
allocation auctions. These allocations are tradable. Volumes traded, although small 
compared to total water allocations, have increased steadily. Since temporary trading, 
or leasing of water entitlements was introduced in 1989 in the Goulburn Murray 
Irrigation District of Victoria the volume traded each year has increased. In New 
Zealand, water use permits may be transferred to another site provided that both sites 
are in the same catchment area, the transfer is allowed by a regional plan, and the 
transfer application has been approved by the permitting authority. 
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2. Chile 
Under Chile's 1981 Water Code, water use rights are completely separate from land 
use rights and can be purchased, transferred, or sold. New water rights are awarded by 
competitive bidding. Partly because most water rights (perhaps 50%-65%) are 
traditional but not legally recognized, water leases are far more common than sales. In 
one area north of Santiago, the price of a three-month lease was estimated at $90-120 
per liter per second. Transaction costs are said to be relatively high because of the 
need for infrastructure investments to transfer water, the need for approval from 
government authorities, and the lack of legally recognized water rights. In general, 
however, the system appears to promote efficient water allocation. Intra- and 
intersectoral gains-from-trade of water use rights have been significant.  
3. United States 
Water rights trading between states does not happen yet in the U.S.; however within 
some states active markets in water rights have developed, mostly in the arid western 
states. The most active market is in California. Cities have been buyers of water rights 
from farmers, while irrigation districts in the water short Central Valley regularly 
purchase water rights from other irrigation districts. CalFED has accelerated that 
process. CalFED, a state-federal program adopted in June 2000, calls for the creation 
of a new water market. In anticipation of that market, a large number of enterprises 
have been established to buy and sell water rights (e.g., Water Bank, Cadiz, Vidler 
Water -- a subsidiary of NYSE-listed PICO Holdings).  
 
Water rights trading takes place in other states, but no comprehensive list of such 
initiatives was identified during the course of the research for this report. 
 
B. Trading Effluent Discharge Requirements 
 
1. United States Experiences 
Despite many academic studies showing the potential benefit of effluent trading and 
considerable effort by EPA and the states to implement the concept, effluent trading 
has yet to live up to its full promise. While conceptually very similar to emission 
trading (which deals with emissions to the air), effluent discharge and its regulation 
also differ significantly from emission trading because effluent trading deals with 
emissions to the water.  
 
Both point and non-point sources contribute to water pollution. Point sources 
discharge pollutants into surface waters through a conveyance such as a pipe or ditch. 
Primary point sources include publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) and 
industries. Non-point sources add pollutants from diffuse locations such as surface 
agricultural runoff or unchannelized urban runoff. The most important non-point 
source of water pollution is agriculture. The differences between emission trading and 
effluent trading have made it difficult to design practical programs that can capture 
the potential benefits of effluent trading. New efforts by EPA to implement its Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program in areas with impaired water quality are 
expected to vastly increase the use of effluent trading. For current EPA efforts to 
promote effluent trading, see the following table. 
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Table 3.   Effluent Trading Projects 
PROJECT WATER BODY STATE ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION STAGE 
TRADES/ 
OFFSETS 
APPROVED? 
SAVINGS 
ESTIMATE 
AVAILABLE? 
Grassland Area 
Tradable Loads 
San Joaquin 
River CA 
Watershed 
trading program Implementation Y N 
San Francisco Bay 
Mercury Offset 
San Francisco 
Bay CA 
Regional offset 
program 
Under 
development N N 
Bear Creek Trading 
Program 
Bear Creek 
Reservoir CO 
Watershed 
trading program Approved N N 
Boulder Creek 
Trading Program Boulder Creek  CO 
Watershed 
trading program Implementation Y Y 
Chatfield Reservoir 
Trading Program 
Chatfield 
Reservoir CO 
Watershed 
trading program Approved N N 
Cherry Creek Basin 
Trading Program 
Cherry Creek 
Reservoir CO 
Watershed 
trading program Implementation Y N 
Dillon Reservoir 
Trading Program Dillon Reservoir CO 
Watershed 
trading program Implementation Y N 
Long Island Sound 
Trading Program 
Long Island 
Sound CT 
Large watershed 
trading program 
Under 
development N Y 
Blue Plains WWTP 
Credit Creation Chesapeake Bay DC Single trade 
Under 
development N N 
Tampa Bay 
Cooperative 
Nitrogen 
Management 
Tampa Bay FL Regional cooperation Implementation Y N 
Cargill and 
Ajinomoto Plants 
Permit Flexibility 
Des Moines IA NPDES permit flexibility Implementation Y N 
Lower Boise River 
Effluent Trading 
Demonstration 
Project 
Boise River ID Watershed trading program 
Under 
development N Y 
Specialty Minerals 
Inc.  Hoosic River MA 
Offset for one 
discharger Implementation N Some 
Town of Acton 
POTW Assabet River MA 
Offset for one 
discharger 
Under 
development N Some 
Wayland Business 
Center Treatment 
Plant Permit 
Sudbury River MA Offset for one discharger Implementation Y Y 
Maryland Nutrient 
Trading Policy 
Chesapeake 
Bay, other MD 
waters 
MD Statewide trading program 
Under 
development N N 
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Kalamazoo River 
Water Quality 
Trading 
Demonstration 
Kalamazoo 
River, Lake 
Allegan 
MI Watershed pilot program Implementation Y N 
Michigan Water 
Quality Trade Rule 
Development 
MI Waters MI Statewide trading program 
Nearing 
completion N Y 
Minnesota River 
Nutrient Trading 
Study 
Minnesota River MN Watershed trading study Completed N/A Y 
Rahr Malting Plant Minnesota River MN Offset for one discharger Implementation Y N 
Southern Minnesota 
Beet Sugar Plant Minnesota River MN 
Offset for one 
discharger Implementation Y N 
Chesapeake Bay 
Nutrient Trading Chesapeake Bay multi 
Large watershed 
trading program 
Under 
development N N 
Neuse River Nutrient 
Strategy 
Neuse River 
Estuary NC 
Watershed 
trading program Approved N Y 
Tar Pamlico Nutrient 
Program 
Pamlico River 
Estuary NC 
Watershed 
trading program Implementation Y Y 
Passaic Valley 
Sewerage Com. 
Effluent Trading 
Hudson River NJ Pretreatment program Implementation Y N 
Truckee River Water 
Rights and Offset 
Program 
Truckee River NV Offset for one discharger Implementation Y N 
New York 
Watershed 
Phosphorus Offset 
Pilot Programs  
Hudson River NY Offset pilot programs Implementation Y N 
Claremont County 
Project 
Little Miami 
River, Harsha 
Reservoir 
OH Potential regional trading project 
Under 
development N N 
Delaware River 
Basin Trading 
Simulation 
Delaware River PA Watershed pilot program 
Early 
discussion N N 
Henry Co. Public 
Service Auth. And 
City of Martinsville 
Smith River VA Single trade Implementation Y N 
Virginia Water 
Quality Improvement 
Act and Tributary 
Strategy 
Chesapeake 
Bay, other VA 
waters 
VA Statewide trading program Approved N N 
Wisconsin Effluent 
Trading Rule 
Development 
WI waters WI Statewide trading program Pilots active N N 
Fox-Wolf Basin 
Watershed Pilot Green Bay WI 
Watershed pilot 
program Approved N Y 
Red Cedar River 
Pilot Trading 
Program 
Tainter Lake WI Watershed pilot program Approved N Y 
Rock River Basin 
Pilot Trading 
Program 
Rock River Basin WI Watershed pilot program 
Under 
development N N 
Source: EPA. Reinvention Activity Fact Sheets. Effluent Trading in Watersheds 
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2. Trading Salt Credits in Australia 
Three states in Australia take part in the Murray-Darling Basin Commission, which 
manages water resources for an area in which over half of Australia's agricultural 
output is produced. The basin system is naturally saline, with some stream inflows 
saltier than the sea. Extensive irrigation activities in the upstream states of New South 
Wales and Victoria, encouraged by the sale of irrigation water to farmers at low 
prices, increased the flow of salt into the river system, reducing water quantity and 
quality to the downstream state of South Australia. Irrigation activity in South 
Australia further added to salinity levels of the water before it reached downstream 
urban users. 
Under the Commission's salinity and drainage strategy, each state is responsible for its 
actions affecting river salinity and no actions are permitted that increase overall river 
salinity. Credits can be earned for investments that limit the entry of salt into the river 
system. The credits are used to offset debits for drainage into the system. These 
credits are transferable between states but not between individuals and businesses. 
SUBSIDIES 
 
A. Subsidies for Improving the Environment 
Subsidies are the mirror image of emission taxes. Rather than taxes to encourage 
firms to reduce emissions, the subsidy approach offers cash payments to firms for 
reducing emissions. Polluters who release emissions forgo the cash payment. Under a 
subsidy system, polluters have an incentive to control all units of pollution whose 
marginal control cost is less than the subsidy. Subsidy systems for pollution control 
are especially popular in two sectors: farming and municipal government. Economists 
point out a major drawback of subsidy systems. While existing firms, farmers and the 
like, have an incentive to reduce their pollution, new entrants may be attracted by the 
higher profits earned as a result of subsidies. In some extreme situations this could 
have the perverse effect of increasing total pollution. Several examples of subsidy 
instruments in developing countries are summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 4.   Selected Environmental Subsidies  
Country, instrument, 
and source of data 
Description of instrument 
Indonesia—tariff 
reductions for wastewater 
treatment equipment 
(O’Connor 1994) 
Tariffs are reduced on imported wastewater treatment equipment.   
Korea—low interest loans 
and income tax deductions 
for purchase of energy-
saving equipment. 
(O’Connor 1994) 
Under the Energy Utilisation Act of 1979, low interest loans are 
provided for a variety of energy-efficiency investments.  Firms that 
produce energy-saving equipment receive a corporate income tax 
deduction of 10%; firms that import this equipment receive a 
deduction of 3%. 
PR China -- reduced 
tariffs for pollution control 
equipment and other 
advanced technology 
goods 
The PR China has made great efforts to encourage the use of 
imported high-technology goods, including pollution control 
equipment, through reductions and in some cases exemptions from 
tariffs and customs duties. 
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Country, instrument, 
and source of data 
Description of instrument 
Philippines—tax 
exemptions for pollution 
control equipment (ADB 
1997a) 
Exemptions of up to 100% of import duties and local taxes are 
given on anti-pollution devices for industries covered by the 
Investment Priorities Plan.  (Before 1984, the exemption was for up 
to 50% of tariffs on imported pollution control equipment.)  A tax 
exemption for pollution control devices of up to 5% of income is 
being considered.  ADB (1997a) comments that the operating costs 
of pollution-control devices is typically greater than the expected 
value of existing fines for violating pollution standards.  It is 
therefore unlikely that the policy has reduced pollution. 
Thailand—import and 
income tax exemptions for 
pollution control activities 
(Anantanasuwong 1997)              
Pollution control equipment not produced in Thailand is exempt 
from import duties, and foreign specialists working on pollution 
control activities are exempt from income taxes. 
Source: HIID, 1999, and others. 
 
B. Environmentally Harmful Subsidies 
1. Developing Countries 
Egypt subsidizes many activities, a number of which could be termed environmentally 
unfriendly. Some of these subsidies are being reduced or eliminated. For example, as 
a conditionality requirement for project lending, the World Bank succeeded in having 
Egypt reduce substantially its subsidies for agricultural fertilizers and pesticides.  
In much of the world, forest resources, waste collection, water, and electricity are 
priced far below their long-run marginal cost. It has been estimated that tax benefits 
for businesses contributed to 5% of the total area deforested in the Brazilian Amazon. 
Fertilizers and pesticides, which are taxed in several European countries, are 
subsidized in parts of Asia. In much of the world, forest resources, waste collection, 
water, and electricity are priced far below their long-run marginal cost. Electricity is 
far cheaper in developing countries than in OECD countries. The World Bank has 
estimated that developing countries use about 20% more electricity than they would if 
consumers paid the true marginal cost of supply.  
 
2. United States 
In the United States, timber, minerals, water, and public grazing land have been priced 
below their true social cost and in many cases even below their private cost. For all of 
these resources, user fees have been assessed. However, to the extent that these fees 
are lower than the private cost of the resources or services on which they are charged, 
such resources and services are actually being subsidized to the detriment of 
environmental protection. 
Livestock grazing fees on federal lands imposed according to a formula established by 
the 1978 Public Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA) are widely believed to be 
below market value. Although fees have been between $1.35 and $1.98 per animal 
unit month (AUM) since 1986, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Forest 
Service estimated that fair market values were $4.75 per AUM for sheep and varied 
across regions from $4.68 to $10.26 per AUM for cattle and horses. State and private 
fees are significantly higher than PRIA fees. Data from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service indicate that in 1993, private fees in 17 western states averaged 
$9.80 and state government fees average $4.58.  
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U.S. Bureau of Reclamation irrigation water subsidies in selected areas ranged from 
57% to 97% of the Bureau's full water delivery cost. Excessive irrigation has been 
associated with a number of environmental problems, including water shortages and 
contamination of water with natural pollutants and agricultural inputs.  
 
3. OECD Review 
Based on an analysis and review of the literature on environmentally harmful 
subsidies, a 1998 OECD report concluded6:  
· A subsidy can be defined as environmentally harmful if it encourages more 
environmental damage to take place than that which would occur without the 
subsidy.  
· The largest percentage of support has been implemented through minimum 
price regulations, which increase the marginal revenues of the producer at the 
expense of consumers and taxpayers.  
· Support in the OECD countries is mainly given to inefficient firms in mature 
industries in order to protect them from foreign competition.  
· The tax jurisdiction under which the support measures are applied has a 
significant effect on the economic and environmental aspects.  
· Support measures consist of a combination of direct financial mechanisms and 
regulations. Removing only one element from such combination will often 
have only limited influence.  
· Support measures may also represent a rather weak beneficial effect on 
income, growth and employment, while having adverse effects on the 
environment.  
· It is difficult to calculate the exact environmental effect of support policies 
across the sectors. A brief analysis may be completed through an examination 
of the elasticity of demand and supply in a given sector, the point of impact of 
the support measure in the market exchange, and direct and indirect links 
between the point of impact of the support and resulting pollution or other 
adverse impact.  
· The positive effects of the support removal will often become apparent only 
after relatively long time span. Any estimates of the environmental benefits of 
support removal will necessarily depend on assumed technical development 
and the time horizon examined.  
· Because of the increasing benefits that accrue over a longer time period the 
total environmental benefits of support removal will be larger than estimates 
based on empirical evidence.  
 
POLLUTION DISCLOSURE 
 
A. Color Coding Firms 
1. Indonesia 
Under Indonesia's PROKASIH (or Clean Rivers Program), the largest polluters are 
encouraged to sign agreements to reduce pollution by specific amounts over a specific 
time period. In the first 2 1/2 years after the start of the program, about 1,000 polluters 
signed agreements, the majority of which took measures to reduce pollution. The 
government has released information on which signatories have complied and which 
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have not and encouraged press coverage of signatories' performance under the 
program. 
In Indonesia, the Environmental Impact Management Agency (BAPEDAL) created 
the Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation, and Rating (PROPER) to rate 
factories on their compliance with national wastewater discharge standards, then 
discloses the ratings to the public. The first of these surveys in June 1995 rated 187 
factories. Five color categories are used to rate environmental performance: gold for 
firms that use best technology and reduce pollution to 5% of the national standard, 
green for firms that reduce pollution to 50% of national standards, blue for 
compliance with national standards, red for firms that fail to meet national standards, 
and black for those without pollution controls.  
 
Formal as well as informal sanctions apply, depending upon the color class. For 
example, the Indonesian stock exchange will not list securities of firms that fall short 
of the blue classification. Cultural factors such as shame avoidance and citizen 
lawsuits also play a role in motivating polluters. Evidence suggests that this system is 
influencing behavior. In the first survey in June 1995, 35.3 percent of the 187 
factories were in compliance with the government's water pollution regulations. Two 
years later, 49.2 percent of the factories were in compliance. 
2. Philippines 
The Industrial Ecowatch Project is a compliance monitoring system introduced by 
the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources in 1995. The idea is 
to use public disclosure (to the extent that firms valued 'reputation') to pressure firms 
to manage their pollution. A "gold" rating means that the firm is practicing resource 
conservation and pollution prevention, using clean technology and implementing self-
regulation beyond the requirements of environmental regulations.  A "green" rating 
indicates very good performance.  A "blue" rating refers to minimum compliance with 
all applicable environmental regulations for at least one year.  A "red" rating refers to 
compliance that falls short of the standards.  Lastly, a "black" rating pertains to the 
absence of any effort to comply with regulations and a pollution level that is 
damaging to the environment. 
Ecowatch is being implemented in the jurisdictions of the Laguna Lake Development 
Authority and the DENR-National Capital Region. The ratings of seventy-two firms 
were calculated in the DENR-NCR area.  Based on initial confidential disclosure to 
the firms, only 4 industries made it to the blue rating. Before disclosure to the public 
was made, 22 firms improved their performance to a blue rating. Former President 
Ramos honored firms with blue ratings in April 1998. These firms have benefited 
from the recognition as full-page advertisements were launched to announce their 
environmental achievement. It appears that resources invested in the Industrial 
Ecowatch Project will pay dividends in the future. The payback is not only to the 
environment but also to the firms that get good media exposure for their products. 
Sooner or later, this will translate to more demand for their goods. With color-coding, 
firms have an economic incentive to manage their pollution.  
 
The success in the adoption of Ecowatch is partly attributed to the assistance of two 
World Bank divisions: the Agriculture and Environment Division - East Asia I and the 
Policy Research Department, Environment, Infrastructure & Agriculture Division. 
Furthermore, the industries’ reception of Ecowatch was not adversarial due to the 
participatory framework used in planning the project's mechanics.  The industries 
themselves were partly responsible for the design of the Ecowatch system, which 
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includes area coverage and criteria for rating & timing. Also, the country's larger 
industry associations came together and supported the launching of the project. 
The database of Ecowatch will be merged with the databases of the Pasig River 
Rehabilitation Program and the MIS Division of the EMB.  This integration of data 
gathered from monitoring activities will strengthen the regulatory network as 
inspection and reporting will become easier.  Also, other users will be given the 
opportunity to tap into this information resource.   
Similar programs are being developed in Mexico, Columbia and the People's Republic 
of China. 
  
B.  Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR) 
For certain kinds of environmental problems and in certain social and institutional 
situations, the best regulatory solution may be to encourage the generation and 
dissemination of information about a problem. This approach recognizes that 
disclosing information can put pressure on businesses indirectly (rather than directly 
through administrative penalties such as fines or closures), and encourages them to 
engage in low cost measures to address the environmental problem rather than seeing 
business always as “the problem” to be regulated. A good example of this is the 
United States experience with the Toxic Release Inventory, which requires business to 
report the amounts of toxic materials that they emit into the environment. The simple 
fact of reporting led to a large reduction in the release of toxic substances. U.S. Vice 
President Gore has termed the TRI disclosure program "the single most effective 
common-sense tool'' of U.S. environmental policy.  
 
The US Toxics Release Inventory reporting system dates from 1987. Since then 
several other nations have developed similar systems. Known internationally as 
Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR), these programs have their origin in 
the 1992 Earth Summit, officially called the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED). Chapter 19 of Agenda 21, the Summit's 
action plan, calls on nations to develop such programs. The OECD, the World Bank, 
and UNEP have developed PRTR guidelines and offer assistance in developing such 
programs.  
The early PRTR programs include Canada's National Pollutant Release Inventory 
(1993), the United Kingdom's Chemical Release Inventory, and Australia's National 
Pollutant Inventory. The Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Trinidad and Tobago presently are in various stages of implementing PRTR 
programs. Currently, pollutant release data by facility and for geographic regions are 
available on the Internet for the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom.  
Recently, the Environmental Defense Fund, a U.S. NGO, created an Internet site it 
calls "scorecard," that facilitates access to the U.S. data and enables the user to 
express directly to plant managers concerns about pollutant releases and their impact 
on environmental quality. In its Sector Facility Indexing Program, the USEPA makes 
available on the Internet detailed information on pollution releases and permit 
violations at industrial facilities in five industrial sectors. For the five sectors, a 
concerned citizen can determine pollution releases at individual facilities, whether a 
facility is in compliance with its environmental permits, and what fines its owners 
have paid for permit violations. 
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C. Drinking Water Quality Reports 
In an August 19, 1998, notice in the Federal Register, the USEPA required the 
suppliers of drinking water to provide households with information on the quality of 
their drinking water, beginning in 1999. The reports must contain the following 
information: 
· the lake, river, aquifer, or other source of the water; 
· a brief summary of the susceptibility of the local drinking water source to 
contamination; 
· how citizens can obtain a copy of the complete water system assessment from 
the supplier; 
· the level (or range of levels) of any contaminants as well as EPA’s health-
based standards for the contaminants; 
· the likely source of any contaminants; 
· the potential health effects of any contaminants; 
· the water system’s compliance with other drinking water-related rules; 
· an educational statement for vulnerable populations about how to avoid 
Cryptosporidium; 
· educational information on nitrate, arsenic, or lead in areas where they are 
detected in quantities e that are more than 50% higher than EPA’s standard; 
and 
· telephone numbers for additional sources of information. 
EPA encourages water supply systems to post water-quality information online, and 
the Agency maintains links to this information on the Internet. 
 
LIABILITY FOR HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT: 
Liability for damage to human health and the environment can be a powerful 
incentive to encourage good environmental behavior by corporations, as well as to 
compensate those who are injured. If liability rules make polluters pay for the damage 
they cause they will control pollution to the point where the marginal pollution 
damage equals the marginal costs of control. At this point, the total costs of pollution 
to society (costs for controlling pollution and costs of damage) are minimized. If 
liability rules fail to make polluters pay for the harms they cause, polluters will 
recognize only their pollution control costs as a cost of doing business and damage 
costs will be borne by the victims. The result will be inequities and excessive amounts 
of pollution. 
  
Liability can take two forms: civil law and common law. Civil liability is expressly 
written into law. Many environmental statutes worldwide have liability provisions, 
though environmental liability actions in developing countries are relatively rare. 
Jurisdiction is one problem: Should a case be brought in the developing country where 
the spill occurred or in the home country of the concern that caused the spill? As the 
examples here suggest, there is no universal rule regarding jurisdiction. Moreover, in 
some cases individuals harmed by spills are not compensated due to unclear liability 
rules or inadequate financial guarantees prior to the start of operations.  
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The first set of examples concern releases at mining sites (Baia Mare in Romania, 
Kumar in Kyrgyzstan, Los Frailes in Spain, Ok Tedi in Papua New Guinea, Omai in 
Guyana, Taipan in the Philippines, and Yanacocha in Peru). The second set of 
examples concern damage assessments for coral reefs in Egypt, the US, Puerto Rico 
and Australia. The principal lessons are twofold. First, liability for damage to natural 
resources and the environment can be an important economic tool in encouraging 
firms to act responsibly. However, unless the firms are well financed or forced to post 
large performance bonds, firms may use bankruptcy proceedings as a shield against 
liability.  
A number of reforms are being debated. The Australian government is considering 
legislation that would require Australian companies operating abroad to adhere to the 
same environmental standards that apply in Australia. Elsewhere there are calls for 
mining and other extractive enterprises to post bonds or insurance to cover potential 
liabilities. Otherwise, the full costs of environmental harms will not be borne in the 
event of a serious polluting incident.  
 
A. Mining Cases 
1. Baia Mare, Romania 
The Baia Mare region of Romania is heavily polluted from past mining and industrial 
activity. The company Aurul SA was established to improve the environment by 
removing and treating waste from mine tailings sites while extracting residual gold 
and silver. Aurul SA is a joint venture 50% owned by Esmeralda Exploration, an 
Australian mining company, and 45% by the Romanian state company Remin, and the 
remaining 5% by another Romanian company.  
 
On January 30 2000, following unusually heavy precipitation, a portion of the tailings 
dam gave way, spilling 100,000 cubic meters of liquid and mud. The material flowed 
across 14 hectares of farmland and into the adjacent Lapus river. The release was 
potentially quite toxic, containing 126 mg/l of cyanide and unquantified amounts of 
heavy metals. In retrospect, Aurul managers acknowledge that not only bad weather 
was involved. The dam was designed as a closed system with no water discharge, but 
this left no opportunity to release excessive accumulations of water. 
 
From the Lapus river, the spill went into the Somes River and crossed the border into 
Hungary, before reaching the Tisza River, which flows through Romania and 
Hungary into the Danube River. At Satu Mare on the Somes, cyanide was measured at 
7.8 mg/l, versus surface water standards of 0.01 mg/l. Several communities closed 
water intakes as the plume passed. As the contaminated water made its way down the 
Tisza river and into the Danube, the media reported that at least 1,240 tons of fish had 
died. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) noted the upper Tisza River was 
inhabited by 19 of the 29 species of protected fish in Hungary. According to WWF 
Hungary, in practical terms the spill eradicated all life in up to 400 kilometers of the 
Tisza and rehabilitating the damage could take decades.  
 
Almost immediately, Esmeralda denied responsibility for causing the spill, and 
claimed the extent of the poisoning had been exaggerated. Meanwhile, Hungary began 
identifying individual losses and cleanup expense in preparation for a mass damage 
claim. In April 2001 Hungary filed a claim for $102 million in the Budapest 
Municipal Court. Romanian authorities initially stated that they too would file a 
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damage claim but later appear to have had second thoughts due to Romanian 
participation in Aurul SA. Serbia also stated it would file a damage claim. 
 
After it became clear that the release had caused 
damage and that it likely would be held responsible, 
Esmeralda offered compensation to landowners 
within the 14 hectare area that was contaminated as 
a direct result of the release. Esmeralda continued to 
deny the spill could have caused the damage 
claimed downstream and later declared bankruptcy 
to protect its assets.  
 
Since the spill Aurul has cooperated with a 
Romanian Expert Committee, the Environmental 
Protection Authority, the Water Authority and the 
Public Works Authority and satisfied all 
requirements regarding remediation and 
precautionary actions. On June 13 2000, Aurul restarted the tailings treatment at Baia 
Mare, having received necessary regulatory approvals as well as support from the 
local community. 
 
The amount of compensation to be paid by Esmeralda and/or the Romanian 
government likely will take years to resolve. Not only is the magnitude of the loss 
difficult to quantify in financial terms, but the assignment of liability and collecting 
any sums also are problematic. Three unrelated spills in same general area in the two 
months following the spill further complicate matters. The Romanian government is 
defiant that will not pay money to another nation as a result of the spill. Esmeralda is 
a small company operating under protection of bankruptcy, making the collection of 
substantial sums from it unlikely. A financial analyst's report from CIBC Wood 
Gundy Australia Limited prior to the spill projected that the tailings cleanup at Baia 
Mare would earn Esmeralda approximately $2.1 million (US) annually for a period of 
eight years, further underscoring the limited profitability of the venture and the 
difficulty the firm would have in paying a claim of over $100 million. Criminal 
proceedings have also been launched in Hungary and Romania for damage caused to 
the natural environment. 
 
2. Los Frailes, Spain 
In 1987, a Spanish subsidiary Boliden Aprisa of the Canadian mining firm Boliden 
Ltd. purchased the Anzalcollar mine about 45 km west of Seville in the Iberian Pyrite 
Belt. When the Anzalcollar mine was closed in the early 1990s, its ore concentrating 
facilities were used to process ore from Los Frailes, a lead, zinc and copper mine 
located one km to the west and also owned by Boliden Aprisa. In April 1998, the 
Anzalcollar tailings dam burst, polluting the Guadimar River with 5.5 million m3 of 
tailings water and 1.5 million m3 of tailings, covering about 2,600 of nearby 
agricultural lands with tailings, and threatening the Donana national park, one of 
Europe's leading nature reserves and a UN World Heritage site.  
 
Without accepting legal responsibility, and in fact blaming the Spanish company 
Dragados for improper design and construction of the tailings impoundment in 1978, 
the company has spent approximately 42 million euros repairing damage to the mine, 
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restoring the area contaminated by the tailings and paying compensation to affected 
farmers. An official inquiry after the accident seemed to support the company as it 
found that deformation of the clay soils supporting the tailings dam had caused the 
failure. The mine was allowed to reopen in 1999 and in late 2000 Spanish court 
dismissed criminal charges against Boliden Aprisa. 
 
The Los Frailes mine never was particularly profitable. In 1999 it produced 46,250 
tons of zinc, 17,350 tons of lead, 1,219 tons of copper and 743,000 ounces of silver in 
1999, worth about $25 million. Recently the owners announced that they could not 
proceed with the third phase of expansion and declared bankruptcy. 
 
3.  Kumtor, Kyrgyzstan 
Located at an elevation of nearly 4,000 meters in the Tien Shan mountains of 
Kyrgyzstan, the Kumtor gold mine provides about nine percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP. 
The Kumtor mine produces nearly 20 metric tons of gold annually and has some of 
the lowest gold production costs in the world -- about $90 per ounce. Pre-tax profits 
for the mine are approximately $130 million annually. The Kumtor mine and 
processing facility is two-thirds owned by Kyrgyzatlyn, a Kyrgyz company and one-
third owned by Cameco, a Canadian mining company. The International Finance 
Corporation, an arm of the World Bank, lent $40 million to the operation, its first 
investment in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The IFC believes that the Kumtor mine represents an attractive economic opportunity 
for Kyrgyzstan: "Gold mining is one of the most promising areas of economic 
development in the Kyrgyz Republic and, potentially, the largest source of export 
earnings. The mine, with access roads, power transmission lines, an airstrip to 
transport the gold, and other associated infrastructure, will help open up a remote and 
inaccessible part of the country. The project will have a positive developmental 
impact through employment and transfer of management and technical skills." 
 
On May 20 1998, a truck enroute to the mine with 20 one-ton packages of sodium 
cyanide tumbled into the Barksoon river, spilling the contents of one or two of the 
packages. The next day the company treated the spill area with sodium hypochlorite 
to neutralize the toxic effects. Kumtor also shut off the water supply to a local village 
as a precautionary measure.  
 
For weeks after the incident, more than 5,000 individuals exposed to the chemicals 
sought medical attention, complaining of skin rashes, sores and other ailments. The 
Barksoon river empties into Lake Issy Kul, Kyrgyzstan’s leading tourist attraction. 
Bookings were cancelled and revenues plummeted because of fears that the lake also 
was poisoned. Some 4,800 individuals were relocated temporarily from the southern 
side of Lake Issy Kul where the spill occurred to the northern side of the lake. Media 
reports indicated that several animals and at least two people perished. The company 
promised to pay for all costs of cleanup and medical costs for exposed individuals. 
 
In July 1998, Kumtor officials announced preliminary figures regarding the 
compensation the company had paid. Nearly $500,000 was paid in compensation to 
more than 7,200 people in the village of Barksoon and 3,600 people in nearby Tamga 
village. About $580,000 was spent to relocate and rehabilitate villagers at north-shore 
resorts, $530,000 was spent to construct a new water supply system for Barksoon, 
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$100,000 for reconstructing the road to the mine, and $80,000 for tourism 
advertisements. Total expenditures will be about $2 million. In August the Kyrgyz 
government released a preliminary estimate of the damages of $4 million and in 
January 1999 Cameco agreed to pay the Kyrgyz government $4.6 million as 
compensation for the spill, including $3 million as compensation for local residents. 
 
While some members of the Kyrgyz parliament complained that the compensation 
was inadequate, former environment minister Kulubek Bokonbaev published a book 
in 1999 that argued that all harmful effects of the spill had dissipated within 13 days 
of the incident and no mass poisonings occurred.  
 
4.  Ok Tedi Mine, Papua New Guinea 
The Ok Tedi mine is located on Mt. Fubilan at the headwaters of the Ok Tedi river in 
the Star Mountains in western Papua New Guinea, not far from the Indonesian border. 
The Ok Tedi River flows 200 km to the south where it joins the Fly River. The Fly 
River meanders over 450 km of floodplain until it joins the Strickland River and 
empties into the Gulf of Papua, a large tidal estuary. The immediate area near the 
mine receives about 10 meters of rainfall annually. The mine is at an elevation of 
1,800 m, in a geologically unstable region marked by frequent landslides and 
earthquakes.  
 
Originally the PNG government required in the Environmental Impact Statement that 
the mine have a tailings pond as a condition of operation. After foundations for the 
tailings dam were destroyed by major landslides in December 1983 and January 1984, 
OTML received permission from the government to dump some 65 million tons of 
tailings and waste rock annually into the Ok Tedi and Ok Mani rivers. The tailings are 
sand-sized and smaller, while the waste rock is gravel to boulder size. The waste 
material contains copper, cadmium, lead and other heavy metals.  
 
The tailings and waste rock dumped into the Ok Tedi river system have caused much 
greater adverse impacts downstream than originally envisioned. The riverbed at 
Tabubil, where most mine employees live, has risen by approximately 4 meters. 
Downstream where the Ok Tedi flattens out and loses some of its velocity, sand has 
accumulated to the extent that the riverbed is six meters higher. Elevation of the 
riverbed has increased the frequency and severity of flooding, as well as 
contaminating the floodplain of the Fly River with heavy metals and sand. Several 
hundred square kilometers of formerly productive lands have experienced forest die-
back and areas near the river are no longer suitable for cultivation. In the Ok Tedi, 
catches have declined by 90% from baseline (pre-mine) levels, while on the middle 
stretches of the Fly River, catches have declined by about 70%. It is important to note 
that fish and water quality both meet WHO standards, meaning that human health 
impacts have not been an issue. 
 
There are at least six different compensation agreements designed to address 
environmental impacts. The first agreement covered land loss during construction of 
the mine. The first agreement also provided compensation in the event of 
unanticipated adverse environmental impacts within the area covered by the mining 
leases. The subsequent compensation agreements were the result of litigation by 
affected parties living outside the area covered by the mineral lease.  
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Courts in Papua New Guinea would not accept cases brought by those outside the 
original compensation agreement. As a result, plaintiffs filed suit in the Australian 
courts. BHP worked with the PNG legislature to draft legislation that would bar such 
suits and protect BHP and the other owners of Ok Tedi from liability for harm to 
people or the environment. Adverse publicity effectively stymied these efforts and 
eventually the Australian courts found that several groups of plaintiffs had been 
injured. The PNG legislature enacted the Restated Supplemental Agreement Act 
(RESA) also known as the Mining Act of 1995 to codify these settlements from the 
Australian courts. 
Victories in the Australian courts enhanced the bargaining position of the affected 
landowners by providing them with resources necessary to hire outside legal 
representation and seek greater compensation. The 1995 act, in particular, is 
noteworthy because it provides compensation without proof of loss to communities 
deemed affected by changes to the river system.  
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A 1996 settlement agreement between BHP and 30,000 landowners has three 
elements: creation of a tailings pond to receive wastes from continued mining; 
rehabilitation of the Ok Tedi and Fly Rivers; and compensation of A 110 million ($ 70 
million US) to the landowners. BHP will pipe tailings to unused land at the bottom of 
the mountain at a cost of between A 300 million and A 450 million. OTML agreed to 
dredge about 20 million tons of rock annually in parts of the Ok Tedi River to reduce 
siltation, erosion of the riverbanks and flooding of adjacent farmland. BHP also has 
agreed to pay the plaintiffs legal costs. While the compensation was paid, the mine 
continued operations while it conducted a risk assessment of the planned tailings pond 
and the ongoing dredging activities.  
 
In August 1999, the PNG government asked the World Bank to review OTML's risk 
assessment for its waste disposal operations and to consider broader issues of 
environmental and social stewardship and responsibilities between the government 
and the peoples of the Western Province. The World Bank concluded that the best 
option from an environmental viewpoint was to close the mine immediately. 
However, there had been no preparations for closure in the affected communities and 
the World Bank pointed out that the social costs of closure needed to be considered 
since Ok Tedi is the principal source of employment in the region.  
 
The PNG Government interpreted the risk assessment as supportive of continued 
mining until 2010, the date originally planned for mine closure. BHP recognized that 
the mine was an increasing liability and announced in May 2000 that it wanted to end 
its involvement in OK Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) by June 2001. Atlas Mining, a 
Philippine company, has emerged as the most likely buyer. The Papua New Guinea 
government has expressed concern regarding the sale, citing recent litigation by 
landowners in the Western Province where the mine is located and possible 
compensation that may be ordered by the Victoria (Australia) Supreme Court.  
 
Certainly not all impacts have been adverse. Ok Tedi Mining Limited has been the 
principal agent of economic development in the Western Province. It employs 1900 
people and at least four times that many jobs are created indirectly as a result of the 
mine. During its first 15 years of operation, infant mortality has fallen from 300 to 15 
per 1000 live births, life expectancy has increased from 30 years to 50 years, and the 
incidence of malaria has fallen by at least two-thirds. Substantial sums have been paid 
in taxes and royalties to the PNG government, governments of the Western Provinces, 
and local landowners. 
 
An important aspect of the litigation and settlement concerns what precedent it might 
have for mining operations of foreign companies and whether injured parties could 
seek redress in the home nation of the company. The fact that a mining company 
could be sued in its home country for damage caused in another country where it had 
operations is an important precedent. Moreover, that it could be found liable for 
environmental damage even when it complied with all environmental regulations and 
permit conditions of the host country also is remarkable. Compensation paid to 
adversely impacted parties in the host country have been substantial; the 
consequences of environmental damage were a major drain on corporate resources, 
enough so that BHP is trying to sell or otherwise dispose of its interest in the project. 
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5. Omai, Guyana 
On August 9 1995, a tailings dam at the Omai gold mine in Guyana burst, releasing 
over 3 million cubic meters of cyanide contaminated mining waste into the Essequibo 
river and causing extensive damage downstream. The mine is 65% owned by 
Cambior, a Canadian mining company, and 30% by Golden Star Resources of 
Colorado, and 5% by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and produced about 
250,000 ounces (7 metric tons) of gold worth about $65 million annually. Shortly 
after the incident the government of Guyana absolved the companies of any criminal 
liability. Cambior and Golden Star Resources have denied any responsibility for the 
damage and contest the $100 million in claims that have been filed. A Canadian court 
remanded a lawsuit over spill damage to a court in Guyana, where the matter now 
resides. Cambior's recent financial statements indicate that it believes any amounts to 
be disbursed on these claims will not be material.   
 
6. Taipan Mine, Philippines 
Marcopper began mining operations at Mt Tapian on Marinduque Island in the 
Philippines in 1969. Placer Dome, a Canadian company, co-owned (39.9%) and 
managed the operation. Three Philippine mining companies controlled by then-
President Marcos held the remaining interests until that share was privatized in 1994. 
Placer Dome extracted low-grade copper ore from an open pit mine and used a 
mechanical and flotation process to produce copper concentrates. The company 
disposed of its wastes on land until it obtained a permit in 1975 that allowed mine 
tailings to be dumped into 
Calancan Bay.  
During the development of 
the Tapian orebody, a 
2,000-meter tunnel 2 meters in 
diameter was bored between the 
open pit and the Boac River 
catchment to drain storm water and 
seepage from the pit. Mining of 
the Tapian orebody was finished by 
1990. The nearby San Antonio 
open pit mine began to be 
developed at that time and the 
Tapian pit was used for disposal of 
coarse mining wastes. Once ore 
concentration activities started, 
the plan was to dispose of fine 
tailings in the ocean, a practice 
permitted during mining of the Tapian ore body. 
When the San Antonio pit commenced production in 1992, the Philippine government 
ordered that all tailing be disposed of in the Tapian pit until an alternative long-term 
tailing disposal solution was developed. In order to retain fine tailings in the pit, 
Marcopper designed and installed a concrete plug in the drainage tunnel.  
The Tapian pit was used for tailing disposal until March 24, 1996, when rock holding 
the concrete plug weakened, perhaps caused by a small earthquake, releasing a heavy 
flow of tailings into the Boac River. Mining was suspended while emergency workers 
attempted to stop the leakage and assist people living near the river. Solid materials 
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from the pit halted the main flow of liquid after four days, however it wasn't until 
several months later that a permanent 20-meter long concrete plug, backed by another 
40 meters of earth fill, was installed -- at a cost of over $8 million. 
 
When the spill occurred, Placer Dome and Marcopper quickly acted to build new 
access roads to the villages, to provide medical attention, to develop new water 
supplies and to compensate people for loss of income. The company also relocated 
several houses to high ground because silt in the river channel increased the risk of 
flooding. Rather than dredge the river to reduce silt accumulation, Philippine 
authorities recommended that the company rely on natural action of the river to flush 
the sediments out to sea. In 1996 Placer Dome dredged settling basin in the delta of 
the river to capture tailings before they reached the sea. The total remediation cost 
incurred by Placer Dome is expected to reach $80 million. Because of its positive 
response to the problems, Placer Dome has been told by Philippine authorities that it 
would be a welcome investor in future mining projects in the Philippines. However, 
mining has not yet resumed at the San Antonio mine. 
 
7. Yanacocha Mine, Peru 
On June 2, 2000 a truck traveling from the Yanacocha gold mine spilled 151 kg of 
mercury between the villages of Choropampa and Magdalena. The truck driver 
allegedly went on to Lima without informing residents of the hazards posed by 
mercury. Local residents collected as much mercury as possible, believing it was 
valuable. According to Yanacocha sources, symptoms of mercury poisoning affected 
more than 900 individuals and several individuals were hospitalized.   
 
Newmont Mining is a 51.35% owner of the mine, along with Minas Buenaventura 
with 43.65% and the International Finance Corporation, a private sector branch of the 
World Bank, with 5%. The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), an evaluation 
unit of the IFC, investigated the accident and reported: 
 
The mine had no emergency response plan for mercury spills outside its property 
Newmont did not apply global standards for the transport of hazardous wastes 
The mine did not follow safety procedures for loading and transporting mercury, and 
The mine owners and the Peruvian government were not forthcoming about the 
dangers posed by mercury exposure. 
 
Under protest Newmont paid a fine of 1.74 million soles (approximately $500,000) to 
the Peruvian government. The company also agreed to provide health insurance for 
five years for individuals with symptoms of mercury poisoning, to construct a number 
of public works projects in the affected area, and to respond to the recommendations 
of the CAO. Newmont took a charge of $10 million in 2000 to reflect these costs. The 
company acknowledged that it could not predict the magnitude of any future liability 
from the spill. 
 
B. Coral Reef Damage Assessments 
1. Egypt 
On April 4, 1996 Cunnard Lines' Royal Viking Sun strayed from course and ran into a 
coral reef off Tiran Island near Ras Mohammed in the Red Sea. Before the vessel was 
freed, it damaged approximately 2,000 square meters of reef. Egyptian authorities 
impounded the vessel and demanded $23.5 million in compensation for lost tourism 
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revenues and damage to the environment. Cunnard Lines settled for that amount 
(equivalent to over $10,000 per square meter of reef). 
 
2. Puerto Rico  
On July 24, 1997 the 326-foot Fortuna Reefer went aground near a Nature Reserve 
off the west coast of Mona Island in Puerto Rico. The vessel damaged a barrier reef 
that extends about 10 miles from the eastern end of the island around the south coast 
and to the northwest. The reef contains large, branching elkhorn corals that were 
damaged by the grounding. Because of the remoteness of the site, salvage efforts were 
hindered and the vessel remained aground for ten days. While no fuel oil was spilled, 
the grounding and later salvage activities caused physical damage to an area 
approximately 900 feet in length by 50 to 100 feet wide. 
 
Restoration experts advised reattaching the largest pieces of coral to reestablish the 
physical structure of the reef (Elkhorn coral often survive reattachment). In a 
September 11 settlement agreement with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the ship owner, Rama Shipping 
Company of Thailand, agreed to pay $1,250,000 for natural resource damage 
(equivalent to about $190 per square meter of damaged reef). The settlement provides 
$650,000 for emergency reattachment of 400 large pieces of coral, to be conducted 
under NOAA leadership, and $400,000 for compensatory restoration to the 
Commonwealth. By September 20, NOAA had initiated emergency restoration 
efforts.  
 
3. Florida 
On August 10, 1994 the University of Miami's research vessel R/V Columbus Iselin 
went aground on an ancient coral reef in Looe Key National Marine Sanctuary (now 
part of the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary. The vessel remained grounded on 
the reef for 38 hours causing extensive damage to four spurs of the reef as well as 
significant debris in the area. The grounding destroyed 338 square meters of living 
coral and killed or displaced many sea fans, sponges, fish and other creatures. The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) sought damages to cover 
response costs, restoration of the reef, and lost recreational values, eventually settling 
with the University of Miami for $3.76 million ($11,120 per square meter). The 
settlement included a civil penalty of $200,000. A description of the restoration effort 
is available on the Internet.7  
 
4. Australia 
On November 2, 2000 the container vessel MV Bunga Teratai Satu ran aground on the 
northwest side of Sudbury Reef, a part of the Great Barrier Reef of Australia. The 
22,000 ton, 184 meter long cargo vessel was registered to Malaysia International 
Shipping Corporation and carrying 1200 tons of fuel oil. After two days of effort, the 
ship was freed without loss of fuel or cargo, however the reef sustained considerable 
damage. The Australian government conducted a cleanup in two phases. The first 
phase involved a relatively small 50-meter by 30-meter scar from the ship in the coral. 
This area was heavily contaminated with a tin-based anti-fouling substance that had 
been applied to the vessel. At the end of the first phase of cleanup, several large 
blocks of reef were replaced to facilitate regeneration of the coral. The second phase 
                                                
7 www.sanctuaries.nos.noaa.gov/special/columbus/columbus.html 
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of cleanup involved a larger debris field 100 meters by 300 meters. The shipping 
company has agreed to pay the Australian government at least $2 million to 
compensate for the cleanup and restoration efforts and long-term monitoring. One of 
the other outcomes of the incident will be a thorough review of shipping practices 
near the Great Barrier Reef.  
 
APPLICABILITY TO EGYPT 
This review demonstrates that Egypt already is employing a number of MBI for 
managing water resources. Households and industry pay for water deliveries. Egypt's 
water delivery charges are low relative to most other nations, particularly those in the 
Middle East and North Africa. Households with sewer connections pay modest fees 
(between one-third and one-fifth of O&M costs) for that service. Firms must post a 
performance bond and pay fees for every cubic meter of treated effluent they 
discharge to Egypt's waterways. Environmentally harmful subsidies for fertilizer and 
pesticides were reduced or eliminated. Natural resource damage assessments have 
been used to seek compensation when ships cause damage to coral reefs.  
With the exception of the New Valley project, Egypt does not impose charges for 
agricultural water deliveries. Efforts are underway to develop cost-sharing 
mechanisms for these services. In addition there are no fees for withdrawals from 
groundwater aquifers, despite the deflectable nature of some aquifers. 
Trading of pollution rights would require measurements that currently are not made, 
in addition to fundamental changes in Law 4. The feasibility of trading water rights 
should be explored. Other water scarce regions are finding considerable success with 
such systems.  
 
Egypt currently has no initiatives to report information regarding industrial releases of 
pollutants; however, it did participate for a time in an OECD PRTR initiative among 
developing nations. Likewise, Egypt has not implemented (or apparently considered) 
a color rating system for the environmental performance of firms. As this report notes, 
many developing countries now are using such systems with success.  
Finally, Egypt has been successful in collecting damage assessments from ships that 
harm coral reefs in the Red Sea. The discussion of mining pollution in this paper 
revealed the difficulty of collecting for natural resource damages from small, poorly 
funded operators. Egypt could review the current situation regarding petroleum and 
mineral exploration and production on its territory to determine if the operators would 
be capable of paying compensation in the event of a major accident. If not, a system 
of performance bonding could be required to protect Egypt's environment. 
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OBJECTIVES 
 
(i) Review current systems of agricultural taxation and their implications 
regarding the potential introduction of “Market- Based Incentives” 
(MBIs) in the irrigation sector. 
(ii) Identify current subsidies remaining in the agricultural sector and 
specially their likely impact on crop choice. 
(iii) Analysis of the impacts of the remaining subsidy policies in 
Agricultural Sector affecting irrigation demand and/or water supplies. 
(iv) Identify and prioritize other causes of irrigation water use and 
allocation inefficiencies, and the basis for identification of potential 
(MBIs) applications in the agricultural sector. 
 
INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND 
 
The economic cost of providing water as a natural resource might be much higher 
than the value of irrigation water as an agricultural input. In a normal (regular) market 
the economic value of water resource is its opportunity cost, which is the value in its 
best alternative use. However, the farmers, hardly, bare only the costs of lifting water 
to their field and/or partially the costs of maintaining the irrigation system network, 
and exclude the water economic costs from their budget. Therefore, when, the 
cropping pattern is determined according to the crop profitability and  the economic 
allocation of water resource is not taken into account.  Accordingly, it might be 
postulated that there is a sort of market failure in allocation of irrigation water 
Accordingly, it is noticed that, the expansion in the acreage of high water use type of 
crops, such as sugarcane and rice; is not surprising, surpass the planned area, spite of 
the land allotment for water demanding crops (such as rice). The farmers usually 
violate that, even though the monetary penalties they might pay.  
Annex (1) presents a flow chart that illustrates, in a comprehensive approach, 
the sequence of the irrigation water economic efficiency in relation to the supply and 
demand.   
 
AGRICULTURAL TAXATION SYSTEMS IN EGYPT 
 
This section presents specification of the types of agricultural taxation, causes of 
inefficiency of the taxation systems and their implications, particularly on irrigation 
water allocation. 
 
3.1 Specification of The Systems 
 
The Egyptian agricultural sector is taxed via three systems. The following section 
presents the profile of these systems and table (1) presents the composition of the 
central government taxes revenue.   
 
3.1.1 Direct Tax Bases 
The government of Egypt taxes, directly, the agricultural sector via three subsystems. 
They are: The traditional land tax, the corporate net profit tax and the Unified income 
tax on unincorporated farms 
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3.1.1.1 The Egyptian Agricultural land tax 
It is a levy on presumptive agricultural income. Thus, it might be considered an 
income tax in the form of a land tax. On the other hand, it represents a somewhat 
roundabout method of taxing wealth (land ownership) via a tax on presumptive 
income flow.  
 
1.1.1.1.1 3.1.1.1.1 Types of Agricultural Land Tax 
A tax is levied on all cultivatable agricultural land based upon its estimated annual 
rental value (Law No. 113/1939). The annual rent value is reassessed every 10 years 
by a committee process (law No. 53/1935). The present land tax is based upon 
assessed values from 1968-1988 that has become effective since 1989. The 
forthcoming estimate will most likely not be initiated until after 2001 and goes into 
effect by the year 2003.  
 
The law No. 112/1997 issues an additional fee that differentiates the agricultural land 
holdings by utilization pattern. Such fee is of L.E.0.25 per feddan cultivated in 
traditional crops, LE.1 per feddan for vegetables and LE.5 per feddan for orchards. 
1.1.1.1.2  
1.1.1.1.3 3.1.1.1.2 Taxes due to Decentralization of Governmental Activities 
A proportion of the taxes on agricultural land supposes to be allocated to the 
governorate authority. According to laws (No. 43/1979 and No. 145/1988), 25% of 
basic and additional taxes collected on agricultural land is returned to the 
governorates in which the property is located. The Local authorities suppose to 
allocate such value to the villages, which the taxed land locates within their respective 
boundaries. The remaining 75% are devoted to the towns. 
 
Local government councils in most governorates suppose to charge the agricultural 
landholders an extra amount of 15% on the absolute value of the initial tax. Such 
amount represents a source of finance for the local governance. 
Table (1) presents the composition of Central Government Tax System in 1996/1997. 
It is noticed tat the share of agricultural land tax in total revenue of taxes is very 
small, either for central government of for the governorate authorities.  
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Table (1) Composition of Central Government Tax System in 1996/1997 
 
Type of Tax 1996/1997 
Non –agricultural Corporate profits 30.27 
Goods and Services 28.00 
Customs Duties 20.10 
Stamp Duties 7.80 
Personal Income 4.30 
Agricultural Corporate Profits 1.43 
Land Tax to Central Government 0.40 
Land Tax to Local Government Authorities .27 
Other Taxes to Local Government authorities 3.83 
Others 3.60 
Total 100 
 
1.1.1.1.4 3.1.1.1.3 Types of  Exemption 
Full exemption is applied for total land holdings, which are not greater than 3 feddans, 
condition that this farm is the only source of income. However, many farmers pay the 
tax rather than submit to tedious process required getting exemption. Even though, 
many farmers would proceed this requirement if the cost of registry subdividing of the 
land among the legal owners were not so high.  Permanent exemptions are granted on 
agricultural land owned by the state or dedicated to the common benefit of the village 
citizens.  Exemption for 10 years after becoming productive are conferred to 
reclaimed, desert and fallow lands. Taxpayer whose annual land tax does not exceed 
LE.4 is totally exempt, (Law No. 370/1953). 
 
3.1.1.2 The corporate net profit tax 
The taxation rate on the net profit of the agricultural corporate varies by the type of 
corporation. In general there are three types: Exporters and Manufacturers, Other 
Corporations, and Projects Enjoy Tax Holidays. 
1.1.1.1.5  
1.1.1.1.6 3.1.1.2.1 Exporters and Manufacturers 
Exporters and Manufacturers generating annual net profits above L.E. 18000 should 
be taxed on annual income base. They are taxed at a rate of 34%, of which 2% as 
development duty, on annual net profits. 
1.1.1.1.7  
1.1.1.1.8 3.1.1.2.2 Other Corporations rather than Exporters and Manufactures 
They are subject to 42% taxation rate, of which 2% as development duty, on annual 
net profits. 
1.1.1.1.9  
1.1.1.1.10 3.1.1.2.3 Projects Enjoy Tax Holidays 
Three types of agricultural projects enjoy tax holidays. The projects located in new 
urban communities enjoy tax holidays for 10 years. The corporations employing more 
than 50 workers enjoy tax holidays for 5-15 years. The investments in free zones 
enjoy tax holidays for infinite periods.   
 
 APRP water Policy Program                    Annex B-4       Economic Incentives for Water Management 
3.2 The Unified income tax on unincorporated farms 
The unified Tax on income of natural persons is based upon  (Laws No. 157/1981 and 
187/1993 and amendment 90/1996, 226/1996, 162/1997 and 5/1998). It is levied on 
five categories of non-corporate income: 
1) Wages and Salaries 
2) Moveable Capital: Interest income and foreign dividends 
3) Non-commercial professions 
4) Net profits of all operations carried out by commercial and industrial 
entities whose owners are sole proprietorships: This category includes 
individuals engaged in the selling of agricultural inputs and/or the 
marketing of agricultural and industrial activities. All costs are 
generally deductible. 
5) Sole, simple, limited and general partnerships 
However, if the taxpayer owns agricultural land and buildings, he or she is 
taxed according to the revenue of real estate wealth. The tax base is the 
same as that used for agricultural land tax. 
 
3.3 Indirect Taxes 
There are three subsystems for indirect agricultural sector taxation, which are: Sales 
taxation (Value added tax), Exchange rate overvaluation and Import taxation. 
However, such types do not serve the objectives of the study. Therefore, they were 
cited here just to complete the profile specification.  
 
 
3.3 Causes of  Taxation Systems Inefficiency 
The agricultural land tax as presently constituted is deficient in almost every aspect: 
revenue generation, vertical and horizontal equity and administration. 
1) The agricultural land tax is very expensive levy. Its collection cost 
approximates half of its gross collections.  
2) One of the inefficiency causes of income taxation is the frequent 
underestimated report.  
3) The taxpayer’s protestation prolongs the appeals process; it is a tedious time 
consuming process. Even though, during which the initial tax liability cannot 
be increased.  
4) The ministry of finance in Cairo collects all agricultural land tax payments. 
This is because the local governments are not fiscally autonomous. In spite of 
the existing laws that cites the proportion of the land tax that should be 
delivered to the local governance, it seems that very little goes to governorates, 
-Table (1)- and nothing goes to towns or villages.  
5) Although “Real Estate Tax Department” collects numerous taxes, it is 
estimated that 50% of its working time is allocated to the overall 
administration of land tax. However, the share of this type of tax in 
government total tax revenue is very negligible. 
6) Until now the Taxation Departments in Egypt continuos to carry out all their 
operations manually. 
7) Egypt’s property taxation, including agricultural land, is seriously deficient in 
most aspects, from tax base valuation to property registration and records 
keeping.  
8) Although the upper-middle to high-income categories of farmers are subject 
to unified income tax, the real life practice showed that the proportion of them 
that actually pay this tax is minor, Table (1). 
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3.4 Implications of The Agricultural Taxation Systems  
Although the Egyptian agricultural sector generates one-six of GDP and one-third of 
total employment, it bears a very small proportion of the overall tax burden. The 
following section presents the concluded major implication issues. 
 
3.4.1 Implications of the agricultural land taxation system: 
The impact of gross and net revenue of agricultural land tax on both total and tax 
revenue of the government is negligible, even after implementing the re-estimation of 
net rental value, beyond 2003. Given the very low level of agricultural land taxation it 
has insignificant impact upon investment incentives.  
 
Therefore, some investigators propose to replace the agricultural land tax with an 
income tax regime, either unified income tax or corporate income tax, which 
adequately reaches into agricultural sector.   
 
It is assuming that any new reform of the existing income tax system would not 
include the net incomes of low-income farmers, which form the bulk of all 
landholders. Accordingly, such reformed taxation would not be cost effective. 
 
3.4.2 Implications of the Agricultural Income Taxation 
The sum of both unified and corporate income taxes represent the bulk of government 
taxation revenue. Therefore, the two types of taxation may have some marginal 
impact on investment decision. However, given the existing high exemption and tax 
holidays, and that only 4.3% of agricultural land in Egypt are currently in corporate 
hands, this does not appear to be a major factor.  
(1) The unified income tax of natural person is 
supposed to impose an income tax obligation on 
the net farm income derived from agricultural 
land. The base for this levy is the estimated 
annual rent value of the agricultural land, the 
same as agricultural land tax. The base of 
estimating the agricultural land tax will not 
change before the year 2003. In addition, the 
off-farm income is empirically detectable with 
much difficulty. Thereby it, severely, restricts 
the growth of tax revenue. 
(2) However, if we would not look at this issue 
through a dark glass, we assume that, given the 
reform and liberalization measures, the share of 
private agricultural corporate will be 
significantly higher in the future via activation 
and simulation of land purchase and rentals 
market. Thereby, the corporate income tax, may 
be one of the major tax revenue.  
 
3.4.3 Impacts of agricultural land taxation on equity aspect 
The data of the 1997 Egypt Integrated Household Survey of the MALR, is the only 
available source that permits approximation of direct taxes paid by farmers according 
to income brackets. The data indicate that there is a reasonable positive associative 
trend between farm income (actually, expenditure) and farm size, region, and 
 APRP water Policy Program                    Annex B-6       Economic Incentives for Water Management 
cropping patterns. The data do not show any distribution of land tax burden across 
farmer income groups. A reasonable interpretation of such results assumes that, within 
the geographic jurisdiction of each rental value estimation committee there is a great 
deal of differences in cropping patterns, irrigation methods, distance from town 
center, etc. 
 
The other issue of the role of land taxation in realizing the equity aspect is that the 
three feddans or less exemption clearly seeks to relief poorer farmers of the land tax 
burden. Under this assumption, the poorest of the farmers, in terms of net return to 
area cultivated, have the smallest landholdings. Therefore, the tax falls on richer 
farmers with above 3-feddan. Accordingly, this exemption policy applies the element 
of progressive agricultural land taxation system. However, the 1990 Agricultural 
census, shows that 37% of farmers with land holdings of less than 1-feddan have 
nonagricultural occupations income and therefore are disqualified from applying for 
the exemption in the first place. The percentages of land holdings 1-2 and 2-3 feddans 
with nonagricultural occupations are 20% and 15% respectively. The 5% of Egypt’s 
cultivatable area are orchard, which does not benefit from exemption –Table (2). 
On the other hand, the percentage of landholdings with nonagricultural occupations 
rises from 14% in 5-10 feddans class to 39% in the over 100 feddan interval. Most of 
these occupations are managerial, technical, 
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Table (2) Relative Frequency Distribution of Land Holding and Agricultural and 
Holdings with Nonagricultural Income in 1996/1997 
 
Farm Holding Brackets in 
Feddans 
0-1 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- 10- 50- 100+ 
% of  Holdings with 
nonagricultural 
Occupations 
37% 20% 15% 16% 18% 14% 27% 35% 39% 
% of  total Holdings 69% 13% 7% 4.2% 3% 2% 1.5% 0.2% 0.1% 
% of total  Agricultural 
land 
18% 11% 10% 9% 7% 10% 19% 7% 9% 
 
Professional, or administrative titles. The aggregate income received by such persons 
is much well above the average. 
 
From all above, it seems that land tax effectiveness is achieved if measured against 
total income (farm and off-farm). However, It can be postulated that the land tax 
burden becomes a decreasing proportion of total income as total income rises. Only 
5% of landholdings fall in the class 4-5 feddan. Less than 2% of landholders are found 
in the 10 feddan and above category. 
AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUBSIDY POLICY IN EGYPT 
Starting from 1986 important reforms have been introduced under the Economic 
Reform Program (ERP) to the agricultural sector. The broad context of these reforms 
was the redefinition of the policy regime from centrally controlled planned economy 
towards a free market economy. The major aim of such drastic transformation was to 
overcome the agricultural stagnation, which has been dominant for decades. 
 
4.1 The Chronology of  The  Agricultural Policies Reform 
Prior to 1986, the government of Egypt controlled nearly all aspects of the agricultural 
sector. The central planned economy imposed control on crop rotations, the area 
planted to most food and cash crops, producer and consumer prices, agricultural 
processing, marketing and trade, farm input supplies and credit. 
 
Most of these policies were dismantled shortly after 1986. Since 1987, Egypt has 
engaged in an ambitious set of macroeconomic and market reforms, known as ‘The 
Economic Reform Program ERP”, when the MALR began removing both taxed and 
subsidized agricultural prices. . However, in 1992 Egypt undertook a more 
widespread policy reform designed to affect all sectors of the economy, which is still 
being implemented. The ERP consists of two major components, (1) stabilization 
policies (SP) and (2) a structural adjustment program (SAP). 
 
The SP designed in consultation with the IMF. The policies were oriented to make 
reductions in expenditures to bring about an adjustment of domestic demand to reduce 
the level of dependency on external resources. Thus this component of the program 
would correct the fiscal and monetary policies, in order to cut the inflation rate, and 
allow both the interest and exchange rates to respond to market forces. 
 
The SAP was planned in collaboration with World Bank and USAID. It was designed 
to improve the economic conditions of the supply, in order to reduce vulnerability to 
external shocks in the future. Such improvements include corrections of the 
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distortions in economic policies, improvement of domestic resources, and produce 
institutional transformations. The SAP consists of five components: (1) price reform 
measures, (2) private sector reforms, (3) foreign trade liberalization, (4) public sector 
reforms and (5) the social fund. 
 
The ERP was supported by the World Bank loans, USAID finance program, approved 
standby agreement with IMF in terms of SDR, African development Bank and some 
other international financial organizations. 
 
4.2 Policy  reforms in agricultural sector since 1986: 
The agricultural reform program, effectively began in 1986, has five major 
components 
(3) Removal of government farm price controls 
(4) Removal of government crop area controls 
(5) Removal of government crop procurement 
controls 
(6) Elimination of subsidies on farm inputs 
(7) Removal of government constraints on private 
sector practices in processing and marketing of 
farm products and inputs. 
Table (3) provides a summarized profile for the time schedule by year of 
implementation of the agricultural policy reform. 
Table 3. Chronological Program of Implemented  
Agricultural Policy Reforms: 
Year Policy reform action 
1986 Removal of compulsory procurement of all crops with the exception of 
paddy, cotton and sugarcane, because these three crops are the highest water 
consumptive crops in Egypt. 
Optional procurement with floor prices for wheat, maize and other crops. 
1991 Removal of compulsory procurement of paddy.  
Optional procurement with floor price for rice. 
Elimination of exchange rate subsidy for imported inputs. 
1992 Cotton procurement price raised by 66% of previous 5-years average of the 
world price. 
Elimination of all crop area controls except for minimum area requirements 
for cotton and rice. 
 
1993 Elimination of all input subsidies with the exception of cotton pest control 
subsidy. 
Elimination of cotton area control. However, regional allocation of varieties 
stayed to be determined by government. 
1994 While the conventional administrative marketing system of cotton was 
allowed permissions were given to private sector to compete with public 
sector in ginning, buying and selling cottonseed. 
1996 The permissions given to the private sector to compete with public sector in 
exporting cotton were cancelled. The Government decided to provide 
incentives to the cotton farmers. These incentives are provided in terms of 
baring the costs of land preparation and/or insecticides and pesticides control 
when farmers face unfavorable conditions. 
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4.2.1 Institutional Reforms in Agricultural Sector: 
Institutional measures have also been implemented in agricultural sector with the 
intent of liberalizing the policy environment. These measures are: 
(1)  Removal of government constraints on private sector practices in imports, 
exports and distribution of farm inputs to compete with Principal Bank for 
Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC). 
(2)  Removal of government constraints on private sector practices in importing 
and exporting agricultural commodities. 
(3)  Gradual transformation of (PBDAC) into financial institution. 
(4)  Selling Public ownership of the new reclaimed land to private enterprises, 
either individuals or companies.  
(5)  Liberalization of the agricultural land market. The law issued in 1992 cited to 
increase the official rent from a value of 7 times the land tax to a value of 22 
times the land tax and after a transitionally period of five years, the land 
tenancy system had been completely liberalized in 1997. The rental value has 
become a resultant of the market forces. 
 
4.2.2 Economic Changes in Agricultural Sector by target policy issue 
The table number (4), summaries the major changes in agricultural sector by the type 
of policy, and corresponding target economic issue. 
 
Table 4. Economic Changes in Agricultural Sector by target policy issue 
Target Policy (Economic Issue) Policy actions 
Agricultural Production policies Crop areas and rotations decided upon by farmers except that 
a maximum area of rice was retained and a minimum area of 
cotton was relaxed. 
Input Delivery policies Agricultural inputs are marketed freely 
Input prices policy Prices of agricultural inputs are market determined except: 
50% subsidy on fuel, 50-75% subsidy on cotton seeds, 80% 
subsidy on cotton control costs and 15% tax on fertilizer 
imports. 
Credit Policies PBDAC is working on a competitive basis in finance market. 
Interest rate is not subsidized any more and includes 2% 
commission for PBDAC.  
Agricultural output marketing  Optional delivery system is now applied for all crops except 
for cotton and sugarcane. Compulsory delivery system is still 
applied to cotton and sugarcane, where 100% of the output is 
delivered to government (Business Public Sector Companies). 
 Whereas, the optional delivery of maize and rice associates 
with a floor price estimates, the government insists to keep 
the optional delivery of wheat delivery a floor price, usually, 
20% higher than the world price (border price).  
The farm gate prices for cotton is determined annually by the 
official cotton committee for the ELS and LS varieties 
according to the forecasting study of the international market 
movements.    
Exchange Rate Policy After the stability of the free market exchange rate at about 
0.3$/ LE. For one decade, by the onset of 21st century another 
devaluation occurred. It has reached L.E. 4.55 per 1- US$ at 
the banks and about 3% higher at the private sector exchange 
bureau. Currently it ranges between L.E. 4.75 to 4.85 / 1-US$. 
Such rate may reflect the real supply and demand conditions 
of the hard currency in the Egyptian economy. 
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TYPES OF CROP SUBSIDY LEFT BEYOND THE ECONOMIC REFORM 
PROGRAM  
5.1 Development of  Cotton Price Policy 
 
Before the market season of 1994 all cotton procedures were required to sell all their 
cotton to the government of Egypt, which gave the government monopsony control 
over purchases of domestic cotton. The cotton border price as the domestic farm gate 
equivalent of the cotton export price was calculated and compared with the cotton 
procurement farm price. The difference showed that the former was higher than the 
later, which implies that there was an indirect tax paid by the farmers up to 1993. The 
average value of such indirect tax was about 30% over the period 1986-19919.  
 
However, this tax was not collected on all the cotton purchased from the farmers, but 
only on what exported. Such tax was considered as a subsidy or transfer payment 
from the cotton sold to domestic textile industries. 
 
In order to induce farmers to plant more acreage of cotton, the procurement prices, 
which were set by the administration, have increased since 1990/1991.  
The government of Egypt for many years has administrated the export prices of 
Egyptian cotton. Export prices for each variety and grade are set each year by a joint 
decision of representatives of the ministry of economy and foreign trade, the cotton 
affairs holding company, and the five cotton trading companies, which are under the 
business public sector management). The government of Egypt past policy has been to 
set exports prices at the onset of each market season and hold to them for the entire 
market season. This policy has lead to depressing sales when prices were set too high. 
The export price of Giza 70 set by the government was on the average 59% above the 
world price of “US Pima” and Giza 75 was 90% above “SJV CA.” over the period 
1986-1992. 
 
Although the export prices for Egypt’s cotton were far above the prices of competing 
varieties during 1986-1992, it has resulted in declining the Egyptian cotton exports. 
Therefore, in response to the falling world prices and in attempt to regain the market 
share lost, Egypt has reduced cotton export prices since 1992/1993-market season. 
 
Currently, the Cotton marketing and exportation policies are still under intervention 
practices by the government authorities. Fortunately, the differences between 
announced price and free market export price is diminishing as experience is gained.  
The high committee of cotton determines every year the price by variety according to 
the analysis of the export market price. The export price is forecasted in advance by 
this authority and announced in the international market.  
 
Available data shows that the average annual export price was L.E.3696.7 per ton of 
crude cotton, before liberalization program (1980-1986) and increased to about L.E. 
7514.1 in 1999. With respect to farmer’s nominal profitability per feddan of cotton, it 
increased from about L.E.73 before economic reform era to more than L.E. 662 after 
                                                
9 O’mera, Gerald, Ibrahim Soliman; Emad El Hawary and Samir Mostafa, (1994). “ 
The Cotton Supply Response: Agronomic and Economic Factors Affecting Cotton 
Production in Egypt”. APCP/USAID PROJECT NO. 263-0202, PBDAC and 
Chemonics Int.  
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economic reform implementation. At constant price level such profitability also 
increased from L.E. 79 before economic reform and liberalization to more than L.E. 
219 per feddan by application of the program. However, the government still provides 
incentives to the farmers to keep cultivation of cotton. In the unfavorable years some 
subsidizes to the costs of production are provided. These include baring a proportion, 
up to 80% of the cost of the land preparation and insecticides and pesticides control, 
as well as 50-75% of cottonseeds price. Unfavorable years include high infection by 
cotton worm or some other diseases or a sharp drop in cotton yield and/or price. The 
amount of such subsidy over the second half of nineties ranged between L.E. 100-250 
per feddan. The government authorities determine the regions that are allowed to 
cultivate cotton and the cultivated variety. Early in nineties the experience with the 
private cotton export firms was not encouraging. Therefore, exportation of cotton has 
been restricted within the public business companies.  AS shown earlier, the higher 
committee of cotton announces in advance the expected export price of cotton. 
 
 5.2 Sugarcane Price Policy 
All Sugarcane Refineries in Egypt are still under what is called Public Business 
Sector. This sector is an adjustment pattern of the public sector management. The 
companies have more flexibility to take decisions towards making profit and reaching 
competitiveness under free market conditions. The Ministry of State for the Public 
Business Sector has the general supervision of these companies managerial 
performance.  
 
The price of domestic produced refined sugar stills higher than imported one. This is 
mainly because the government provides a higher price for the sugarcane delivered by 
the farmers to the refineries than the international average price. The international 
price of refined sugar accounts 75% of the domestic price.  To get the procurement 
sugar cane farm price requires calculating the equivalent border price of sugar at farm 
gate.  Consequently, this procedure requires a set of data including costs of processing 
and values of by products. As sugar cane is the main agricultural activity of the Upper 
Egypt farmers, such subsidies are provided to compensate the high cost of sugarcane 
production.  
 
5.3 Wheat Price Policy 
The government of Egypt provides incentive to the farmers in order to encourage 
them to deliver more wheat to the Principal Bank of Development and Agricultural 
Credit (PBDAC) and/or the mills of the Public Business Sector. The objective of such 
policy is to maximize the share volume of local wheat in the processing of subsidized 
bread, as a social dimension of the economic development. Such incentive is in terms 
of purchasing wheat usually at higher price than the border price of imported wheat 
by 20%, i.e. the average price of the later is about 80% of the domestic wheat 
delivered to the official channels. The quantity delivered this year (2001/2002) 
suppose to surpass 2 million tons, i.e. about one third of the national production10 
                                                
10 Ibrahim Soliman Osman Gad and Mohamed Gabber, (1997). “Wheat Marketing 
Performance under Free Market System”. Egyptian Journal of Agricultural 
economics, Vol.7, No.2. 
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5.4 Fuel Price Policy 
Farm management studies have shown that almost 100% of the farms are using 
mechanization systems for land preparation, water pump to lift irrigation water to the 
their fields, and harvesting and threshing of grains. One-forth to one-third of the 
farmers use planter and drilling machines as well as laser leveling for soil. Recent 
studies concerning agricultural mechanization and fuel consumption have shown that 
the common type of water pump used in Egyptian agriculture of a horsepower about 
16 HP and the common operating power for other farming operations is the tractor of 
65HP11. They also, accounted the subsidy in the Diesel fuel price as 50%.  
     
IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUBSIDY POLICY IN EGYPT  
6.1 Impacts on Agricultural Sector Performance 
 
The economic reform program impacts are presented here as the profile of the major 
findings of  “A General Equilibrium Model Applied by IFPRI in 1995 to investigate 
the impacts of the structural adjustment program of Egypt on agricultural sector. 
Several policies of the Economic Reform Program (ERP) had already been 
implemented since 1990, as the base year of the model. 
 
The analysis of that model was limited to the impact of the subsequent of the 
Economic Reform Program changes implemented between 1987-1994.  
 
The changes of he concerned policies were introduced into the model as the “Base 
Solution” which was entitled “Full Liberalization with 1990 Export bounds”. This 
solution corresponds to 1990 base year resource endowments, technology, prices and 
export bounds applied to 1994 policies. It detects what might have happened in 1990, 
assuming that the ERP had been fully implemented at that time. 
The model’s output showed that: 
1) The ERP had, generally, negative impact on the agricultural sector. 
2) The value of agricultural output declined by 8%  
3) The producer surplus declines by 16% 
4) The cropped area and production of individual commodities would not change 
very much. 
5) Agricultural output prices decreased by 3 percent on average. 
6) Input costs increased with the removal of subsidies. 
7) Consumers gained 6% from the policies changes, because of decline in prices 
8) The economy welfare as the sum of consumers and producers surplus would 
decrease by 0.5% 
9) If the value of reduced input subsidies were accounted as less deductible 
burden from the taxpayer dues, so the net social payoff would be undoubtedly 
positive. 
 
6.2 Impacts  on Crop Choice 
Table 5, provides some major indicators of crop choice associated with the ERP 
between 1986 and 1994.  It is concluded that both the cultivated area and the cropped 
                                                
11  Ibrahim Soliman, Maisa Megahed, (1998). “ Factors Affecting Fuel Consumption 
Efficiency of Agricultural Tractor in Egypt”. The Egyptian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, and Page: 73-82.  
 
 APRP water Policy Program                    Annex B-13       Economic Incentives for Water Management 
area increased annually by 2%,  which resulted in slightly insignificant decrease in the 
cropping intensity. The substitution among seasonal crops was apparently significant. 
In winter, the area of long season berseem has decreased annually by  1% associated 
with an increase in both wheat and broad bean area by  9% and  3%, respectively. 
Also sugar beets area was almost doubled. In summer, whereas, the increase in both 
rice and maize area was apparently significant, i.e. by 8% and 5% per year, 
respectively, the area of cotton decreased per annum by 4%. Sugar cane area, Upper 
Egypt major crop, has also increased annually by 2%. 
 
Two major conclusions has been recognized from, table 5, data analysis. First, 
surprisingly, neither the absolute level, nor parity profit and nor percent change in 
crop profitability could be considered as interpretative variable of the substitution 
among major crop acreage.   
 
Secondly, the major increase in individual crop area was in favor of major highly 
water consumptive crops, i.e., rice and sugar cane.  
To assure that these conclusions has been applicable up till now, the analysis was 
repeated for the year 2000 to be compared with 1994, as shown in table 6. The results 
of such table did not show any new significant conclusion, except that wheat and long 
season berseem as well as sugar beets have significantly replaced the broad legumes 
area particularly broad beans.  
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Table (5) Impacts of Economic Reform Program on  
Agricultural Land Use and Profitability12 (1986-1994) 
 
Comparative Item 1986  1994  % annual change 
 (000) 
Feddan 
Real Net 
Income 
per 
Feddan 
L.E.13 
(000) 
Feddan 
Real 
Net 
Income 
per 
Feddan 
L.E. 
(000) 
Feddan 
Real Net 
Income 
Per 
Feddan 
L.E. 
WINTER:       
 Berseem (S) 870 141 737 101 -2% -4% 
Berseem (L) 1866 211 1785 244 -1% 2% 
Wheat 1206 304 2111 199 9% -4% 
Broad Beans 307 349 373 53 3% -11% 
Sugar Beets 37 Na 42 78 2%  
Others 742 Na 808 na na na 
Winter Total 5028 na 5856 na na na 
Summer & Nilli:        
Maize 1231 146 2058 157 8% 1% 
 Rice 1008 447 1379 423 5% -1% 
Others 2023 na 1637 na   
Summer Total 4262 na 5115 na   
  Cotton 1055 79 721 219 -4% 22% 
 Sugar Cane 262 553 301 405 2% -3% 
Perennial Total       1317 na 1022 na -3% na 
ORCHARDS&PALM-
DATES 
529 Na 1002 na 11% na 
Cropped Area 11136 Na 12995 na 2% na 
Cultivated Area 6003 Na 7165 na 2% na 
Cropping Intensity 1.86 Na 1.81 na 0% na 
 
 
                                                
12 Calculated from Annex 2 
13 Deflated at constant price, (1987/1988=100) 
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Table (6) Impacts of Economic Reform Program on 
Agricultural Land Use and Profitability14 (1994-2000) 
 
1994 2000 % Annual Change 
(000) 
Feddan 
Real 
net 
income 
per 
feddan 
(L.E.) 
(000) 
Feddan 
Real net 
income 
per 
feddan
15 (L.E.) 
(000) 
Feddan 
Real net 
income 
per 
feddan 
(L.E.) 
      
Comparative Item 
      
WINTER:       
Berseem (S) 737 101  525 350 -5% 41% 
Berseem (L) 1785 244 1864 742 1% 34% 
Wheat 2111 199 2463 293 3% 8% 
Broad Beans 373 53 307 144 -3% 29% 
Sugar Beets 42 78 136 236 37% 34% 
Others 808 N/A. 1159  7% NA 
Winter Total 5856 N/A. 6454  2% NA 
Summer & Nilli:       
Maize 2058 157 1928 247 -1% 10% 
Rice 1379 423 1569 412 2% 0% 
Others 1637 N/A. 2883 NA 13% NA 
Summer Total 5115 N/A. 6380 NA 4% NA 
Cotton 721 219 518 374 -5% 12% 
Sugar Cane 301 405 319 777 1% 15% 
Perennial Total 1022 NA 837 NA -3% NA 
 
                                                
14 Calculated from Annex (3)  
15 Deflated at constant price (1987/1988 = 100) 
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OTHER CAUSES OF IRRIGATION WATER USE INEFFICIENCY 
Outside the dilemma of the market failure16, there are two other sets of causes behind 
the irrigation water use inefficiency. They are (1) physical male structure and 
deformation and technical deficiencies of the irrigation system network and (2) Socio-
economic obstacles at farm management level of water use. 
 
7.1 Some Socio-economic Causes of Irrigation Water Use Inefficiency 
    
Some Socio-economic studies identified other causes, rather than taxation and subsidy 
policies, of irrigation water use inefficiency. Such causes were detected from sample 
surveys and field investigations, which are presented in this section: It is concluded 
from these investigations that at the farm management level, frequent, violations of the 
irrigation rules (quotas and schedule. etc.) are results and not causes of water supply 
deficit.  
 
Usually the water distribution is conducted according to the area cultivated. Frequently, 
the actual discharge is less than the authorized (planned) quota, particularly during 
summer season. 
(1) The discharge rate from the primary irrigation 
canal to the “Mesqa” is expressed as number of 
minutes/feddan. Therefore, it is, common, that the 
“Mesqas” at the end tail of a primary irrigation 
canal receive fewer water supplies. The total 
deficit in some governorates or regions may reach 
one-third. 
(2) There would considerable waste in water, due to 
refilling the canal level between each two 
successive dates of irrigation. Therefore, the farm 
at the end tail of the canal bares the cumulative 
losses in water. If the approved schedule of 
irrigation dates, implies that the farmer at the 
beginning of the canal gets to irrigate first, 
followed the successive neighbor, the burden of 
the total accumulated water losses would be 
deducted from the last farmer’s quota (the farmer 
at the end tail of the canal). To avoid such 
problem, the “WUA” can reschedule the irrigation 
dates on base of successive location of the farms, 
in order to distribute the waste of water evenly, 
among farms. 
(3) The water is allocated on base of area holding. A 
significant proportion of agricultural land has been 
taken over time for urban used and/or 
infrastructure construction. . However, a 
significant portion of such area is still recorded as 
agricultural land. Therefore, it is accounted in 
water discharge allocation. Accordingly, some 
                                                
16 See Section 2-4 in this study. 
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regions or holdings may receive excess of water at 
the expenses of others. 
(4) Usually the deficit in water supply occurs during 
the summer season, i.e. from Mid of May to the 
end of July. The farmers’ complaint is less 
severing after that, starting from August and 
thereafter, when the irrigation of cotton and rice 
stops. 
(5) Receiving the quota of irrigation water as a mix of 
agricultural drainage and pure water increases 
water salinity and soil salinity, which implies 
leaching of salt with excess of water, that 
magnifies the water deficit problem. 
(6) Some farms located by a drainage canal, lift water 
from such canal to recover the deficit in irrigation 
water, even though they know the drawbacks of 
this action. 
(7) Also, some other farmers install wells, which get 
water again from the seepage water that often 
leaks via the Nile branches, and some times such 
water is salty but not so polluted.                           
(8) Most of the farmers believe that poor leveling of 
the field lowers the irrigation efficiency. They also 
believe that although laser leveling, if available at 
low costs, is useful in saving irrigation water, it 
would be of negative results if it has been 
conducted inefficiently.  
(9) Farmers are reluctant in clearing up the tertiary 
canal  “mesqa” or side canal “Ganabya”. Weeds 
block the water stream flow and consume a 
significant portion of water availability.  
(10) Violation of the irrigation rules in order to get 
self-reliance solutions that may overcome water 
deficit on individual base. Here are some real life 
practices under such umbrella: 
(a) Farmers intend to break some “Weirs” or open some bridges, which 
control the water discharge into the canal  “Gessr-banks” to get enough 
water supplies for their areas. They find their ways with “Al Bahar” to 
avoid penalties associated with such violation. It could be done by 
individuals, or by a group of farmers, or by an individual farmer for a 
group of them. 
(b) There are several approaches of exchanging water surplus among 
Farmers, in particular, during critical times of water shortage. E.g. 
Farmers with excess of water within their quota transfer it to their 
adjacent neighbors for free, but they give priorities to brotherhood 
(relatives); lend excess water, which is refunded when the donor is in 
need of water.  
(c) Some powerful farmers in the village violate the schedule to get 
enough water for their own large farms, their relatives or sometimes for a 
group of farmers in the village. Penalties, in many cases are phased out. 
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It should be mentioned that The “WUA”S is established to manage 
institutionally such social types of water sharing. 
 
7.2 Physical Male Structure, Deformation and Technical Deficiencies of the 
irrigation System: 
The set of causes related to the irrigation system network are identified under section 
number 2.3 of this study. The existence of these defects affects the irrigation water 
supply. They cause either deficit in the effective supply reaching crops, or degeneration 
of the water quality, or raise the costs of water distribution and delivery or both. Here is 
the identification of some major ones: 
(1) Water logged soil,  (2) seepage or leakage of the 
water through the main canals. (3) Contamination 
of drainage water mixed wit irrigation water. (4) 
Contamination of irrigation water with heavy 
metals. (5) Lack of consistency between irrigation 
water discharge and drainage system capacity.  (6) 
The impacts of the expansion of some plants and 
some weeds that grow and float in the Nile and its 
branched canals, which block the flow of water. 
The projects included in the National Irrigation Improvement program (IIP) 
suppose to treat such obstacles and therefore increase the available water 
supply. Among their major benefits is expected decrease the cost per cubic 
meter of irrigation water 
 
ESTIMATION OF IRRIGATION WATER ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY  
8.1 Methodology 
Estimation of the average economic efficiency for irrigation water was derived from the 
following equation: 
Average Economic Efficiency of Water in Irrigation =  (Average Return per One cubic 
meter of water)/ (Estimated shadow price of irrigation water). 
 
If the resultant ratio was less than one, it implies that the irrigation water use was 
economically inefficient, because the return per 1-m3 of water could not cover its 
economic price. Consequently, if it was greater than one indicates that there is an 
economic attractiveness towards expansion of such pattern via more water consumption.  
 
The average return per one cubic meter of water was estimated by dividing the net 
income per feddan over the water consumptive use per feddan for each corresponding 
rotation. The water consumptive use of each crop was derived from the estimates of The 
Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources. 
 
The available estimates of crop Evapo-transpiration as cubic meters of water per feddan 
by crop was used to estimate the water consumptive use per feddan according to an 
average irrigation efficiency of 70% for all crops, except for rice it is assumed as 50%. 
 
Table (5) provides the real level of net income per feddan of each major crop. It was 
used to estimate the average income per feddan according to the most common crop 
rotation (pattern) in Egypt, as presented in Table 6. All were biannual rotations (winter 
and summer crop), except the case of sugar cane rotation; it was a triple-years rotation, 
and e.g. sugar cane as perennial crop that lasts for 3 years on the field, with three annual 
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harvesting.  Hence, the associated rotated crops were assumed berseem in winter and 
maize in summer (wheat could be substituted with berseem).  
 
The shadow price of one cubic meter of irrigation water was deducted from the major 
findings of a General Equilibrium model applied by IFPRI in 1995 to investigate the 
impacts of the structural adjustment program of Egypt on agricultural sector. It was 5.7 
Egyptian piasters per one cubic meter of irrigation water. Accordingly, the above shown 
equation was applied. 
 
From the same General Equilibrium model the irrigation water demand (price) elasticity 
was estimated as 0.3717  
 
8.2 Irrigation Water Economic Efficiency at current Price Policies 
 
Form table 7 the sugar cane rotation is an uneconomic pattern of water consumption use 
because the return per one cubic meter of irrigation water is less than the shadow price 
per 1-M3. However, the socio-economic impacts of cultivating sugar on the Egyptian 
economy should be thoroughly studied to judge its feasibility. 
 
It should be mentioned that both berseem-rice and wheat-rice rotations have the highest 
economical efficiency of irrigation water use, followed by sugar-beets rice rotation. The 
water consumptive use for cotton rotation is almost economical. 
 
Once the irrigation water demand (price) elasticity is 0.37, a saving in available water 
for irrigation use by 10% (about 3.8 billions cubic meters of water) would not raise the 
shadow price of water more than 3.7%. Then there is all possible probability for growth 
in area and yield of berseem, rice, wheat, maize and even cotton (under current 
economic policies), with a charge for water use by the farmers.   
                                                
17The price elasticity was estimated by rerunning the model under the 
assumptions of 5% increase of irrigation water availability and another 
iteration with 5% decrease in the irrigation water supply. The change in the 
shadow price of water estimates was used to calculate the arc elasticity.     
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Table (7) Economic Efficiency of Irrigation Water Under Current Economic 
Reform Policies 
 
 
 
Crop Rotation 
Real net 
income/feddan 
L.E.  
[1] 
 
Consumptive 
Use of 
Water/feddan 
(m3) 
[2] 
Income/m3  
water 
Egyptian 
Piasters 
(EP) 
[3] 
Economic 
Efficiency 
of 
irrigation 
water 
[4] 
Sugar cane-maize-berseem 304 6312 4.82 0.85 
Sugar beets-rice 501 5841 8.58 1.51 
Berseem-rice 774 5598 13.82 2.42 
Berseem(L)-maize 401 5385 7.45 1.31 
Berseem(S)-cotton 320 5338 5.99 1.05 
Wheat-rice 620 5274 11.76 2.06 
Wheat- maize 300 4929 6.08 1.08 
 
[1] Source: Table (5) and the table of Annex 2 
[2] Calculated from: Hussein, Z., Seckler, D. and El-Kady, M. (1994). “ Crop 
Substitution for More Efficient Water Use in Egypt”. Working Paper Series No. 1-14. 
Cairo Strategic Research Program, where the available estimates of crop Evapo-
transpiration  (m3 of water per feddan) by crop and then by rotation was divided by an 
aggregate average of irrigation efficiency of 0.7, except for rice it was assumed as 05.  
[3] =[1]/[2] 
[4] = [3]/ (shadow price of 1(m3) of irrigation water. 
The shadow price of water used is 5.7 Egyptian piasters18  
                                                
18 Hazzell, Peter, N. Perez, G. Siam and Ibrahim Soliman. (1995). “Impact of The 
Structural Adjustment Program on Agricultural Production and Resource Use in Egypt”. 
EPTD Paper No. 10. Environment and Production Division, International Food Policy 
Research Institute. Wash. D.C. USA. 
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8.3 Impact of Fuel Free Price on The Economic Efficiency of Irrigation 
Water: 
8.3.1 Methodology: 
As mentioned earlier (5-4), the subsidy of fuel price is about 50%. Diesel is the 
common type of fuel used for operating agricultural machinery. The tractor of 65 HP 
and irrigation pump of 16 Hp are the common types of power used. Numbers of 
operating hours by crop by farm operation are derived from available field surveys19’ 
20’21. Chemonics Int. for the “MALR” to cover the agricultural year 1992 derived the 
estimated costs and revenues of each crop22.  
 
The estimates for the fuel consumption for each crop was derived from the model 
generated by Ibrahim Soliman et, al., and published in (1998)23. The model estimates 
the fuel consumption as a response of the Horsepower, Loading Factor and the 
Number of hours of the machinery operation. The loading factor estimates the 
weighted share of each farm operation according to an index that reflects the level of 
energy (power) needed to conduct each farm operation. Table (8) shows the estimated 
cost of fuel consumption by crop. 
 
The costs and revenue of the concerned crops were taken from three sample surveys 
for the agricultural year 199419,20, 21, 22, because They include also the corresponding 
data of machinery operating hours by farming operation for each crop.  Table (9) 
presents the estimated decrease in net income, as fuel price subsidy would have been 
phased out. Such decrease ranges between 23% of cotton net income to 60% of rice 
and short season berseem. 
 
Recalculation of the irrigation water inefficiency was conducted under free price of 
fuel, using the same procedure shown in section (8.1). 
 
 
 
8.3.2 Economic Efficiency of Water at Free Price of Fuel: 
 
                                                
19Ibrahim Soliman, Mohamed Gaber and Ali Ibrahim, (1994). “Socio-Economic 
Impacts of Application of Non-Conventional Mechanization for Wheat Crop: A case 
Study in Kafr Al Shaikh”. Minia J. Agric. Res. & Vol. 16, No. 3, P: 958-980.  
20 Ibrahim Soliman, Mohamed Gaber and Ali Ibrahim, (1994). “Socio-Economic 
Impacts of  “ The Bio-Mechanical Technological Package Applied for Sugar Cane 
Development: A case Study in Minia Governorate”. 5th Conf. Agric. Dev. Res., Fac. 
Agric., Ain Shams Univ., Cairo, Egypt. Page: 1-22. 
21G. O’mera, Ibrahim Soliman, Emad El Hawary and Sari Mostafa, (1994). “ 
Agronomic and Economic Factors Affecting Cotton Production in Egypt: The Cotton 
Supply Response Project, Chemonics/ PBDAC, and USAID Project No. 263-0202. 
22 Agricultural Production and Credit Project:  A Sample Survey Conducted by 
Chemonics Int. for MALR:  “The costs of Production Surveys:” APCP Deliverable: 
WP-VII/7.3.A. 
23 Ibrahim Soliman, Maisa Megahed, (1998). “ Factors Affecting Fuel Consumption 
Efficiency of Agricultural Tractor in Egypt”. The Egyptian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, and Page: 73-82.  
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The ratio of the return to one cubic meter of water to the shadow price of water is 
estimated in Table (10), under the assumption of the free price of fuel used for 
operating the agricultural machinery systems for each crop rotation.  
 
The major concluded findings show that if the subsidy of fuel price was removed the 
economic efficiency of using water for irrigating the sugar cane rotation would be 0.6, 
Table 10, i.e. the inefficiency of water use would be worsen than the results of table 6. 
The return to one cubic meter of irrigation water was hardly covering the shadow 
price of water under the subsidized price of fuel for wheat-maize and berseem (S)-
cotton rotations, table 6. Without such subsidy the return to irrigation water would 
cover only 60% to 50% of the irrigation water shadow price, Table (10). Also 
berseem-maize rotation would not be economically feasible in using irrigation water 
without fuel price subsidy. The only two rotations that showed a feasible allocation of 
irrigation water were Berseem-Rice and Wheat-Rice without the subsidy of fuel price, 
where the water economic efficiency would be 1.3 and 1, respectively, Table (10).  
Obviously, The removal of the incentives *subsidy) that are provided to wheat farm 
price (20% above the imported wheat price) would make the wheat- rice rotation also 
inefficient in using irrigation water by economic principals. 
    
 
Table (8) Estimation of Fuel Consumption and Costs 
At Its Subsidized and Free Price for Major Crops 
Machinery operating hours Consumed 
Fuel in 
Liters 
Fuel Costs (L.E) Crop 
Irrigation Others Total  At 
Subsidized 
Price of Fuel 
At free 
price of 
Fuel 
Cotton 34 58 92 707 283 565 
Wheat 18 69 87 783 313 627 
Maize 28 40 68 497 199 398 
Rice 15 82 97 915 366 732 
Sugar Cane 83 14 97 365 146 292 
Berseem L. 29 51 80 627 251 501 
Berseem S. 8 25 34 295 118 236 
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Table (9) Percent of Shrinkage in Net Income Per Feddan of Major Crops:  
(Due to Phasing out the Fuel Subsidy) 
Crop 
Net Income/ Fed. 
(L.E.) 
 Total Costs 
per Feddan 
(L.E.) 
At 
Subsidize
d Price of 
Fuel 
At Free 
Price of 
Fuel 
% of 
shrinkage 
in net 
income 
due to 
phasing 
out fuel 
subsidy 
Cotton 632 1210 927 23% 
Wheat 485 756 443 41% 
Maize 465 410 211 49% 
Rice 645 625 258 59% 
Sugar Cane 2046 1040 894 14% 
Berseem L. 388 633 382 40% 
Berseem S. 237 195 77 60% 
 
Table (10) Impacts of Phasing out Fuel Subsidy 
 On Economic Efficiency of Irrigation Water 
Crop 
Real Net 
Income per 
Feddan (at 
subsidized 
fuel price 
L.E. 
shrinkage 
in net 
income due 
to fuel 
subsidy 
(L.E.) 
Real net 
income 
per 
feddan 
At fuel 
free price 
L.E. 
Consump
tive Use 
of 
Water/fe
ddan 
(m3) 
Real net 
income/m3 
in 
Egyptian 
piasters 
(EP) 
Economic 
Efficiency 
of 
Irrigation 
Water 
Berseem-rice 774 347 427 5598 7.6 1.3 
Wheat-rice 620 331 289 5274 5.5 1.0 
Berseem(L)-maize 401 175 226 5385 4.2 0.7 
Wheat- maize 300 159 141 4929 2.9 0.5 
Berseem(S)-cotton 320 132 188 5338 3.5 0.6 
Sugar cane-maize-berseem 304 77 227 6312 3.6 0.6 
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ANNEX 1 
Irrigation Water Demand and Supply: An Overview 
The Economic efficiency of Irrigation water 
 
It is the ratio of (Marginal return to irrigation water in activity “crop” I) to (the 
marginal cost of irrigation water using system J). If such ratio equals one for all 
activities there will be an optimum efficiency in water allocation among agricultural 
activities. It is also can be used to estimate water allocation efficiency between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. In this case the comparison would be 
between the marginal return to irrigation water versus that to the non-agricultural 
activities. 
 
Concerning irrigation water for agriculture, the crop that shows a ratio greater than 
one means that more irrigation water can be allocated for its production. If this ratio is 
less than one there is access irrigation water and a proportion of it should be 
reallocated among other activities (crops) that showed a ratio greater than one.   
The marginal return to water in agriculture: The Demand Side 
 
It is the additional value of output (crop production) generated by an 
additional one cubic meter of water. It determines the demand for irrigation 
water. For a certain agricultural activity (crop), the demand for water as an 
agricultural production factor is derived from the demand for this crop. Where 
the value of marginal product of this crop is the demand price of water at 
different density (quantity) of water applied per feddan. However, under 
existing water policies in Egypt, such derived price of irrigation water, if 
estimated, would represent the shadow price of water, rather than a market 
price, because the farmers do not pay for irrigation water as a scarce natural 
resource. 
Hence, the marginal return to irrigation water (as a shadow demand price of 
water for agriculture) is the incremental crop yield generated by the last added 
cubic meter of irrigation water multiplied by the crop price. On the other hand, 
the marginal return to irrigation water is affected by other exogenous factors. 
These factors are the type of crop, the productivity of the crop and its price 
level, which determine the marginal return to irrigation water. Therefore, the 
irrigation water demand price is not determined, only by the quantity of 
available water, but it is mainly an outcome of the agricultural economy 
performance and policies. Any intervention to reform the water use policy 
should concern such factors.  
 
Type of Crop: 
The type of crop is determined by the cropping pattern. Under free market 
system the crop rotation and pattern are the farmers’ decisions. The type of 
soil and climate as well as the crop profitability are the factors affecting the 
farmer’s decision. The Government of Egypt has liberalized its controls on 
agricultural sector that constrain the farmer’s choice. 
 
The Crop productivity:  
The farming system reflects the response of the input output relations, farm 
size and level of technology. The technological package, in turn, is a resultant 
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of the type and density of physical technology (mechanization), chemical 
technology  (fertilization), and biological technology (crop variety). 
 
Crop Price Policy: 
The crop price is a determinant variable of profitability. Under free market the price 
policy should not violate the price mechanism, which in turn, makes the profitability 
of each crop a real reflection of its comparative advantage. Accordingly, the price 
policy affects, significantly, the role of comparative advantage in the crop choice 
decisions among alternative competitive crops. Any governmental intervention in the 
price mechanism that ignores comparative advantage leads to some sort of price 
distortion. Finally, such price distortions, if any, would violate the optimum allocation 
of the water use, according to the economic efficiency definition showed above.   
 
The Marginal cost of irrigation water: The Supply Side 
 
Irrigation System Network: 
The major components of the irrigation system from the source till the 
destination (the field) compose of  “Water Transportation and Conveyance 
System”,  “Water Distribution System”, and “Water Operational System on 
Farm”. The design, technology and maintenance of these systems affect at 
different proportion the costs of water supply up to the plant. Furthermore, the 
farmers are responsible for maintaining the tertiary irrigation system (Mesqas) 
that deliver water to their field. Thus the farmer’s contributing a small 
proportion of the total cost of entire system of irrigation water delivery to the 
field. 
Generally, such cost is derived from the fixed and operational expenditure of 
water supply. They include the investment cost of establishing the national 
irrigation system network, and the costs of operating the system as well as the 
cost of maintaining such system. The irrigation system network, rate of water 
losses and the irrigation efficiency, consequently, affect these expenditure 
items. 
 
Water Losses: 
The Water losses occur all the way along the network of irrigation, i.e. from the 
source till the destination (the farm field). The irrigation water losses are mainly due 
to evaporation and leakage. All types of losses limit the net water volume that reaches 
the crop roots in the field. Consequently, they affect the irrigation efficiency.  
The irrigation efficiency:  
 
The aggregate irrigation efficiency is the ratio of actual quantity of water reached the 
plant to the quantity of water discharged to the irrigation network. Whereas it is 
commonly estimated at the farm level, it is measurable at any distribution or 
conveyance stage from the source till the field. If the major objective is to reform the 
irrigation water policy, then one of its main targets will be to increase the irrigation 
efficiency. This, in turn, will lead the system towards minimization of water supply 
cost. Consequently, will lead to maximize the economic efficiency of water use.  
 
The Water Supply and  the Market Price  Mechanism 
Economically, the marginal cost of water supply supposes to be the value of an 
additional cubic meter of irrigation water. However, the government authorities 
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(MOWRPW and MOALR) in Egypt determines the aggregate volume of water supply 
for agriculture. It is a controlled spatial allocation regime, which provides a constant 
water supply by agricultural region and even by basin24. Currently, the Government 
tries to allot the regions of the crops of highly demand for water, particularly, 
sugarcane and rice. However, the violation of such area allotment by the farmers is 
frequent. Therefore, the supply of irrigation water is not determined via market price 
mechanism If there were a market price mechanism for water, the beneficiaries of 
water use (the farmers) would have considered the full cost price of irrigation water in 
their expected crop profitability and crop choice. Currently, they consider only the 
cost of the water pump that lifts water from the canal to their field.   
 
It seems that the Irrigation water allocation faces market failure conditions. Therefore 
it is necessarily to investigate the causes of such issue within a techno-economic 
context. The market failure stems from that the farmers make benefits from using a 
scarce economic resource and they do not pay its social price or economic cost. In 
other words, the demand for irrigation water is a derived demand. It is derived from 
the demand for agricultural output (the primary demand). The agricultural output 
provides benefits to farmers (agricultural profitability), and consumers (consumer 
welfare). When the demand for irrigation water meets the constant supply of water 
allocated for agriculture, a market price of irrigation water would be determined. 
Accordingly, the beneficiaries (the farmers) suppose to pay the market price of water. 
However, the economy does not receive from the beneficiaries (the farmers) the 
shadow price of the irrigation water as a natural resource or a public good. They do 
not, even, bare a significant portion of the irrigation network system up to the field.  
                                                
24The agricultural areas in Egypt, at each district, are divided into large blocs. Each 
one has homogeneous soil type, fertility and physical characteristics. 
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Figure 1. The Irrigation Water Demand and Supply Model  
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Annex 2 
Agricultural Land Use and Profitability of Major Crops 
In 1986 and 1994 
 
1986 1994 Comparative Item 
(000) 
Feddan 
Nominal 
Net income 
per feddan 
(L.E) 
(000) 
Feddan 
Nomin
al Net 
incom
e per 
feddan 
(L.E) 
% Annual  
Change in  
Nominal 
Net Income 
Per Feddan 
L.E. 
WINTER: 
 Berseem (S) 870 129 737 305 17% 
Berseem (L) 1866 194 1785 737 35% 
Wheat 1206 279 2111 559 13% 
Broad Beans 307 320 373 159 -6% 
Sugar Beets 37 N/A. 42 236 N/A 
Others 742 N/A. 808 N/A N/A 
Winter Total 
5028 N/A. 5856 N/A N/A 
Summer & Nilli:  
Maize 1231 134 2058 473 32% 
 Rice 1008 410 1379 1277 26% 
Others 2023 N/A. 1637 NA N/A 
Summer Total 4262 N/A. 5115 NA N/A 
  Cotton 1055 73 721 661 101% 
 Sugar Cane 262 508 301 1222 18% 
Perennial Total       1317 N/A 1022 N/A N/A 
ORCHARDS&PALM-DATES 529 N/A. 1002 
 
N/A         N/A 
Cropped Area 11136 N/A. 12995 N/A N/A 
Cultivated Area 6003 N/A. 7165 N/A N/A 
Cropping Intensity 1.86 N/A. 1.81 N/A N/A 
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Annex 3 
Agricultural Land Use and Profitability of Major Crops 
In 1994 and 2000 
 
1994 2000 Comparative Item 
(000) 
Feddan 
Nominal 
Net income 
per feddan 
(L.E) 
(000) 
Feddan 
Nomin
al Net 
incom
e per 
feddan 
(L.E) 
WINTER: 
Berseem (S) 737 305 525 1082 
Berseem (L) 1785 737 1864 2296 
Wheat 2111 559 2463 907 
Broad Beans 373 159 307 445 
Sugar Beets 42 236 136 731 
Others 808 N/A 1159 N/A 
Winter Total 
5856 N/A 6454 NA 
Summer & Nilli: 
Maize 2058 473 1928 763 
Rice 1379 1277 1569 1276 
Others 1637 NA 2883 NA 
Summer Total 5115 NA 6380 NA 
Cotton 721 661 518 1156 
Sugar Cane 301 1222 319 2404 
Perennial Total 1022 N/A 837 NA 
ORCHARDS&PAL
M-DATES 
1002 
 
N/A 1087 NA 
Cropped Area 12995 N/A 13921 NA 
Cultivated Area 7165 N/A 7542 NA 
Cropping Intensity 1.81 N/A 1.85 NA 
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ANNEX C 
 
 
 
 
 
STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP RESULTS 
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BACKGROUND 
 
The MBI Study Team investigated the water management challenges facing Egypt in 
the future. Two problem areas were defined: managing water supplies (quantity) and 
water quality degradation. These were disaggregated and then the team identified a 
long list of potential economic instruments that might be employed to mitigate one or 
more of the disaggregated problem areas. This list was reviewed as to applicability 
and practicality to arrive at twenty instruments judged to be deserving of further 
study. The team developed and applied a screening process to the twenty instruments 
that were considered deserving of further study. A stakeholder workshop was 
conducted on 24 March 2002 to obtain input from stakeholders regarding the potential 
efficiency and acceptability of the twenty short-listed instruments. 
 
WORKSHOP FORMAT 
 
The stakeholder workshop was organized as follows: 
 
¨ Presentations by study team 
¨ Working Group Sessions to discuss and evaluate MBIs 
¨ Completion of questionnaires by individuals subsequent to participation in the 
Working Groups. 
 
WORKSHOP RESULTS 
 
The results of the workshop are presented in the following attachments: 
 
Attachment 1: Workshop Questionnaire 
 
Attachment 2: Summary Table of Questionnaire Results 
 
Attachment 3: Stakeholder Comments (arranged by instrument) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ATTACHMENT 1 
 
Workshop on Economic Incentives for Water Resources Management 
March 24, 2002; USAID-MWRI EPIQ Water Policy Reform Program 
 
Questionnaire on Evaluating Potential Market-based Incentives for 
Improved Water Management in Egypt 
 
Instructions: Please answer the questions (v - check the appropriate box) for each 
proposed water management MBIs based on your professional experience and judgment. 
 
A.  Water Quantity MBIs 
 
1. Introduce area-based charges for smallholder agriculture 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
2. Create a market for participation in irrigation improvement programs 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
3. Allow Contracts for priority water delivery 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
4. Increase water tariffs to large industries 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
5. Increase urban water tariffs 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
6. Introduce volumetric irrigation water charges in areas in addition to 
Toshqa 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
 
7. Introduce a tradable groundwater rights scheme for the Western Desert 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
 
 
8. Introduce groundwater extraction charges 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
  
Comments:           
             
9. Provide a subsidy for the purchase of urban water meters 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
10. Provide a subsidy for the purchase of water-conserving equipment 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
11. Reduce the subsidy on fuels used for water pumping 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
 
B.  Water Quality MBIs 
 
1.  Increase wastewater user charges 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
2.  Provide Government subsidies to wastewater plant construction 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
3.  Reduce tariffs on pollution control equipment 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
4.  Increase discharge fees to industry 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
 
 
5.  Increase sewerage fees for households 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
  
Comments:           
             
 
 
6.  Improve self monitoring of discharges by industry 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
7.  Encourage small-scale environmentally acceptable ways of disposing of 
household sewage 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
8. Formalize liability for harm to water and ground water 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
9. Introduce new applications of performance bonds 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
10.  Widen public disclosure of EIA and environmental quality data 
  Warrants study & action   Deserves further study   Not presently applicable 
Comments:           
             
 
Any other Comments:         
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
  
ATTACHMENT 2 
 
Workshop On Economic Incentives For Water Resources Management, March 24, 2002 
Summary of Questionnaire Results 
A. Water Quantity MBIs 
 
Warrants study 
& action 
Deserves 
further study 
Not presently 
applicable 
Total 
Introduce area-based charges for small holder agriculture 7 14 12 33 
Create a market for participation in irrigation improvement programs 11 16 5 32 
Allow contracts for priority water delivery 3 10 20 33 
Increase water tariffs to large industries 21 12 1 34 
Increase urban water tariffs 16 11 6 33 
Introduce volumetric irrigation water charges other than in Toshqa 7 14 11 32 
Introduce a tradable groundwater rights scheme for the Western Desert 7 17 10 34 
Introduce groundwater extraction charges 9 20 3 32 
Provide a subsidy for purchase of urban water meters 18 10 4 32 
Provide subsidy for purchase of water-conserving equipment 18 11 1 30 
Reduce the subsidy on fuels used for water pumping 6 13 12 31 
 
B. Water Quality MBIs     
Increase wastewater user charges 15 13 2 30 
Provide Government subsidies for wastewater plant construction 12 16  28 
Reduce tariffs on pollution control equipment 22 9  31 
Increase discharge fees to industry 23 10  33 
Increase sewerage connection fees for households 8 16 6 30 
Improve self monitoring of discharges by industry 20 10 1 31 
Encourage small-scale environmentally acceptable ways of disposing of 
household sewage 
16 12 2 30 
Formalize liability for harm to surface water and groundwater 19 10 2 31 
Introduce new applications of performance bonds 5 23 1 29 
Widen public disclosure of EIA and environmental quality data 20 7 3 30 
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ATTACHMENT 3 
STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ON INSTRUMENTS 
 
Instrument  Comment (Numbers Represent Different Stakeholder) 
A1  1. WUAs issue 
2. Positive if linked to crop evapotranspiration, to motivate switch to more 
valuable crops (best if goes back to system for improvements). 
3. Land tax is already applied, the holders less than 3 feddans are 
exempted, and new lands has a grace period 10 years. 
4. Services to be improved as to convince farmers to share cost. 
5. They pay land tax which is considered including in it part for irrigation 
waters. 
6. OK for funding if can solve the head-tail equity issue.  Will have no 
effect on efficiency or reduction in area. 
7. High priority to improve local infrastructure link to WUA + land tax + 
local development fund accounts legal structure. 
8. Should include technology as criterion for change.  Trip less than gated 
pipes less than furrow. 
9. Farmer’s ability to pay. 
10. It might be very difficult to apply political and /or socially or 
economically. 
11. Based on regions, associations, WB, ect. 
12. To be left to WUAs to apply or water boards and not applicable as it is 
presented. 
13. Leave this to the WUA. 
14. To be combined with other instruments that promotes efficient 
practices (ex. tax reduction, ….etc) 
15. Service before charges. 
16. Left to the WUAs/Water Boards to decide on the appropriate 
instrument for charging for irrigation water. 
 
 
A2  1. Difficult to sell, program has some geographic priorities of its own. 
  2. It will take sometimes for people to touch the benefits and afterwards 
they will ask for it for their lands. 
  3. Information to make it clear to the water users of the benefits. 
 4. The irrigation improvement is needed in the old lands, 90% are 
smallholders own less than 3 feddans (very poor far more). 
5. Not clear what the econ. instruments / incentive being proposed is. 
 6. Need to be careful poor associations are not left out, potential for 
resource capture in a reuse. 
  7. Link with # 1 but includes new lands and crops. 
  8. Method of payment, grace period, repayment period. 
  9. It is presently applied. 
10. Difficult to apply in IIP areas at the moment. 
  
11. It needs first to convince users by the benefits of irrigation improvement. 
 
 
A3 1. Equity averse. 
 2. It could be applicable for mega project as done in Toshka. 
 3. Should be within the Government responsibility for the time being. 
 4. Unfair – negative social & economic Impact. 
 5. Some cost recover, but little impact on volumes used. 
 6. Could be applicable on mega projects, further studies for small farms. 
7. Raises issues of *resource capture* by wealthier persons / WUAs equity can be 
a concern.  Need much study if going to use. 
8. Examine what rates should be charged to fully compensate losers (what risk fee 
should Toshka farms pay to Delta?). 
9. No classes for water delivery. 
10. Negative equity results. 
11. Equity issue. 
12. Applied in mega projects and also study for impacts another users. 
13. They for Toshka…. old lands? 
14. Not practical now. 
15. This has had impact from the social point of view. 
16. Applicable for mega projects but requires for the study on the impacts on the 
other users. 
 
 
A4 1. Keep in mind that firms in industrial cities already pay high water tariffs. 
 Problems are with collection and with translating the revenues to actual 
improved mgt. 
 2. Will be a problem for public sector industry. 
 3. Applicable for large industries with incentives for recycling, better quality 
discharge. 
 4. A recycling and utility low quality water.  
 5. Yes very important but should be combined with incentives for clean tech. 
 6. Considering the policy of GOE towards giving incentives for investors. 
 7. Impact on industry competitiveness. 
 8. Include as charge for discharge monitoring and treatment. 
 9. MBI for quality (link to B4) 
 10.You have to increase tariffs for both supply water & wastewater. 
 11. (But relatively small impact due to low % of water demand) Probably better 
than # 5 though, esp. of metered # 9. 
 12. How it will affect the costs of the final product and prices. 
 13. It is possible now. 
 14. Within overall package of financial & non-financial “incentives”. 
 15. But the quality of wastewater must be controlled and recycling is a must. 
 16. To economically evaluate the reflection on the product cost and the marketing 
process. 
 
  
 
A5 1. Very difficult. 
 2. Sensitive issues but if there were real improvement in service delivery it would 
be double-econ. Stratification. 
 3. Include categories to vary charges. 
 4. Yes the urban demand is low compared with Agr. But the losses are big. 
 5. To enable evaluate its reflection on the poor. 
 6. Without affecting the low-income groups categories. 
 7. Need meters first. 
 8. This will rationalize water usage in additional to treatment costs. 
 9. Meter based or not? Small impact due to low % of water demand, 
potential/equity problems. 
 10. How we control the losses in the water system and assure the right 
consumption. 
 11. Could be increased based on categorized it. 
 12. How does it? It is necessary, but concerns of poor must be addressed.  Look at 
block rate tariffs. 
 13. Study cross-subsidy for rich + poor by geographic areas. 
 14. Make sure you ask for real cost and according to actual consumption. 
 15. If the water meters are provided. 
 16. Based on metering which is not easy. 
 17. Without affecting the low-income groups. 
 18. Could be increased on bases of slices without affecting low-income groups. 
 19. Very difficult will require decades of concerted effort. 
 20. Politically difficult.  Poor metering system another USAID project already 
investigating this.  No need to reinvent the wheel. 
 
 
A6 1. It is possible to study introducing such system in other mega projects like El 
Salam. 
 2. To survey other mega projects similar to Toshka that have rich land 
ownerships. 
 3. Not technically feasible. 
 4. Capacity building is needed. 
 5. For mega projects/large holder agriculture. 
 6. Volumetric charges for individuals are impossible may be it is applicable with 
IMT system and allocation. 
 7. Look at charging on a bigger unit than farms by WUA for example. 
 8. So difficult to be applied. 
 9. Very important “but cost recovery” after improving the system to enable vol. 
meas. 
 10. There are other locations such as El Salam Canal, etc. 
 11. Some areas need further studies. 
 12. The old valley shall be subjected only for big holder (say 5 feddans or more). 
 13. It is very critical and it nictitates careful legalization. 
 14. Very hard and costly to implement. 
  
 15. Also El Salam Canal Project and other new land projects (Nuberia, etc) 
 
 
A7 1. Meanwhile the establish of holding companies is an issue. 
 2. Individually owned wells, group owned wells and governmental well. 
 3. The cost of using G.W. in western desert is costly-such use must be cost 
effective. 
 4. Deserve further study to show whether it is presently valid or not. 
 5. Exists in some areas depends on existence of pumps (not free flow) and 
allocability of rights by owner/controller. 
 6. Have to be very careful to introducing new property rights.  How tradable? Can 
create new barriers to efficiency and new class of wealth with no action. 
 7. Socio-economic studies are needed. 
 8. That have limits on withdrawals, use must be tied to right.  Sell right to private 
company, regulated by government. 
 9. Yes. 
 10. It is not very clear to me. 
 11. Impacts need to be assessed and analyzed, establishment of Holder companies 
for water supply in the Western Desert. 
 12. Can be used but it has serious impacts.  Holding companies established is a 
good example. 
 
 
A8 1.Above lower limit of extraction. 
 2. But we have to consider that there are some areas suffering from water shortage 
in some months. 
 3. For municipal industries. 
 4. Can be studied for industry & urban uses. 
 5. Municipal and Industrial water use. 
 6. No!!! Users pay fees for licensing. However the fees’ should be reused. 
 7. User should pay for benefit gained from a national adaptable asset.  Industry & 
urban need study. 
 8. Most of groundwater systems in need for rehabilitation including deep and 
shallow wells. 
 9. Yes for industry much better than property # 7. 
 10. Provided that the charges not to be the only element, but the life time of the 
project should be considered. 
  
A9 1. To evaluate its economic viability. 
 2. Users pay for meters. 
 3. Best. 
 4. Applicable. 
 5. It is important to be done. 
 6. The further study may focus on the size of urban water meters installed and size 
needed to be installed. 
 7. Study where meters should be household reuses neighborhood. 
 8. Why subsidy? What would that accomplish? 
 9. Purchase is one thing; maintenance is a big constraint. 
 10. Subsidy in reuse of tariff reduction. 
 11. What about the rural areas? 
 12. Important precursor to # 5, though costs may significantly reduce benefits. 
 
 
A10 1. In terms of industry link to modernization & reduction of pollutants discharged.  
# 3 next section. 
 2. Yes. 
 3. The instrument is good. 
 4. Yes by all means. 
 5. Can be applied. 
 6. Or exemption from another tax. 
 7. Revolving funds. 
 8. Same as in 9. 
 9. It is better to exempt the user of these equipment from the proposed irrigation 
charges-this will be more effective and will reduce the burden on the 
government. 
 10. Check the society awareness about the potential of this issue. 
 11. Could we look at tariff differentiation on imports as well? 
 
 
A11 1. Politically difficult, not specific to water sector but relevant to economy at 
large. 
 2. For whole economy. 
 3. How to avoid impact on small farmers. 
 4. Not too much effective. 
 5. It will not help. 
 6. To economically and socially evaluate its reflection. 
 7. Part of the much larger issue of the diesel subsidy. 
 8. It’s difficult though to charge for informal pumping. 
 9. What is the percent of fuel used for water pumping? 
 10. Too complex & tightly linked to other sectors of economy. 
 11. Fuel is not the only input for water pumping (animal power, electricity and 
manual) 
 12. A key idea if economy wide but major political issue needs to be resolved 
 
  
 
B1 1. Don’t know. 
 2. Should be based in a mental costing to encourage reuse recycling should 
differential teletypes of pollutant in water encourage clean each. 
 3. Link to efficiency. 
 4. Make sure they are connected & payoff first. 
 5. Real readings (estimates) according to household size. 
 6. To some extent. 
 7. Focus on large and/or strong industrial discharges. 
 8. Equity. 
 9. The wastewater treatment plants are still beyond any action (40% in urban and 
5%in rural). 
 
 
B2 1. Government already constructs. 
 2. The GOE. are already financing wastewater treatment plants – private sector is 
hardly participating. 
 3.  Yes. 
 4. Very initial. 
 5. Don’t know economics what do we know about BOTs + user charges…. 
 6. Egypt is short of wastewater plants & the GOE budget needs reinforcement. 
 7. Already in practice? 
 8. With supervision to insure meeting standards. 
 9. No private sector participation should be the trend. 
 10. Look at all options to increase construction of new plants.  Needs to keep up 
with need. 
 
 
B3 1. To know how much could be the Government burden. 
 2. In conjunction with low tariff on clean production equipment instead of control 
“scrubbers”. 
 3. To encourage end of pipe control but as important is the reduction 
differentiation of tariffs between clean tech. Polluting tech. 
 4. May send wrong signal with whom trying to reduce tariffs in general?  Could 
we differentiate between imported polluting & non-polluting equipment that 
entails Egypt adopting its own technical guidelines under TBT agreement? 
 5. Should also consider a fund to provide clear tech. Loans. 
 6. See # 10 above. 
 
 
B4 1. Must be couple with access to wastewater plants otherwise fees would 
encourage industry to illegally dump into the Nile. 
 2. 4.B Incentives for recycling (link to A4) 
 3. It is very important but needs a mechanism with enforcement. 
 4. Needs mass-based-monitoring to fractions? 
 5. Enforcement? 
  
 6. According to the composition of its wastes. 
 7. Link to modernization programs to reduce pollutant discharges & water needs. 
 
 
B5 1. Will not encourage consolation, only a revenue generation tool for GOE. 
 2. Consideration for the low-income group. 
 3. What’s the difference from # B1? 
 4. Not existing now? 
 5. Not a flat fee.  It should be based on real consumption/discharge. 
 6. How many are now connected?  Need to assess none water based waste 
disposal setlines. 
 7. Based on what?  Consumption? 
 8. As in the case on increasing water tariffs, will take a long time.  
 9. Another USAID project already made headways in investigating this.  No need 
to reinvent the wheel. 
 10. To know whether it is within the poor capabilities. 
 
 
B6 1. Accuracy? Disclosure? 
 2. Industry is a responsible “citizen” 
3. How to monitor and assure improvement in quality of discharges. 
4. Awareness first. 
5. Should be taken seriously right away. 
6. High priority, use other donor industry support projects for implementation. 
7. Must link to improvement.  Not clear what this is? 
8. Concepts of clear production need to be highlighted & self-monitoring is 
important to track savings in resources. 
 
 
B7 1..Specifically applicable to poorer rural districts.  Highly desirable because 
households are paying informally but, in an unsustainable way. 
 2. Not practical. 
 3. The only solution especially in the rural areas. 
 4. For rural areas, encouragement. 
 5. Difficult to apply  & can create confusion. 
 6. In areas that cannot be served by centralized treatment. 
 7. Should be started because the problem is growing up. 
 8. Yes, especially in rural areas. 
  9. See #5 above. 
 
 
B8 1. Weak enforcement limits usefulness. 
 2. Of vital importance. 
 3. Need to determine implementation mechanism. 
 4. Enforcement? 
 5. Legal analysis for existing liability rules would be useful. 
  
 6. But should be coupled with alternative ways disposal methods + a lot of 
awareness. 
 7. WUA’s & Boards Juditual system. 
 
B9 1. No significant/viable options were proposed through. 
 2.??? For water?? 
 3. Update existing laws to make them score significant & streamline GOE Admin. 
Process. 
 4. Not easy to be introduced ever for irrigation. 
 5. Attitudes. 
 
B10 1. Involve NGO community + Ministry of Health need legitimate political 
pressure. 
 2. It will help awareness of public of the problem. 
 3. Well designed database. 
 4. Critical. 
 5. Law 4/1994 specifies the implementation of EIA for any project in the planning 
stage. 
 6. Part of a much broader awareness program on water. 
 7. Definitely. 
 8. Though I would not consider it an MBI and it seems to be politically 
unacceptable in Egypt. 
 9. The public needs to understand its rights and obligations in terms of 
environmental conservation. 
 
Any Other Comments 
 
1. They need to understand the importance of scarce resources. 
 We need to raise awareness and to raise the interest of the people in the country. 
 The “need to know” should be developed so that the data disseminated can be 
ultimately used. 
2. Discussion of water quality instruments was too academic – did not get enough 
into pros (screening criteria) on specific instruments. 
3. Information is a powerful tool.  Government is gradually getting used to providing 
different types of useful information. 
4. Incentive for recycling water.  Look at combinations of C-C & MBIs. 
5. Thanks. 
6. MBI for encouraging introducing new technology in irrigation system may tax 
exemption on modern equipment. 
7. It is important to link the use of new technologies with tax or subsidy to allow 
more water use efficiency. 
8. Distinguish between fees for O & M on investment and charges or other 
incentives (disincentives to change behaviors.  The presentation was lumping a 
bench of distinctive tools into one basket. 
9. People (users) shall pay for water use or consumption.  But small holders (less 
than 2 feddans) might be exempted for the time being. 
  
10. Make sure that the report use agreed upon text. 
 
 
 
 
 
